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This thesis explores how processes of inclusion and exclusion are mediated
by devices of oversight. It analyses the role of registration and statistics
in the formation of a German state collective from the emancipation of the
Prussian Jews to the deportations in the 1940s. The focus of the thesis is on
the role of registration and statistics in the identification and localisation of
German Jews prior to the deportations in the 1940s. It argues that National
Socialists policy regarding concepts of state-membership and the devices of
oversight accelerated long-lasting trends in German nation-building.
While the fact that the census 1939 inquired Jewish ancestry is a well
known fact in historiography its significance for the identification of individ-
ual Jews in the context of the Shoah has been disputed. The thesis argues
that a population register introduced in 1939 – the People’s Card Index
(Volkskartei) – was essential in the identification of German Jews. Consult-
ing new sources it shows that the collation of the census data on ancestry
with the Volkskartei was ordered in March 1941 to facilitate the identifi-
cation and localisation of German Jews in the context of the deportations.
Unlike previous research on the issue the long-term approach and the unique
vantage point reveal that until 1938 the National-Socialist measures in reg-
istration and statistics are a continuation of developments initiated in the
Weimar Republic. National-Socialists were unprepared for the implementa-
tion of nationwide antisemitic measures. The efforts eventually taken evolved
from internal power struggles and the desire to accumulate the required data
before Germany entered the war.
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People from Paper
In 1934 administrative lawyer Friedrich August Knost at the Reichsstelle für Sippen-
forschung (Reich Kinship Oce) intended to monitor the racial composition of the
German population. In order to implement the National Socialist racial policy Knost
planned the creation of the rst register that was to represent das ganze deutsche Volk
 und bald nicht nur das lebende sondern wirklich de[n] ganze[n] Volkskörper. Apart
from providing a vessel to imagine the Volkskörper, the notion of an index comprising
the entire population also provides a powerful image of total control in which the Na-
tional Socialist claim of unrestrained access to the individual materialised. The registrars
maintaining such a device would have the entire population at their command, Knost
pictured:
Man könnte in 2 Stunden daran vorbeigehen, während das wirkliche Volk,
wenn es in Viererkolonnen marschiert, dazu 8 Monate brauchte.1
Yet, despite these early considerations, Knost's register was never realised. It took ve
more years until in 1939 the National Socialist Ministry of the Interior established a
comparable device: the Volkskartei (People's Card Index), a card index that registered
every German on an individual card.
Today, the card index is a device of the past. Still, forms of registration are ubiquitous.
We register not only with government agencies but with a party, a club, services on the
internet, the library or the gym. Registration appears to be an essential yet banal
practice of social organisation. It produces a reference between an entry in a database
and a person. In order to manage the rights and obligations of the registrant and the
organisation the reference allows identication and localisation of the person represented
by listing relevant features of the registrant. Similarly, the evaluation of these features
for personal targeting as well as for statistical analysis are all too familiar to us.
1. Friedrich A. Knost, `Staatsbürgerlisten, Familienregister, Reichssippenkartei. Der Weg vom
Standesamt zum Sippenamt', Zeitschrift für Standesamtswesen. Personenstandsrecht, Ehe- u. Kind-
schaftsrecht, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (STAZ) (Frankfurt am Main), 1934, 324331, 329.
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Census and registration are the devices of oversight established by modern states
over the 19th century to facilitate basic institutions such as taxation and conscription.
Changes in the social fabric in the wake of the establishment of the market economy,
in particular the increased mobility of the population, required institutions capable of
replacing the control mechanisms of the feudal state. Hence, local authorities developed
techniques and devices to accumulate, store and access knowledge on the population.
Whereas registration documents the individual, the data which is aggregated is used
to collate statistical representations of the population as a whole.2 Registration forms
the backbone of a new relationship between the state and its members. The statistical
mode on the other hand fostered the creation of modern state collectives during the
formation of a system of nation states. Conversely, registration allows the denition of
the margins of state membership by identifying those to whom access to state institutions
is denied. The history of these devices of oversight in Germany is deeply entwined with
the reweaving of the social fabric that accompanied the creation of the nation state
during the 19th century. It is as much a technical as it is a social history.
In this thesis I will analyse these factors of registration and processes of inclusion and
exclusion by exploring how changes in concepts of state membership in Germany reected
in the devices of oversight. The focus of this thesis clearly is on the role of these devices
during National Socialist rule. However, impeded by such focus, historiography has
hitherto tended to overemphasise the technical novelty of the Nazi registration system.
In order to dierentiate genuine National Socialist measures from general trends in the
development of the devices of oversight this thesis traces the relevant moments for the
development during the Nazi rule back into the previous century. In this regard, the
narrative structure runs the risk of most technically oriented studies as it implicitly
conveys a deterministic notion. Yet, instead of constructing a historical necessity, the
historical contextualisation will facilitate an assessment of the role of National Socialist
politics in the establishment of Germany's registration system.
The periodisation of the thesis is determined by three historical movements that start
in the early 19th century and come to a preliminary close in the 1940s. These histor-
ical dynamics emanate from the changes introduced when the Ancient Regimes were
under pressure from the disruption brought about by the French revolution and occu-
pation. They merge again in the 1930s with the National-Socialist attempt to produce
a homogeneous Volksgemeinschaft.
2. Cf. James C. Scott, John Tehranian and Jeremy Mathias, `The Production of Legal Identities
Proper to States: the case of the permanent family surname', Comparative Studies in Society and
History (The Hague) 44, no. 1 (January 2002): 444, 10.
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The basal strand of this thesis traces the technical development of modern registration
and census investigations. On a material level the documents produced in this process 
that evolve from entries for entire households in books or lists to individual index cards
 embody both the gradual atomisation of the modern individual that is at the core
of the process of emancipation and the formation of a direct relationship between the
state and its subjects. Beginning with the shared origins in registration it follows their
dierentiation into separate institutions with specic methods and concludes with the
eventual fusion of these methods in the Volkskartei  a comprehensive yet dynamic card
index of the German population.
This process was complemented by the concomitant reintegration of the increasingly
atomised individuals into modern state collectives. The second thread of this thesis thus
recapitulates the development of concepts of state membership in Germany. From the
initial introduction of the concept of `citizenship' on the occasion of the emancipation of
Prussia's Jews it traces the development to more exclusive concepts of state membership:
the `Nation', the `Volk ' and the `Volksgemeinschaft '.
Finally, the main thread of the thesis focuses on the margins of state membership
as it recognises its dialectic character that simultaneously denes criteria both for in-
and exclusion and thereby allows members and non-members to be distinguished. My
main concern is therefore the analysis of the status of Germany's Jews in population
registers and statistics from the emancipation to `emancipation revoked'  from the
inclusion in the state collective to the role these devices had in the exclusion from the
Volksgemeinschaft by deportation and often murder under National Socialist rule.
The thesis is divided in two parts. The rst two chapters organise the existing his-
toriography on the separate topics in a chronological manner and seek to elucidate the
general concepts and the historical development. The remaining chapters thoroughly
explore the role of the devices of oversight under National Socialist rule in the creation
and establishment of a new form of state membership, the `Volksgemeinschaft '.
The rst chapter `Governing citizenship' covers the period from 1812 to the outbreak
of the First World War. It exposes the conceptual relations of emancipation and regis-
tration, the technical development of registration, the onset of standardisation amongst
the German states and the genesis of an increasingly ethno-cultural understanding of
state membership. The Prussian registration system has been understood as paradig-
matic by historians and National Socialists. I will therefore focus on Prussia in the rst
chapter. With the exception of Holger Mühlbauer's 1994 dissertation, research on the
long-term development of the German registration system is sparse.3 To reconstruct
3. Mühlbauer covers a wider time span and focuses on the development of legal framework and regu-
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and analyse the practical implementation of registration I refer to the manuals for the
registrars and similar contemporary sources. Over the rst chapter I will embed the
technical development into the political context.
The chapter `The `Volk ' contested' takes a closer look at Germany's census of Jew-
ish soldiers during the Great War from the vantage point of registration and census
investigations. In a second part I will analyse hitherto unconsidered sources on Wei-
mar's attempts to align registration systems on a national level in 1928. The results of
these eorts largely informed the registration system introduced in 1937, however the
obstacles to the reform resurfaced in the 1940s.
With the third chapter `A racial state' the thesis reaches its very core. It explores
the various competing and imperfect attempts to monitor and alter the `racial com-
position' of the German population. Leaning on existing research that focused isolated
initiatives the chapter confronts the competing eorts to show that, besides the institu-
tional and technical diculties experienced, National Socialists were ill-prepared for the
implementation of their key ideologeme.
The Nuremberg Laws at the end of 1935 that provided the rst clear-cut denition of
`race' mark an incision. Over the course of the study I will show that in 1936 the Ministry
of the Interior engaged in a consistent initiative to accumulate the data required to
identify Jews according to the denition agreed upon in Nuremberg. The fourth chapter
`Unied registration system' will then analyse the establishment of a rst nationwide
registration system in 1937, the genesis of which dates back to the Weimar era. This
system provided the framework in which the later eorts to identify German Jews were
integrated. It is a well known fact that the 1939 census asked all Germans about Jewish
ancestors in the grandparents' generation. The further utilisation of the data however
is disputed.
The Volkskartei introduced in 1939 was intended to represent every German citizen
and provide ample information including the `racial descent'. While neither the census
nor the index alone suced to identify and localise Jews in Germany, I will argue that
the Volkskartei was essential in identifying and locating German Jews prior to the de-
portations. The crucial step overlooked by prior research was the collation of the census
data on descent and the Volkskartei in early 1942 when the deportation of Germany's
Jews had just been decided upon. This process will be explored in detail in the sub-
lations. Holger Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen und Datenschutz in der DDR: historischer Rückblick;
Studie im Rahmen der Forschungsarbeit `Kontinuität und Brüche in der Entwicklung des Einwohnermel-
dewesens - dargestellt am Beispiel Berlins'; juristische und verwaltungsinformatorische Untersuchung
(Berlin: Techn. Univ. Berlin, 1992).
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sequent chapters `The Volkskartei ' and `Volkskartei and deportations' that thoroughly
analyse the genesis, implementation and the collation with the census data of the most
ambitious device for monitoring the population  the Volkskartei. The ultimate decom-
missioning of the index in 1943  which coincided with the last deportations of Jews and
`Gypsys'  marks the endpoint of this study.
Several aspects, in particular the details of the 1939 census, which included questions
on `racial descent', have been addressed in historiography before. In 1961 Raul Hilberg
made a passing reference to the signicance of the census for the numeric identication
of Jews as dened by the National Socialists.4 So did Hans Günther Adler in 1974.5
In 1983 Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth published the most inuential study on re-
gistration and statistics during the Nazi rule.6 They suggest that the Nazis followed
a coherent plan to tighten the grip on the population in general and identify Jews via
the census. According to their ndings, the census results on descent were immediately
compiled into a card index of Germany's Jews that facilitated the deportations.
Despite its persisting inuence Aly and Roth's study did not remain uncontested. In
2001 Jutta Wietog rebutted their claim. Wietog argued that the Statistical Oce with-
held the data and that, instead, the data required for the deportations was aggregated
elsewhere. Aly and Roth as well as Wietog fail to acknowledge the crucial importance
of the registration system for the deportation of Germany's Jews. Apart from that, the
limitation of Aly and Roth on the twelve years of Nazi rule also prevented them from
dierentiating specic National Socialist measures from those merely inherited from the
previous administration. I will instead argue that the early measures introduced by the
Nazis were a continuation of Weimar eorts. Only with the Volkskartei did registration
take on a specic National Socialist form.
But what is more, the limitation aects their assessment with regard to the link of
modern administration and National Socialism, not least because they uncritically accept
the bureaucrats' claimed achievements without analysing the actual implementation as
Adam Tooze pointed out.7 The thorough analysis of formerly unconsidered sources on
the test-run of the Volkskartei in the Potsdam district will for the rst time allow an
4. Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden; 3: Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden
Bd. 1-3 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1990), 443.
5. Hans Günther Adler, Der verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1974), 281.
6. Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth, Die restlose Erfassung. Volkszählen, Identizieren, Aussondern
im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2000).
7. J. Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German State: 1900 - 1945: the making of modern economic
knowledge, Cambridge studies in modern economic history 9 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), 36-39.
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assessment of the pervasion of the measures both in smaller cities and rural areas.
Beyond clarifying the historical details in registration the results of the study have
wider implications for the assessment of the National Socialist era and its relation to the
previous development. With regard to the production of the Volksgemeinschaft since
the turn of the century research has highlighted the performative and participatory
aspects.8 The vantage point of my study will once again focus on the administrative
prerequisites for these acts, maintaining the importance of documents in the process.
I will eventually argue that only the collation of the census data with the registration
system and the Volkskartei in particular allowed the implementation of the negative
logic of the Nuremberg Laws that produced the Volksgemeinschaft by exclusion.
8. Michael Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung. Gewalt gegen Juden in der deutschen
Provinz 1919 bis 1939 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2007).
1 Governing citizenship
The political changes brought about by the French Revolution exerted pressure on the
Ancient Regimes to modernise. This pressure aected the subject of this study in partic-
ular, as it helped introduce `citizenship' as a new form of state membership in Germany.
In this chapter I will trace the establishment of new concepts of state membership
in Prussia and the concomitant establishment of registration and statistics during the
period from 1812 to 1913.
The state's `desire' to acquire data on its population has been conceptualised by James
Scott who coined the term `legibility' to describe the state's eorts to structure data on
its population and territory.1 In order to produce a clear display of the data, Scott
argues, the administration has to reduce and standardise information. This prerequisite
for high-modernist schemes like land consolidation, taxation or conscription results in
neglect of other qualities which are the reason why such schemes tend to fail.
John Torpey rened Scott's approach introducing the term `embrace' to underline
aspects of legibility present in the German term `erfassen'.2 Its plethora of connotations
range from the idea of complete immersion to that of a rigid grip. Even the creators of
the Volkskartei  advocators of `totale Erfassung'  felt unease with the terminology:
Die Ausdrücke `erfassen' und gar `Erfassung' sind gewiÿ nicht schön. Aber
bis jetzt hat noch niemand ein besseres Wort dafür gefunden.3
Torpey intended the concept of `embrace' to highlight the inclusive as well as the ex-
clusive aspects of state membership. In a world of nation states, he argued, individuals
are increasingly understood as bearers of mutually exclusive nationality, which facilit-
ates the states' eorts to monopolize the legitimate means of movement.4 Both terms
1. James C. Scott, Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have
failed, Yale agrarian studies (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1998).
2. John Torpey, The invention of the passport: surveillance, citizenship and the state, Cambridge
studies in law and society (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000).
3. Erich Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei, 1.-3., ed. Artur Kääb (München, Berlin: Jehle,
1939), 48.
4. Torpey, The invention of the passport, 12.
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evoke strong imagery and present a shortcut to understanding. These metaphors have
been quite productive and informed a number of researchers I am relying on during my
own research.
I do not completely agree with Scott's analysis. A point limiting Scott's argument, has
been put forward in the context of philosophy of language. Given that categorisation is
rst and foremost a speech act it is valid for our purposes too. Leaning on Wittgenstein
I want to emphasise that the devices of oversight are utilised to produce a clear display
of certain aspects considered relevant: eine Ordnung zu einem bestimmten Zweck.5
Notwithstanding the inherent violence in classication that is shown in its exclusive
aspect, the concept draws our attention to the purpose of a particular order rather
than to the means of its production. Likewise my concern is to locate the technical
development of registration and statistics in the political framework and analyse their
respective interrelation to evolving concepts of state membership.
Forms of statistics and registration existed before the modern state. However, the
year 1812 is marked by two events that present an incision in elds that were otherwise
subject to slow change. Berlin introduced a rst central registration oce that intended
to register the entire population of the city, and in the course of the emancipation of
Prussia's Jews the concept of citizenship was rst introduced in Prussian law. I will
analyse the connection of emancipation and registration before elucidating the relation
of increased mobility and the 1840s change from ius soli to ius sanguinis in citizenship
law in the chapter `Concept of `Staatsbürger ''. This change marks a rst turn towards
closure in the concept of state membership and was accompanied by the introduction of
minority censuses. The process of German unication and its impact on statistics and
registration will be subject of `Belonging to the Reich'.
1.1 Subject and Citizen
The development of the emancipation in Prussia in particular of Jews in 1812 has been
described in detail elsewhere, and no additional summary of events is called for. Yet,
reconsidered under the aspect of `legibility' or the introduction of devices of oversight,
the years 1812-1813 form a focal point in the transition of Prussian statehood considering
the relation of state and citizen and its concomitant production of documents.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Tagebücher 1914 - 1916. Philosophische Un-
tersuchungen., Werkausgabe Ludwig Wittgenstein 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), PU, 132.
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For Prussia the emancipation of Jews marks the beginning transition for all Prussians
from subject to citizen, from a direct, personal relationship to an abstract one mediated
by documents.6
The Prussian Setting
Napoleon's troops had brought a vivid impression of the eciency and superiority of a
modern state and its conscription army to Prussia, triggering a development that would
considerably outlast the occupation. The French rule introduced equal civil rights and
inspired democrats  to the Ancien Regime it brought the tools of modern bureaucracy.
The French inuence was both setting precedents and mobilising repulsion. While resist-
ance to the French forces acted as a catalyst for the early German national movement,
it also prolonged the Ancien regime's life by incorporating nationalist opposition in
rank and le of the liberation army. Yet, the rupture of the French rule conrmed the
need for reform of the marginalised Prussian state in order to restore the status quo
ante.7 Hence, the Stein-Hardenberg reforms attempted to muster dormant resources for
a Prussian liberation while leaving the feudal system by and large untouched. The re-
forms were preceded by the emancipation of serfs, the introduction of economic freedom
and freedom of movement in 1807 and culminated in the establishment of a Prussian
conscription army in 1813 on the brink of the Battle of Leipzig.8 In 1808, the muni-
cipal ordinance (Städtereform) established self-governance of the municipalities and put
them in charge of the police. This had a long-lasting eect as it prevented the central
government from directly regulating the police.
By decentralising administration and the introduction of census surage, the reform
allowed for some  albeit limited  citizen participation in which the elected parliaments
had only an advisory function.9 In a complementary manner, the newly established
authorities had to develop a new relationship with their subjects. The newly granted
freedom of movement entailed the administration's need to replace the control over the
6. Cf. Oliver Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945 (Göttingen: Vand-
enhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 25 and Scott, Tehranian and Mathias, `Legal Identities Proper to States',
16.
7. Cf. Walter Grab, Der deutsche Weg der Judenemanzipation: 1789 - 1938 (München: Piper, 1991),
17.
8. Cf. Heinz Stübig, `Die Wehrpicht', chap. Die Wehrverfassung Preussens in der Reformzeit, ed.
Roland G. Foerster (München: Oldenbourg, 1994), 3953, 46.
9. Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, Preuÿen zwischen Reform und Revolution: allgemeines Landrecht, Ver-
waltung und soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848, Industrielle Welt 7 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1975), 169;
Eli Nathans, The politics of citizenship in Germany: ethnicity, utility and nationalism (Oxford: Berg,
2004), 39.
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population, which the dissolving feudal system had ensured via personal bonds by trans-
ferring it into corporate knowledge. Scott has described this as a direct, unmediated
relationship to the citizen.10 However, this `unmediated relationship' had to rst be
produced. Registration is thus the administrative counterpart to the freedom of move-
ment and substitute to the knowledge these intermediaries had about their subjects. The
new relationship between state and citizen is largely embodied in the forms and docu-
ments that are the prerequisites for state activities where (in principle) interchangeable
ocials had replaced the personal bond. Essential state activities such as taxation and
conscription also relied on clear identication of individuals.11
Registration and emancipation
In the feudal state life data  typically birth, marriage and death  was, if at all,
recorded by the religious bodies. With the development of modern administration, the
documentation was gradually transferred to state institutions.
Registration is a phenomenon of an unwieldy urban society and hence was only re-
luctantly introduced in rural areas but established early on in cities where even the
locals are foreigners.12 Accordingly, the step in registration from foreigner's control to
citizen control in Prussia was rst taken by Berlin. Scott emphasised that these projects
tend to spread from centre to periphery.13 Over the course of the following chapters,
we will see that devices of oversight also tend to be introduced to control marginalised
groups before being adapted for the entire population.When French troops took Berlin
in 1806, the new administration abolished corporative dierences and taxed all inhab-
itants according to their income. To facilitate taxation and quartering, a rst central
registration of citizens was introduced in 1807. On a daily basis the local police stations
(Polizei-Commissarien) had to report newly registered citizens to the Hauptkontrolle al-
ler Einwohner which formed a rst central register of Berlin's entire population. Whilst
the register was introduced to facilitate administrative requirements of the French, Berlin
Police were well aware that registration would also serve as means to control the inux of
the mobile poor, who in the course of the formation of a labour market and the resulting
increased mobility began to form a new threat to `public order'.14 In acknowledgement of
the benets of centralised registration the police department insisted on the adaption of
10. Scott, Tehranian and Mathias, `Legal Identities Proper to States', 16.
11. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1996), 35.
12. Cf. Walter Siebel, Die Kultur der Stadt (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015), 286.
13. Cf. Scott, Seeing like a state, 42.
14. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 32-33.
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a similar device after the French had left. In December 1812 the `Wohnungs-Melde-Amt'
was established, staed with seven ocials to register all of Berlin's inhabitants.15
The Wohnungs-Melde-Amt of 1812 maintained data on Berlin's inhabitants in two
separate registers, consisting of single sheets of paper for each entry, stored in card-
board boxes.16 An entry was made for each head of a family adhering to a patrilineal
concept, so that women and children appeared on their husband's or their father's sheet.
One register organised inhabitants alphabetically by patronyms, the other one spatially.
It listed inhabitants according to streets and houses. The registers linked names and
addresses  assuming everybody had a xed name and habitation  and thus the alpha-
betical register enabled the localisation of a person known by name or the belonging
of a person to be documented and proven. The spatially organised register allowed au-
thorities to connect localities to their inhabitants. Authorities could use the registers
to address individuals by name or as inhabitants of a specic location. Though the
oce initially operated without legal basis for the rst time Prussian administration
had made the shift from alien control to citizen control, albeit limited to Berlin.17 In
1837 the Prussian Ministry of the Interior made an initial but fruitless eort to estab-
lish similar standards of registration in Prussia in order die Ungleichförmigkeit [. . . ]
der Vorschriften [. . . ] zu polizeil. An- und Abmeldungen [. . . ] zu entfernen. In ac-
cordance with Berlin's regulations, landlords and lessors were obliged to register their
tenants. Failure to comply would be penalised either by a ne or 24 hours imprison-
ment. The regulations were to be implemented sowohl auf dem platten Lande, als in
den Städten.18 In Berlin the regulations of January 1813 obliged:
 the landlord to register a tenant on the day of moving in, whereas the latter had
to register his family and sta. Husbands had to report marriages and the birth
of children.
 deaths also had to be reported either by the head of family or the landlord.
 foreigners had to register at the Polizei-Fremden-Bureau if their stay in Berlin
exceeded 24 hours.19
15. Ferdinand Meyer, `Zum Jubiläum des Berliner Einwohner-Melde-Amtes', `Der Bär: illustrierte
Wochenschrift für vaterländische Geschichte.' (Berlin), no. 35 (1886): 428430, 429.
16. H. Dennestedt and W. von Wolsburg, Preussisches Polizei-Lexikon, vol. 1 (Berlin: Moeser, 1855),
773.
17. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 33-34.
18. H. Dennestedt and W. von Wolsburg, Preussisches Polizei-Lexikon, vol. 4 (Berlin: Moeser, 1855),
150-151.
19. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 34.
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Though the regulations were simple, the short time span of a single day made it hard
for the unaccustomed public to comply. In the subsequent years central registration
failed to be as ecient as envisioned so that registers were usually not current.20 In
1830 central registration was even suspended, only to be reintroduced six years later
with additional sta and from now on under the designation of Einwohner-Meldeamt.21
Statistics evolved from the inherent logic of the data maintained by the registration
oces representing the population as uniform sheets of paper in alphabetical order.
Germany's rst statistical oce was founded in 1805. However, it had no inuence on
data collection and relied on gures provided by the provincial administrations. Hence
statistics were initially a delineate function of registration. Nevertheless, statisticians
understood the value of registration and used it to ask additional questions. Even though
Prussia was not a nation state and consequently had not developed a concept of `national
minorities', in the 1820s registration sheets in particular in East Prussia began asking a
question about the spoken language in order to identify Polish-speaking Prussians.22
In order to register, sort and count the population, individuals had to be identiable.
The prerequisite for all these state activities is therefore the identication of a person
by name, meaning that all inhabitants had to adhere to similar name patterns. Again
Prussia would follow the French precedent.23 As Gérard Noiriel has pointed out, the
establishment of xity of names was essential in the citoyen's production. Revolu-
tionary France had granted civil status to all citizens but since only Catholics were
registered before 1792, documentation was confronted with obstacles relating to Prot-
estant and Jewish French. In some regions Jews did not practice the patronymic naming
system. Hence French Jews were obliged to adapt names coherent with the system prac-
tised by their non-Jewish compatriots and declare their civil status to the administration
to be eventually registered in a special register.24 That Jews were registered separately
and the decree was accompanied by restrictions on usury and petty trade  a striking
resemblance to charges also brought up against `Gypsies'  sheds light on the fragility of
20. Meyer, `Zum Jubiläum des E.-M.-A.', 429.
21. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 37.
22. Cf. Morgane Labbé, `Institutionalizing the Statistics of Nationality in Prussia in the 19th Century:
from local bureaucracy to state-level census of population', Centaurus 49, no. 4 (2007): 289306, 290-
291.
23. Jane Caplan, `Documenting individual identity: the development of state practices in the modern
world', chap. `This or That Particular Person': Protocols of Identication Nineteenth-Century Europe,
ed. Jane Caplan (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2001), 4966, 60.
24. Cf. Gérard Noiriel, `Documenting individual identity: the development of state practices in the
modern world', chap. The Identication of the Citizen: The Birth of Republican Civil Status in France,
ed. Jane Caplan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2001), 2848, 36.
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emancipation and the narrowness of the universal human rights in France.25 The `nor-
malisation' of the status of Jews was, however, an exceptional issue not only in France
but in every European country and  as Katz pointed out  in particular in the German
lands.26
During the occupation French legislation was extended to North-Western Germany
and a large number of German Jews had [. . . ] been given a taste of full civic rights.27
Hence in course of the general liberalisation of Prussia the reformers granted civic rights
to the Jewish population exemplifying the new relationship the modernised Prussian
state intended to form with its entire citizenry. In order to make individuals identiable
by name, the adaption of the patronymic name system was prerequisite for the access
to (partial) civic rights.28 In 1833 all Jews in Prussia  including foreigners without
prospect of naturalisation  had to adopt a surname.29 Further regulations in 1816,
not limited to Jews, forbade the use of other people's names. In 1822 changing your
name without the authorities' permission was proscribed. Both measures show how the
patronymic system and the xity of names in particular were not fully established
amongst non-Jewish Prussians either.30
To enjoy the benets of the edict, the heads of Jewish families had to register them-
selves and their dependants at the local police oce by 24th September 1812, making
them responsible for the implementation of the edict.31 As their identities were previ-
ously unknown to the authorities, this was the only feasible procedure. Notably, this
is an aspect of registration that will remain the main obstacle to producing a seamless
25. Cf. Werner E. Mosse, `Paths of emancipation: Jews, states, and citizenship', chap. From
`Schutzjuden' to `Deutsche Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens': The Long and Bumpy Road of Jew-
ish Emancipation in Germany, ed. Pierre Birnbaum (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 5993,
68.
26. Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto: the social background of Jewish emancipation, 1770 - 1870 (Cam-
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press., 1973), 7.
27. Cf. Mosse, `Paths of emancipation', 68.
28. Dietz Bering, `Das Emanzipationsedikt von 1812 in Preuÿen: der lange Weg der Juden zu `Ein-
ländern' und `preuÿischen Staatsbürgern'', chap. Namenannahme: nur scheinbar unproblematische Para-
grafen im preussischen Emanzipationsedikt, ed. Wissenschaftliche Tagung2012.03.11 Potsdam Diek-
mann Irene A., Europäisch-jüdische Studien 15 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 201218, 208 and Michaª
Szulc, `Das Emanzipationsedikt von 1812 in Preuÿen: der lange Weg der Juden zu `Einländern' und
`preuÿischen Staatsbürgern'', chap. Jüdische Staatsbürger in der bürokratischen Alltagspraxis, ed. Wis-
senschaftliche Tagung 2012.03.11 Potsdam Diekmann Irene A., Europäisch-jüdische Studien 15 (Berlin:
de Gruyter, 2013), 167198. 173.
29. Scott, Tehranian and Mathias, `Legal Identities Proper to States', 17.
30. Caplan, `̀This or That, 60.
31. Cf. Michaª Szulc, `A Gracious Act or Merely a Regulation of Economic Activity? A Daily Life
Perspective on the Reception of the Prussian Emancipation Edict of 1812', The Leo Baeck Institute
Year Book (Oxford) 59, no. 1 (2014): 2336, 27.
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oversight over the population. All registration measures hinge on the public's compli-
ance. Only after the individual's initiative could the local administration proceed to
compile lists of those applying for citizenship and send these to the governments who
would  like in France  enter the information into the General-Juden-Verzeichnisse.
These registers were used to send certicates of citizenship to the applicants.32 The
prerequisite for the application was Prussian residency; citizenship was therefore based
on the principle of residence or ius soli.33
In contrast to the earlier attempts to equalise the status of Jews brought forward
by Jewish representatives Jacob Moses and Daniel Itzig in 1789, the edict of 1812 was
initiated from within the Prussian bureaucracy.34 Prussian Minister von Schroetter  in
charge of the 1808 Städtereform and no friend of Jews  directly linked the emancipa-
tion of Jews to the establishment of conscription, thereby hoping to achieve both the
limitation of the inux of Jews from neighbouring countries that had previously intro-
duced conscription and the expansion of Prussia's pool of soldiers.35 Scott places the
establishment of xed names and patronyms in general in the context of conscription.36
In the long term Schroetter expected an educational eect of conscription turning Jews
away from usury and into useful citizens.37 The edict yielded the intended results as it
ensured Jewish Prussian loyalties and mobilised Jewish participants for the war  both
conscripts and volunteers. Although the exact numbers of Jewish participants during
the war of liberation could never be established, even Treitschke had to acknowledge
the Jewish contribution to the liberation.38 With the Edict of 1812 Jews were free to
choose residence and occupation, apart from state posts, special taxes were revoked and
the privileges of jurisdiction and exemption from military service abolished.39 But not
32. Cf. Szulc, `Jüdische Staatsbürger. . . ', 172-173.
33. Cf. Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945, 30.
34. Cf.Marion Schulte, `Das Emanzipationsedikt von 1812 in Preuÿen: der lange Weg der Juden zu
`Einländern' und `preuÿischen Staatsbürgern'', chap. Zu den Reformdiskussionen innerhalb der preuÿis-
chen Ministerialbürokratie, ed. Irene A. Diekmann, Europäisch-jüdische Studien 15 (Berlin: de Gruyter,
2013), 103123, 103.
35. Schulte, 114.
36. Scott, Tehranian and Mathias, `Legal Identities Proper to States', 15.
37. Horst Fischer, Judentum, Staat und Heer in Preussen im frühen 19. Jahrhundert: zur Geschichte
der staatlichen Judenpolitik, 1st ed., Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo-Baeck-
Institute of Jews from Germany 20 (Tübingen: Selbstverlag, 1968), 21.
38. Cf. Fischer, 40-44; and Julius H. Schoeps, `Das Emanzipationsedikt von 1812 in Preuÿen: der lange
Weg der Juden zu `Einländern' und `preuÿischen Staatsbürgern'', chap. Von der Untertanenloyalität zum
Bürgerpatriotismus: Preussen, die Juden und die Anfänge des Identikationsprozesses zu Beginn des
19. Jahrhunderts, ed. Irene A. Diekmann, Europäisch-jüdische Studien 15 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013),
619, 13.
39. Cf. Katz, Out of the Ghetto, 170.
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all of the Jews in Prussia would benet from the improvements since the scope of the
edict was limited to the Prussian territories of 1812. Furthermore, though the promise
of equal civic rights had encouraged reformers within the Jewish community to promote
an understanding of `Judaism' as a religion rather than as an ethno-cultural nation, it
was not acknowledged as an ocial religion.40 Jews were granted civic rights, not as
Jews but as citizens only. Even after the 1815 promise of Frederick William III, all
volunteers would be endowed with state jobs after the war, Jewish volunteers were still
denied access, so that positive freedoms were established in the economy only.41 It is
therefore fair to conclude, as Paul Rieger did on the occasion of its centennial, that the
edict was
nicht zugunsten der Juden, sondern im Interesse des preuÿischen Staates
erlassen worden. [. . . ] Nur die Entfesselung aller in Preuÿen ungenutzt
ruhenden wirtschaftlichen und geistigen Kräfte konnte dem Staate die Ener-
gie zum Aufschwung nach so tiefem Sturze vermitteln.42
This development echoes the theoretical approach of the early reformer Moses Mendel-
son, who was [c]onating the notion of citizenship with the capacity to act as free
independent consumers and producers.43 This conation of citizenship and the free
market led many Jews to believe, that registration for citizenship did not matter. Some
believed that being poor and without business they did not have to register since they
saw no benets and had to pay a fee. Others  like the son of Mendelson  had spent
time abroad and thus failed to register and he only made up for it in 1816.44 Com-
parable cases can be found well into the forties.45 A noteworthy eect caused by the
fact the aected had to implement emancipation by registering themselves occurred in
the Itzig family in which several members, despite their earlier eorts towards Jewish
emancipation, failed to register as they already felt thoroughly integrated.46 The civic
40. Cf. Leora Batnitzky, How Judaism Became A Religion: an Introduction to modern Jewish thought
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 29 and Katz, Out of the Ghetto, 174.
41. Koselleck, Preuÿen zwischen Reform und Revolution, 60.
42. Rieger, Paul: Das Judenedikt vom 11. März 1812. Zur Jahrhundertfeier der Gleichberechtigung
der preuÿischen Juden, in: Im Deutschen Reich 3 (1912), 113121. As cited in: Tobias Schenk, `Das
Emanzipationsedikt von 1812 in Preuÿen: der lange Weg der Juden zu `Einländern' und `preuÿischen
Staatsbürgern'', chap. Das Emanzipationsedikt: Ausdruck `defensiver Modernisierung' oder Abschluss
rechtsstaatlicher Entwicklungen des `(aufgeklärten) Absolutismus'?, ed. Irene A. Diekmann, Europäisch-
jüdische Studien 15 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 2376, 24.
43. Gideon Reuveni, `Emancipation through Consumption: Moses Mendelssohn and the idea of mar-
ketplace citizenship', The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book (Oxford) 59, no. 1 (2014): 722, 15.
44. Cf. Szulc, `A Daily Life Perspective . . . ', 27-28.
45. Szulc, `Jüdische Staatsbürger. . . ', 196.
46. Cf. Szulc, `A Daily Life Perspective . . . ', 32.
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equalisation of Jews was a longer process both from legal and administrative perspective.
But the Edict of 1812 also had eects on the wider population as it sparked a wider
debate over the principles of citizenship.47 Emancipation in Prussia was limited, not
only for Jews who were partially emancipated, as Mosse put it, in (and into) a society
itself only partially emancipated.48 It is noteworthy, however, that the edict of 1812 is
the only document of the reform era to use the term `Prussian citizen', turning Prussia's
Jews  in a process of exceptional normalisation  into the rst preuÿische Staatsbürger
as Koselleck has emphasised. Only after the creation of a single Prussian market in 1818,
with the abolishment of internal tolls and the extension of freedom of movement to all
Prussians, was the concept of Prussian citizenship tacitly introduced, avoiding the term
and instead speaking of residents and subjects.49
Concept of `Staatsbürger '
In the German states democratisation, state building and nation building occurred sep-
arately. These conditions are reected in distinctive concepts of state membership.
In German, formal state-membership, participatory citizenship, and ethno-
cultural nation membership are designated by distinct terms: Staatsange-
hörigkeit, Staatsbürgerschaft, and Nationalität or Volkszugehörigkeit respect-
ively.50
Citizenship was a product of `German particularism'.51 The `nation' in contrast was one
of the democrats' claims and, as such, contrary to the Ancien Regime's intentions.52
Hence the disparate course of (state-) citizenship and nationality facilitated the devel-
opment of an essentialist concept of nation that understood the nation as preceding the
state. On the other hand the concept of citizenship had been established without a
reference to the nation.53 The `Germans', nationalists referred to, were still citizens of
separate states. But in spite of its particularist origin, the concept of citizenship was
47. Cf. Andreas Brämer and Gideon Reuveni, `Introduction Jews as German Citizens: The Prussian
emancipation edict of 1812 and beyond', The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book (Oxford) 59, no. 1 (2014):
35, 3. and Szulc, `A Daily Life Perspective . . . ', 26.
48. Mosse, `Paths of emancipation', 59.
49. Cf. Koselleck, Preuÿen zwischen Reform und Revolution, 59.
50. Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood, 50-51. Cf. Dieter Gosewinkel, `Staatsbürgerschaft und
Staatsangehörigkeit', Geschichte und Gesellschaft (Göttingen) 21, no. 4 (1995): 533556, 544-545.
51. Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945, 27.
52. Cf. Andreas Fahrmeir, `Nineteenth-Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration', The His-
torical Journal (Cambridge) 40, no. 3 (September 1997): 721752, 723-724.
53. Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood, 51-52.
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shaped by the mutual inuence of these states. The importance of the concept of cit-
izenship grew with the increasing use Prussians made of their freedom of movement and
the developing welfare system, since citizenship allowed the restriction of access to these
institutions.54 But the increase in mobility conicted with the developing system of poor
relief to which access was granted on the basis of the Heimatrecht.55 German states had
a mutual interest in the identication and determination of belonging of their respective
citizens or more specically those who were Ausländer. As seen above, the rst Prussian
citizens were granted citizenship on the grounds of their residency in Prussia, so that
citizenship tended to assimilate foreigners. To avoid tacit naturalisation of poor people
by way of continuous residency, the basis of state membership was altered.56 Brubaker,
Fahrmeir and Gosewinkel in varying degrees attribute the development of citizenship
in German lands to inter-state regulations concerned with the expulsion of the migrant
poor, whose numbers were rising as a corollary of the economic transformation.57 Cit-
izenship was not so much an institution of inner cohesion but of `domestic closure' and
the desire to control the movement of poor migrants.58 But the limitation of immigration
was not the only concern in clarifying citizenship, legislators were also addressing those
with the intention to leave in order to evade conscription by prohibiting emigration for
soldiers and draftees.59
1.2 Conceptual change: Ius Sanguinis
Starting in the 1830s, the Prussian administration began drafting a new citizenship
law, that was nally passed in 1842.60 With the further codication of citizenship the
territorial ius soli was replaced by the ius sanguinis based on descent.61 The Gesetz
über die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Eigenschaft als Preuÿischer Unterthan explicitly
abstained from the formerly practised ius soli : Der Wohnsitz innerhalb Unserer Staaten
54. Cf. Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945, 26.
55. Cf. Leo Lucassen, ``Harmful tramps' Police professionalization and gypsies in Germany, 1700-
1945', Crime, Histoire & Sociétés (Genève) 1, no. 1 (1997): 2950, 35.
56. Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood, 67-70.
57. Fahrmeir, `German Citizenships'; Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen. Die National-
isierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001); Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood, 70. Cf. Koselleck, Preuÿen
zwischen Reform und Revolution, 129136.
58. Cf. Fahrmeir, `German Citizenships', 737.
59. Cf. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 60.
60. Nathans, 55-62.
61. Cf. Gosewinkel, `Staatsbürgerschaft und Staatsangehörigkeit', 547.
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soll in Zukunft für sich allein die Eigenschaft als Preuÿe nicht begründen.62 No one
should be allowed to claim Prussian citizenship solely based on residency. But the
two concepts were never seen as mutually exclusive by contemporaries as Gosewinkel
elaborates. It also has to be stressed that remnants of the ius soli remained in force, in
particular the loss of citizenship after ten years of absence.63
The 1842 law introduced an oscillating concept of citizenship that lay the groundwork
for a long-lasting heritage. The criteria for naturalisation remained in what Gosewinkel
considered the arcane realm of administration where naturalisation was turned into
an act of state grace, preserving a notion of absolutism in the age of bourgeois legal
thought.64 Henceforth authorities could grant naturalisation to `useful' foreigners re-
ferring to ius soli and deny it to others, seen as potential burden to society based on
the ius sanguinis. This was particularly dicult for Jews who had not sought natural-
isation and itinerant families, who were not able (or not willing) to produce sucient
documents proving their identities and belonging, and who were increasingly categor-
ised as `Gypsies'.65 Decisions regarding the settlement of Jews remained a prerogative
of Prussia's Ministry of the Interior instead of the local administration as was the case
for all other foreigners.66 Otherwise, all special legislation regarding Jews or `Gypsies'
was suspended, making them in principle equal Prussian citizens.67 Apart from estab-
lishing descent as main criterion for citizenship, the 1842 law also introduced a strictly
patrilineal concept in which each family member's citizenship depended on that of the
male head of the family.68
Oliver Trevisiol maintains that even though ius sanguinis replaced the ius soli this did
not determine Germany's later route to a `völkisch' law of citizenship.69 Nonetheless, this
change in paradigm would inuence the future course of events. Gosewinkel rightfully
stresses, that the concept of descent was particularly prone to fostering an ethno-cultural
understanding of state membership that imagines the nation as a community based on
descent which precedes the state and its institutions.70 In these aspects the Prussian
62. As cited in Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945, 31.
63. Cf. Trevisiol, 35.
64. Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 97. Translation S.B.
65. Cf. Jennifer Grana Illuzzi, Gypsies in Germany and Italy, 1861 - 1914: lives outside the law
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 91.
66. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 68.
67. Marion Bonillo, `Zigeunerpolitik' im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1871 - 1918, Sinti- und Romastudien
28 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001), 67.
68. Cf.Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 95.
69. Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945, 31.
70. Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 547.
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law was intended, and turned out to be, prototypical for citizenship laws throughout
German lands. In particular the vagueness in the process of naturalisation allowed
the establishment of a practise that exposed applicants to the subjective judgement of
ocials.71
Registration in 1842
To enforce the new rules, authorities had to produce a clear display of the population.
Complementary to the clarication of citizenship in 1842  and closely connected to the
law establishing poor relief  the Gesetz über die Aufnahme neuanziehender Personen
regarding registration came into eect. It was by and large adopted in July 1867 by the
North German Confederation and would remain in force until 1937.72 For the whole of
Prussia, the law introduced the obligation to report moves between municipalities, the
so called An- und Abmeldung (registration and cancellation of registration).
With regard to this law Leo Lucassen assessed that Meldepicht (obligatory registra-
tion) became one of Prussia's authoritarian legacies to Germany.73 Yet, implement-
ation was not monitored and depended entirely on the local administration's initiative
so that on a Prussian scale registration remained far from being comprehensive. Fur-
thermore, only general requisitions were laid down in the law, so that the local police
departments would issue police regulations (Polizeiverordnungen) tailored to their juris-
diction, resulting in literally thousands of local regulations, subject to frequent renewal.74
Hence the data acquired by each department could dier due to the diering demands of
the local authorities. As we will see, it still took more than a century until what could be
considered `stringent' registration provisions were implemented beyond the local scale.
Diculties establishing stringent registration were also encountered in Berlin where
[d]as Institut des E.-M.-A. zu Berlin, [. . . ] seiner schwierigen Handhabung wegen schon
mehrfach gescheitert war. But in spite of these diculties, registration was recognised
as die erste Grundlage einer geregelten Polizei-Verwaltung. Since, the Einwohner-
Melde-Amt (E.-M.-A.) sought to tighten its grip on the population through constant
changes and adjustments of the registration regulations.The E.-M-A.'s purpose was
71. Cf. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 62.
72. Cf. Leo Lucassen, `Between Hobbes and Locke. Gypsies and the Limits of the Modernization
Paradigm', Social History 33, no. 4 (November 2008): 423441, 434-435 and Mühlbauer, Einwohner-
meldewesen, 40.
73. Lucassen, `Between Hobbes and Locke', 435.
74. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 39-40.
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in jedem Augenblicke und ohne weitläuge Nachforschungen über den Aufen-
halt, Stand, Alter, Geburtsort, Verhältniÿ und Beziehungen einer jeden sich
in Berlin aufhaltenden Person vollständige Auskunft zu geben, und das Auf-
nden der gesuchten Personen zu erleichtern und die bestraften Individuen
nachzuweisen.75
In order to full this ambitious task, ocials depended on the population's compliance.
One part of this eort was the establishment of notication obligations of the local police
departments to the E.-M-A. for every An- und Abmeldung on a daily basis  establishing
the rst notication obligation (Benachrichtigungspicht) in Prussia  thus making it
harder to escape registration, once registered. The other part of these adjustments was
that the penalties for non-compliance quintupled from 1837 to 1849. Since 1841 delib-
erate `false registration' (that is registering a residence with a lessor without actually
living there) was also penalised. Though there were no printed forms, registration in
writing was mandatory, answering the following questions:
 full name
 day and year of birth
 religion




 name and address of the registrant76
Obligation to register new tenants remained with the landlord, respectively everybody
der einem Neuanziehenden Wohnung oder Unterkommen gewährt to include all forms
of subtenancy.77 This illustrates how remnants of the feudal order were still relied upon.78
To make registration easier and thereby increase compliance, the respite was extended
to six days for moves within Berlin; everyone else was still obliged to register within 24
hours. Another new rule required the Meldeämter to report school-age children of new
residents to the school department (Schuldeputation) on a monthly basis. Compared
to 1812 the oce had increased the number of sta and introduced more dierentiated
registers. The E.-M-A.'s 53 employees maintained 6 separate registers.79 In addition
75. Cf. Dennestedt and Wolsburg, Preussisches Polizei-Lexikon, 772-773.
76. Cf. Dennestedt and Wolsburg, 772-780.
77. As cited in Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 41.
78. Cf. Koselleck, Preuÿen zwischen Reform und Revolution, 70.
79. Cf. Dennestedt and Wolsburg, Preussisches Polizei-Lexikon, 773-777.
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to the Hauptregister aller Einwohner and the Haus-Register, the E.-M.-A. was now in
charge of the Fremden-Register, the Gewerbe-Register, the Register der Gesuchten and
the Straf-Register.80 The Fremden-Register consisted of two repositories, the kurrent
and the reponiertes Register the rst of which listed all registered foreigners currently
present in Berlin, while the latter archived those who had left. The Gewerbe-Register
documented those, who had successfully applied for a trade permission. The Register
der Gesuchten allowed the listing of individuals whose whereabouts were unknown and
who in irgendeinem polizeilichen Interesse ermittelt werden sollen. Finally, the Straf-
Register served to monitor [j]ede irgendwie bestrafte Person, separated in a `kurrent '
and a `reponierte' part. The latter comprised those who had moved out of Berlin or
died.81 With the exception of the Straf-Register that instead registered the person's
nationality, all registers included a question about either religion or confession. In re-
gistration the patrilineal principles present in the concept of citizenship were mirrored.
Correspondingly, family members were listed on the male head of family's registration
sheet. Women were thus only registered individually when they moved out of their par-
ents' home unmarried or their husband died, in which case the deceased's sheet was kept
but his death was registered. The concept of family was explicitly limited to the nuc-
lear family. Relatives other than parents and children had to be registered separately.
Registration was thus following a trend towards increasing individuation of the citizens,
emancipating them from the social fabric that was increasingly reduced to the nuclear
family as Koselleck pointed out.82 The registration sheets were organised according to
criteria derived from social order or were more precisely a representation thereof. Thus
the data maintained in the registers could be analysed to understand the composition
of the population.
Nationality and statistics
During the 1830s the rst statistics derived from the E.-M.-A.'s data would monitor
fatalities, births, inux and departure  and thus the overall growth of population.83
The rst census was conducted in 1834 after the establishment of the Deutscher Zollver-
ein. But the data sets were quite disparate, therefore collation on a state level was near
impossible. In an eort to achieve better comparability, the statistical oce promoted
80. See chapter `Registration and emancipation', 11.
81. Dennestedt and Wolsburg, Preussisches Polizei-Lexikon, 774-776.
82. Koselleck, Preuÿen zwischen Reform und Revolution, 70.
83. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 43.
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the establishment of uniform questionnaires and thus had a rst standardising eect on
registration. But registration oces started to collect data for purposes other than iden-
tication. The eastern Prussian practice, begun in the 1820s, of categorising nationality
by asking for the language spoken at home, was being adapted all across Prussia.
With the heightening of national sentiments during the 1848 events, rst statistical
maps presenting the distribution of nationalities in Prussia were published by laymen.
Their access to the sources and their ndings depended on the goodwill of the registration
oces and were distorted by the heterogeneity of the local sources. Despite this fact, the
private initiatives successfully challenged the Statistical Oce to publish statistics on
nationalities. In 1858 the category of `family language', dened as the language usually
spoken at home, was introduced in the census.84
However, determining nationality on language alone was contested among statisti-
cians.85 So the practise was eventually suspended, as Neumann  statistician in the
Poznan district  remarked in 1883:
Auf direkt die Nationalität betreende Erhebungen ist wie bekannt nicht
mehr zurückzugehen. Denn Erhebungen dieser Art sind um ihrer Unzuver-
lässigkeit willen seit 1861 eingestellt.86
Neumann, still interested in the national composition of Prussia, instead tried to extra-
polate the very same information from the statistical data on the three major religions.
The confessional statistics related religion and vital data of the respective groups, produ-
cing tables comparing birth rates, age structure and so forth. Between 1843 and 1861 the
compilation of Judentabellen had been a regular part of the censuses in Prussia whereas
before the Judentabellen had been produced from the naturalisation certicates. Only
in the brief period between 1868 and 1874 did statisticians stop capturing data on re-
ligion. Nevertheless, the local courts (Amtsgerichte) maintained local Judenregister for
the period between 1848 and 1874.87 With the introduction of the Personenstandsgesetz
and the Standesämter (Registry Oces) in 1875 data on religion was recorded again,
and the evaluation of the censuses included separate tables on Jewish fertility, fatality
and origin that were made accessible to the public.88
84. Cf. Labbé, `Institutionalizing the Statistics', 291.
85. Cf. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality, The
Wiles lectures given at the Queen's University Belfast (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1990), 97.
86. Fr. J. Neumann, `Germanisierung oder Polonisierung? (Ein Beitrag zur Nationalitäts- und Grundei-
gentumsstatistik der Provinz Posen)', Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of Eco-
nomics and Statistics (Stuttgart) 7 (41), nos. 4/5 (1883): 457463, http ://www.jstor .org/stable/
23852354, 458. Cf. Labbé, `Institutionalizing the Statistics', 292.
87. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343, Nr. 17 Sonderakten Bd. 1., Bl. 287.
88. Cf. A. Frh. von Fircks, `Rückblick auf die Bewegung der Bevölkerung im preussischen Staate
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Only after the appointment of Ernst Engel as the new director in 1860 did the statist-
ical oce engage in serious eorts to unify the sources and thus produce more conclusive
statistics. He did so by establishing four main principles for statistics: exhaustivity of
the census, registration by individuals, self-declaration, and simultaneity.89 The rst
principle should ensure that the entire population is monitored at one moment in time.
The sole survey unit should be the individual, not the family. Self-declaration puts the
surveyed in charge of completing the questionnaire. In order to avoid numerous surveys
and keep data centralised, simultaneity should ensure that several characteristics (age,
occupation, matrimonial status, etc.) were gathered with the census instead of other
registers. Engel's insistence on these principles garnered the respect of his fellow stat-
isticians, despite the fact that exhaustivity, simultaneity and registration of individuals
had already been discussed under Engel's predecessor Homann in the 1840s and self-
declaration had successfully been introduced in Belgium during the census of 1846.90
With the growing importance of census matters, Engel's thorough reform of statistics 
rst proposed in 1861  was eventually implemented during the 1871 census.
First nationwide registers
Apart from the additional data required by statisticians the police grew increasingly
interested in personal data in particular of those who tended to escape registration.
The gaps in registration and the resulting lack of comprehensiveness inspired individual
police ocers to compile lists of alleged itinerant `criminals' and make them available
to the interested public across state borders.91 During the 1840s some of these police
während des Zeitraumes vom Jahre 1816 bis zum Jahre 1874', Preussische Statistik (Amtliches Quel-
lenwerk XLVIII. A. (1879): 1199, 28. This article, written by one of Engel's employees, gives a synopsis
of the development of the Prussian population from the beginning of ocial statistics to the introduction
of the Personenstandsgesetz in 1874. Special attention is given to Prussian minorities constantly re-
ferred to as races. Discussing birth rates for instance, he states Auch das Religionsbekenntnis ist kein
entscheidendes Moment für die Höhe der Geburtenzier, wohl aber die Rassenmischung . . . .Fircks,
`Rückblick auf die Bewegung der Bevölkerung im preussischen Staate während des Zeitraumes vom
Jahre 1816 bis zum Jahre 1874', 20.
89. Labbé, `Institutionalizing the Statistics', 294.
90. Richard Bökh, Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der amtlichen Statistik des Preussischen Staates.
Im Auftrage des Directors des Königlichen Statistischen Bureaus Herrn Dr. Engel, ed. Ernst Engel
(Berlin: Königliche Geheime Ober-Hofdruckerei, 1863), 50. Homann retired in 1844 and was succeded
by Dieterici who led the oce till Engel took over in 1860. Statistische Bureaus vereinigter thüringis-
cher Staaten, `Die früheren Volkszählungen und die Volkszählung vom 3. December 1864 in Thüringen.
Mittheilung des statistischen Bureaus vereinigter thüringischer Staaten', ed. Statistische Bureaus ver-
einigter thüringischer Staaten, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of Economics
and Statistics (Stuttgart) 3 (1864): 366376, 370.
91. Cf. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 21.
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journals were ocially taken under state control. Initially, three-quarters of the listed
individuals were described as `harmful tramps', half of which were listed because of
minor oences such as begging, vagrancy, no clear means of identity, and so forth
and comprised mainly professions in what we nowadays call the service sector.92 The
change from ius solis to ius sanguinis in 1842 and the Heimatprinzip the welfare system
was based on, brought into existence a new class of migrant poor.93 The signicance
Heimat had gained resulted in a change of function of the Heimatschein, from allowing
the bearer access to welfare to a factual permit of residence, until in 1862 the duty
to be registered with a Heimatgemeinde was lifted.94 In the second half of the 1840s,
however, the police journals, drawing on Grellmann's 1783 book on `Gypsies', began to
introduce the `Gypsy' label to refer to itinerant families that posed grave identication
problems to the police95 resulting in the authorities' heightened attention to these
itinerant families. Lucassen emphasises that the appearance of the people labelled as
`Gypsies' was of little importance. Rather, lack of clarity regarding their belonging and
the thread of responsibility in the form of poor relief motivated the categorisation.96
The development of citizenship in Prussia during the three decades from 1812 to 1842 is
characterised by the closure of the concept from ius soli to ius sanguinis. This legislative
closure was accompanied by the rise of nationalism that developed in opposition to
the state institutions that had established citizenship as form of state membership.
Simultaneously, state institutions like registration and statistics developed and rened
their devices to produce oversight  a process in which statistics became increasingly
independent from registration. Increasingly, documents like the Heimatschein grew in
importance, determining state membership and access to its institutions.
While Prussia's Jews were its rst citizens, naturalisation was to be had only at the
price of neglecting the notion of a Jewish nation in favour of Judaism as a private con-
fession, anticipating the atomisation of the individual from the communities/estates of
the feudal state. Naturalised Jews were denied full citizenship as they remained ex-
cluded from state and military positions. In particular Jews from Eastern Europe and
itinerant individuals and families remained in a precarious status potentially in danger
of being stripped o their citizenship. The initial reforms furthered the establishment
92. Lucassen, `̀Harmful tramps, 33-35.
93. Cf. Lucassen, `Between Hobbes and Locke', 434.
94. Cf. Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 151; and Rainer Hehemann, Die `Bekämpfung des
Zigeunerunwesens' im Wilhelminischen Deutschland und in der Weimarer Republik 1871-1933 (Frank-
furt am Main: Haag u. Herchen, 1987), 86.
95. Lucassen, `̀Harmful tramps, 3738.
96. Lucassen, 37.
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of a single Prussian market and correspondingly an increasingly mobile working class,
whose movements would not necessarily conform with state borders. Thus the author-
ities developed the means to control movement via newly established institutions such
as registration oces, xed identities and documents such as the Heimatschein or the
naturalisation certicate, all of which serve to facilitate the clarication of belonging to
determine who is to be included or excluded, in order to avoid responsibility in the form
of poor relief. Those unwilling or unable to produce the necessary documents would
inevitably raise suspicion. Inter-state deportations of mobile poor furthered the devel-
opment of a coherent system of citizenship in German lands during the 1850s.97 Though
the registration system was intended to comprise the entire population, larger swathes
of the population remained undocumented, as registration was a relatively new institu-
tion, the public was not accustomed to or intentionally avoided, for instance to evade
conscription.98 Police in general were chronically understaed, and local Meldebehörden
operated largely independently from each other, so that there was little control once
someone left the jurisdiction and moved to a dierent municipality.99 The early police
journals formed a predecessor of centralised registration and a notication system. The
success of registration was thus subject to the public's compliance, as was the case with
the naturalisation of Jews before. The increased penalties and the frequent reminders
regarding registration are proof of the hiatus that existed between the vision of a clear
record of the entire inhabitants and its implementation.100
1.3 Belonging to the Reich
After its creation in 1871 the German Reich would in many aspects follow the paths laid
out by Prussia  much to the discomfort of the smaller states, in particular the larger
amongst them like Bavaria and Baden, turning them into Prussia's internal adversaries.
Regarding citizenship, the North German Confederation had taken the decisive step
in 1870, when it adopted Prussian citizen law on the whole.101 Though the National
Assembly in Frankfurt had discussed the issue of citizenship and nationality (with an
emphasis on the latter), these discussions did not manifest directly in any legislation. It
did, however, inuence the discourse in favour of an ethno-cultural concept, in particular
97. Cf. Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 149.
98. Cf. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 85.
99. Cf. Lucassen, `̀Harmful tramps, 32; and: Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 37.
100. See chapter `Registration in 1842', 20.
101. Cf. Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 96.
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after the route to a `Lesser Germany' was taken. Without the multi-national Austrian
Empire remaining Germany was far more homogeneous.102 In this section I will focus on
the increased political importance statistics had gained in the discourse on nationality.
The 1870 Gesetz über den Erwerb und den Verlust der Bundes- und Staatsangehörigkeit
was the result of an evaluation and subsequent standardisation of the existing federal
laws.103 And much like the Prussian law it was motivated not by attempts to produce
inner cohesion, but a coherent juridical space.104 Although citizenship was still tied to
the federal states, Germans now enjoyed the same rights throughout the confederation.
This was also true for those Germans who were regarded as `Gypsies'105 and Jews, in
particular as the new law introduced naturalisation procedures.106
But with Germany's unication a process was set in motion, characterised by Gos-
ewinkel as nationalisation of the state, in which the ethno-cultural understanding of
state membership gained increasing inuence.107 This continuous process of national-
isation of citizenship was, from a legal perspective, only concluded with the law on
citizenship in 1913 on the brink of the Great War.108
The statistical innovations put forward by the Prussian Statistical Oce's new director
Engel  exhaustivity, registration by individuals, self-declaration, and simultaneity109 
were rst applied in the census in 1871. This was signicant not only because more
reliable methods were applied, but all the more as it was the rst to take inventory of
the new nation. Due to the foundation of the Northern German Confederation and the
extension of the German Customs Union (Zollverein) to include the southern German
states, statistics had gained importance. Reliable gures were at the core of this system
since revenue and expenses were distributed among the participating states according to
the size of the population. Furthermore, the results of the census were used to determine
the number of conscripts the federal states had to contribute to the army, the number of
deputies for the Reichstag and the federal parliaments respectively, and the number of
102. Cf. Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschlieÿen, 120.
103. Cf. Gosewinkel, 166.
104. Cf. Trevisiol, Die Einbürgerungspraxis im Deutschen Reich 1871 - 1945, 36.
105. Hehemann, `Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens', 87.
106. Steven E. Aschheim, Brothers and strangers: the east european Jew in German and German Jewish
conciousness, 1800 - 1923 (Madison, Wis.: Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 38. Cf. Jack Wertheimer,
Unwelcome strangers: East European Jews in imperial Germany, Studies in Jewish history (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 13.
107. Gosewinkel, `Staatsbürgerschaft und Staatsangehörigkeit', 548 and Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und
Ausschlieÿen, 178.
108. Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood, 13.
109. See chapter`Nationality and statistics, 23.
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coins issued.110 This mutual interest in designing a process that would not put any party
at a disadvantage facilitated the introduction of standardised questionnaires during the
census of 1867 and the establishment of a Kommission für die weitere Ausbildung der
Statistik des Zollvereins in January 1870 which established unied standards for the
1871 census that introduced questionnaires for individuals instead of households.111 A
further result was the establishment of the Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt as a central
Reich Oce in 1872.112 Yet, the oce remained in a delineate role, processing data it
received from the regional oces.113 The actual survey was conducted by the federal
states' statistical oces. The standardised questionnaires ask for:
 name
 position within the household/family (Stellung im Haushalt)
 sex
 place of birth
 year of birth
 family status (Familienstand)
 religion
 vocation or occupation
 citizenship
 residency114
While each of the new principles were innovative, the most profound change was the
registration of individuals instead of households. Evidence of the general trend towards
individuation, this change in paradigm was also mirrored in a new technical procedure
for data acquisition, that was introduced in some states. Before, census sta would col-
lect the data on tally sheets  grossen Bogen, die alle von gleicher Gestalt  making the
process unreliable as the scribes could easily displace a row. Now, individuals could be
110. Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Die Anordnungen des Bundesrathes für die gemeinsame Stat-
istik der Deutschen Staaten mit den vorbereitenden Verhandlungen insbesondere den Protokollen und
Berichten der Kommision für die weitere Ausbildung der Statistik des Zollvereins, vol. 1 (Berlin: Kais-
erliches Statistisches Amt, 1873), 10.
111. Cf. Friedrich Zahn, `Die praktische Bedeutung der deutschen Volkszählung', Jahrbücher für Na-
tionalökonomie und Statistik: Journal of economics and statistics., 1900, 577592, 578-583.
112. Cf. Anordnungen des Bundesrathes, 502.
113. Cf. Robert Lee, `Bevölkerungslehre und Bevölkerungspolitik vor 1933: Arbeitstagung der
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Bevölkerungswissenschaft und der Johann-Peter-Süÿmilch-Gesellschaft für
Demographie mit Unterstützung des Max-Planck-Instituts für Demographische Forschung, Rostock',
chap. Ocial Statistics, Demography and Population Policy in Germany, 1872-1933, ed. Rainer Mack-
ensen (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002), 253270, 255.
114. Cf. Anordnungen des Bundesrathes, 7273.
28
registered on individual Zählkarten (counting cards), simplifying the process of count-
ing and control.115 The old process of counting the entries in lists on tally sheets gave
virtually no option for checking the results. The counting cards on the other hand could
simply be sorted according to a certain feature, like gender, be counted and recounted
for control. It was also possible to identify mistakes, like the card of a male person slip-
ping into the female pile. This method had been successfully introduced throughout the
Customs Union in 1870 for goods.116 Inspired by a technological transfer that had taken
the librarians' card index boxes into the banking sector, numerous institutions began
to understand the benets of the paper-slip-economy as storage for corporate know-
ledge.117 The concept of representing individual items on single paper cards allowed the
organisation of the data in a way, that would allow for easy maintenance, reorganisation
according to specic questions and alteration. It would, moreover, make it accessible
to dierent individuals by knowledge of the storing system alone. Finally, these cards
could be processed to derive bulk data be it on nances, goods or people. Therefore, in
1871, the method was introduced for the census, albeit on an optional basis, and only
Hamburg and Prussia used counting cards to conduct the 1871 census.
During the commission's negotiations, some delegates  most prominently Regierungs-
rat Bökh, member of the Prussian delegation  wanted to include a question for `language
spoken at home' in the census emphasising the distinction of nationality and citizenship.
But Labbé notes that for unknown reasons Prussia's Ministry of the Interior prohibited
questions on language.118 The ndings of the above mentioned Neumann published
in 1883 suggest, however, the outcome of such statistics may have been unpleasant to
German nationalist interests and thus been prohibited at a time Bismarck was targeting
Polish nationalism:
Gegenüber der noch immer sehr verbreiteten Annahme, daÿ in den früher
polnischen Teilen Preuÿens das Deutschtum in stetigem Vordringen begrif-
fen sei, ist es vielleicht nicht ganz unangezeigt in Kürze darauf zu verweisen,
daÿ unsere allerdings sehr unvollkommenen statistischen Nachrichten hier-
über für die neuere Zeit eine Entwickelung in entgegengesetzter Richtung
wahrscheinlich machen.119
115. W. Stieda, `Die Zählkartenmethode und ihre Anwendung bei der Volkszählung in Elsass-Lothringen
am 1. Dezbr. 1875', Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of Economics and Stat-
istics (Stuttgart) 31, no. 1 (1878): 4958  50.
116. Anordnungen des Bundesrathes, 34.
117. Cf. Markus Krajewski, Paper machines: about cards & catalogs, 1548-1929, ed. Peter Krapp
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 97.
118. Cf. Labbé, `Institutionalizing the Statistics', 296-297.
119. Neumann, `Germanisierung oder Polonisierung? (Ein Beitrag zur Nationalitäts- und Grundei-
gentumsstatistik der Provinz Posen)', 457.
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The census would ask for citizenship instead. The nal results of the considerations
regarding the census were agreed upon on 12th February, exactly one month after the
establishment of the commission.120 When in 1874 the introduction of the Personen-
standsgesetz (Civil Status Act) and the successive establishment of Standesämter (Re-
gistry oces) was discussed to secularise the administration of vital data (birth, marriage
and death), Director Engel dedicated a longer article to the possible benets a nationwide
standardisation might have on statistics.121 Arguing only the combination of meticulous
registration and censuses would eventually yield conclusive results on population growth
and internal migration, he proposed the addition of a signicant number of questions
to the forms for all three life events registered.122 The Civil Status Act established the
registry oces that recorded all vital data in their respective jurisdictions. Engel's pro-
posals, remained marginal and were not taken into account passing the law, however,
the registers of the Standesämter were to produce valuable data for the statisticians.
Internal closure
The crowning in Versailles in 1871 illustrates vividly how the identity of the young unied
Germany hinged on external factors like the opposition to France. But the new nation
was not only externally exclusive. In an eort to promote unity, Catholics were targeted
for their loyalty to Rome, likewise, Social Democrats for their internationalist politics.123
These exclusive tendencies, characterised by Wehler as `negative Integration', gained a
stronger foothold amongst conservatives. Danes, Poles, the French in Alsace-Lorraine,
Catholics, and Jews were seen as a threat to national homogeneity despite their German
citizenship; whereby measures against Poles, Catholics and Jews imbricated.124
Bismarck, who in multi-national Prussia had feared the instigation of nationalist sec-
tarianism now nourished national sentiments and linked the issues in the context of the
1884 elections, stating daÿ die Juden mit den Polen überall gemeinschaftliche Sache
gemacht hätten.125
120. Cf. Anordnungen des Bundesrathes, 67.
121. RGBl I, 23.
122. Ernst Engel, `Der Ein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The 1870 law on citizenship and the founding of the Reich produced a coherent market
and established growing inner cohesion. Complementary to this, there was increasing
closure at the borders of the Reich in particular to the east. The problems with migrant
poor, previously predominantly an aair amongst the German states, were temporarily
relocated to the Reich's borders and the crossing of foreign `Gypsies'. Yet, it turned out
that the majority of cases still occurred at the internal borders triggering a new phase
in their problematization and criminalization as Lucassen reports.126
Coinciding with the Reich's foundation, migration patterns changed and for the rst
time Germany registered an increase in population due to migration.127 Most of the
migrants came to Germany for economic reasons. Yet, not all of them were `unwelcome
strangers'. In particular during harvest season, demand for labour could not be satised
by the local labour market, so that farmers were ready to compensate by hiring Polish
workers, all the more as their labour was cheap.128 But not only the agrarian sector was
drawing on the central European work force. Faced with a lack of cheap labour industries
engaged in the acquisition of foreign workers too.129 The conicts over access to the
labour-market and the resulting desire to distinguish `useful' from `undesirable' migrants
may partially explain why the migrant poor were increasingly categorised `Gypsies' or,
in the case of eastern Europeans, dierentiated into `seasonal workforce' and `Jews'.
The inux of Russian Jews to Germany triggered by the pogroms succeeding Tsar
Alexander II.'s assassination in 1881 had brought attention to Jewish migration. Bis-
marck began to devise plans so that an unusual immigration of a Jewish proletariat is
prevented.130 While the rst attempt to evict Russian Jews faltered, in 1885 Bismarck's
focus shifted to a group more easily identiable. As a result, some 32,000 Poles were
evicted from Germany, about a third of them Jewish.131 These evictions were preceded
by the collection of respective data ordered by the Bundesrat in December 1882. The
data required from the District Governments comprised the identities of immigrants
naturalised after 1848 including their previous nationality and confession  paving the
way for a future inclusion of these questions in the census.132 But the nationalisation
of the state that followed the formation of the Kaiserreich was also accompanied by the
onset of a gradual racialisation of the discourse on nationality. Jews had already been
126. Lucassen, `Between Hobbes and Locke', 473.
127. Cf. Wertheimer, Unwelcome Strangers, 18.
128. Cf. Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 117.
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subject to a conservative strategy during the 1860s, linking Jewish emancipation and
democratisation per se.133 Nonetheless, the `incubation'  to lean on Katz's metaphor
 of modern anti-Semitism during the panic of 1873 and the subsequent years marks a
change in quality.134 By the end of the 1870s anti-Semitism had become institutionalised
through formation of clubs, parties and journals and developed into a `cultural code' 
as Volkov termed it so accurately  during the subsequent decades.135 The coining of the
term `anti-Semitsm' itself reects the racialisation hatred against Jews had undergone.
Signicantly, the new term did not refer directly to Jews or to Judaism.
It spelled an opposition to "Semitism" - an abstraction of all the presumed
qualities of the Semitic race. [. . . ] The term had, of course, other advantages
that made it attractive to contemporaries. Above all it implied a pretentious
scientic theory of race, and carried with it the prestige of scientic termin-
ology. From the very outset the link between anti-Semitism and racism was
established, together with a claim for objectivity and truth.136
Two events marked the turning point when anti-Semitism entered the public sphere:
the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit brought about by Treitschke and the related Anti-
semitenpetition prominently supported by Max Liebermann von Sonnenberg. To un-
derpin Treitschke's claims the petition called for a reversal of emancipation, a stop to
Jewish emigration in particular from Eastern Europe and the reinstatement of statistics
on Jews.137 But even though Treitschke was rebutted by Mommsen and the government
did not encourage the claims of the petition, the surrounding debate paved the way for
the growing acceptance of anti-Semitism on the political stage. The events also show
how statistics had become an accepted tool in political debate.
Simultaneously, federal states began to coordinate measures targeting mobile poor.
Through the formation of the Kaiserreich, `Gypsies' had become citizens with full civic
133. Cf. Henning Albrecht, `Preuÿen, ein `Judenstaat'. Antisemitismus als konservative Strategie gegen
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rights  at least in principle.138 The identication of `Gypsies' and the implementation of
measures against them on the other hand, was up to the police, where the `Bekämpfung
des Zigeunerunwesens ' had developed into a specialised branch that was not subjected
to any supervision.139 In 1883 the Bundesrat agreed not to issue licenses for itinerant
trading (Wandergewerbescheine) to foreign `Gypsies'. As a consequence, individuals
applying for this license from now on had to prove their nationality.140 If they could not
provide documents, such as a `valid' Heimatschein, or a (rare) passport, their status as a
citizen was inevitably jeopardised since the ocials could easily use the vagueness of the
Citizenship Act against them. As there was no obligation to obtain documents that could
prove citizenship, this would have brought almost every German into a predicament. The
arbitrary decision to label someone a `Gypsy' was documented only locally  authorities
in one place might issue permits to people labelled `Gypsies' elsewhere. Illustrating
how this categorisation depended on the local ocial's personal opinion, in 1899 the
Regierungspräsident of Trier wrote to the Prussian Minister of the Interior, justifying
his extension of a trade permit:
Der Antrag auf Ausdehnung des Wandergewerbescheins ist schritich einge-
reicht worden, so daÿ auch aus dem Aussehen des Antragstellers ein Schluÿ
auf seine etwaige Zugehörigkeit zu den Zigeunern nicht gemacht werden kon-
nte.141
From now on les on alleged `Gypsies' were marked, to prevent future miscategorisation.
Ocials made use of the vagueness in the citizenship law to strip inländische Zigeuner o
of their citizenship, turning them into legal foreigners so that they could deal with them
outside of the constraints of law.142 Nonetheless, authorities could not carry on and
deport those stripped o of their citizenship, since no other country would take them
in because they were ocially stateless. The policy basically amounted to increased
repression in order to make them leave.143 In an eort to end this extra-judicial state,
a Spezialgesetzgebung for `inländische Zigeuneuner' was envisaged and to substantiate
claims for an exceptional law Bismarck proposed a census:
Es ist meines Erachtens nicht zu verkennen, daÿ die Beschaung eines eini-
germaÿen zuverlässigen statistischen Materials über die Verhältnisse der im
138. Cf. Hehemann, `Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens', 87.
139. Cf. Lucassen, `̀Harmful tramps, 3940.
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Lande umherstreifenden Zigeuner für die Beurtheilung der zur Unterdrück-
ung derselben zu ergreifenden Maÿnahmen von Nutzen, namentlich aber für
den Fall von Wert sein würde, wenn es sich demnächst etwa als notwendig
herausstellen sollte, im Wege einer Spezialgesetzgebung gegen diese Land-
plage vorzugehen.144
To provide the data on `Gypsies' residing in Prussia, the `Zigeunererhebung ' of 1886
identied 1057 `Gypsies'  the majority of them sedentary  amongst the roughly 29
million Prussians, which was a number so insignicant it would hardly justify a Spezi-
algesetzgebung.145 Nonetheless, at the end of the 1880s the `gypsy-question' ascended
to national level after some of the local governments had demanded the standardisation
of removal procedures for foreign `Gypsies'.146 In order to base the discussions on solid
data in September 1887 Minister of the Interior Puttkamer ordered a census of `resident
Gypsies' in all federal states. Furthermore, he asked for the measures already taken at
the local level, and suggestions for those to be implemented on the national level.147
However, due to the missing denition, the data returned did not produce the desired
results, as precisely the question of citizenship was often handled too liberally. The min-
istry  implicitly foreshadowing the discussion about the denition of the term `Gypsy'
 complained to the Trade Ministry in June 1887:
Die Berichte beschränken sich vielmehr auf die Angaben, daÿ die Betref-
fenden in Preuÿen geboren oder, daÿ sie sich stets im Inlande aufgehalten
oder daÿ einzelne derselben der Militärpicht genügt hätten, und folgern
daraus für dieselben den Besitz der diesseitigen Staatsanghörigkeit.148
Illuzzi argues that this process illustrates how citizenship was increasingly understood
as a consequence of nationality, and not the other way round.149 It is noteworthy,
however, that while all parties agreed that `Gypsies' presented a problem, a coordinated
approach presupposes a shared denition of the targeted group. Since all parties shied
away from engaging in this discussion, the eorts did not result in legislation. Instead,
to decrease the number of inländische `Gypsies' it was agreed yet again to check the
citizen status more rigorously on the occasion of applications for trade permits.150 Still
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unsatised with the data at hand, Bismarck suggested the use of the 1890 census to
monitor Germany's `Gypsy' population. He was opposed by Prussian Minister of the
Interior Herrfurth, insisting registration of `Gypsies' be administered by the police and
the data be maintained in an index, separate from the rest of the population. Once the
Statistical Oce replied that the small number of `Gypsies' would hardly justify wasting
a whole column of the questionnaires, the aair petered out; instead it was agreed to
focus even more on the limitation of itinerant trade and disenfranchisement.151
Yet, at the turn of the century, police eorts to increase control over itinerant indi-
viduals resulted in the establishment of the rst nationwide police information system.
In 1899 Bavaria's police took the lead in `the ght against the Gypsy nuisance' by
institutionalising the systematic registration of `Gypsies'. The Munich based `Gypsy
Information Service' would centrally collect, compile and disseminate data provided by
the local police.152 All over Germany police departments began introducing the latest
technology, like card indices, photography and dactyloscopy to identify and register
criminals  a practice immediately adopted in the registration of `Gypsies'. Hamburg,
Berlin and Dresden introduced dactyloscopy in 1903; Saxony followed suit in 1904 and
in 1911 it was adapted by Bavaria.153 The head of the Zigeunerzentrale was Alfred
Dillmann. In 1905 he published the data the Zigeuner Zentrale had acquired during the
rst six years in the `Zigeunerbuch'. In his analysis of the 3350 names and 613 detailed
descriptions listed in Dillmann's book, Lucassen once again conrms his earlier ndings
that appearance was less important than uncertain belonging.154 According to Jennifer
Illuzzi, Dillman was thus racialising a migrant underclass that had arisen autochthon-
ously from European soil.155 Due to the severe consequences that every such labelling
would entail, Dillmann's denition did not go unchallenged. Examining the publication
of the Zigeunerbuch, Bavaria's Minister of the Interior proposed a reconsideration of the
categorisation:
Bei dieser weit ausgedehnten Auslegung des Begris Zigeuner und der weiten
Verbreitung, die das Buch nden soll, möchte vielleicht die Gefahr nicht
ganz fern liegen, daÿ einzelne dieser Gewerbetreibenden, die sich bisher von
Strafe freizuhalten gewuÿt haben, Klagen über die Erschwerung ihrer Er-
werbstätigkeit vorbringen und da und dort ein geneigtes Ohr nden.156
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The result of this intervention was the distinction between `Zigeuner' and `nach Zigeu-
nerart herumziehende Personen' in the nal publication. The accelerated ow of inform-
ation and the heightened attention brought about by the publication led to numerous
decrees and regulations all over the Kaiserreich trying to implement the previous meas-
ures more stringently: thorough check of identity and nationality when ever itinerant
trade permits or extension was sought, with the ultimate goal being to deny issuance
or extension whenever possible. Though the number of `Gypsy sightings' reportedly
went down, in 1910 the call for a unied approach to the issue reached the Reichstag.157
A year earlier Switzerland had called on its European neighbours to nd an interna-
tional solution to the problem of continuous migration and deportation of the migrant
poor across state borders. But Prussia in particular was unwilling to even consider
an international approach since this would limit its ability to do away with `unwanted
strangers'.158 In 1906 the Munich Oce had begun preparing a conference in order to
coordinate measures taken by the federal states. In this case Prussia's objection was in-
formed by the challenge Bavaria posed to her lead. And indeed for Bavaria the key issue
during the conference  that nally took place in December 1911 and gathered ocials
from all the aected federal states as well as the `Gypsyologists' Aichele, Harster and
Dillmann  was the centralised registration of `Gypsies', preferably in Munich, and a
general obligation to take ngerprints.159 The other controversial issue discussed during
the conference was the denition of the very group in question. Dillmann favoured his
broad, rather sociological denition comprising,
ohne Rücksicht auf Rassen oder Stammeszugehörigkeit alle die Personen
[. . . ] die ohne Beruf oder zum Zweck gewerblicher, schaustellerischer oder
gauklerischer Leistungen oder zum Zwecke des Handels ohne festen Wohn-
sitz gewohnheitsmäÿg und zwar in der Regel horden oder bandenweise um-
herziehen.160
Bavaria's Minister of the Interior repeated his objections and was seconded by the envoys
from Prussia, Hesse and Württemberg.161 Regarding a binding denition he remarked
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Mit Rücksicht [. . . ] auf die Unmöglichkeit einer exakten und erschöpfenden
Begrisbestimmung [. . . ] möchte ich anheimgeben, auch für die Verhand-
lungen von einer solchen abzusehen [. . . ].162
Towards the end of the conference Württemberg's envoy Bechtle coined a phrase that
would cement the oscillating concept and would appear again in Bavaria'a 1926 `Gypsy-
Law':
Zigeuner im polizeilichen Sinne sind sowohl die Zigeuner im Sinne der Rassen-
kunde als auch die nach Zigeunerart umherziehenden Personen.163
Though all participants agreed that coordinated measures were required, the conference
could not agree on a closing document. This was mainly due to Prussia's persisting
opposition to Bavaria. In spite of Prussia's reluctance to accept Munich's leading role,
the Zigeuner Zentrale evolved during the subsequent years to function as the central
registration of `Gypsies' in Germany with other Police Departments not only seeking
information but also reporting to the oce.
The censuses in 1890, 1900 & 1905
Even though the census of 1890 was not used to aggregate data on `Gypsies', it mirrored
the change in concept of nationality and citizenship. Despite the remaining doubts of
statisticians the International Statistical Congress in 1873 had  for lack of a better
alternative  agreed to recommend the inclusion of a question for language in order to
identify nationality. The congress was following Bökh's argument, that language was
the only adequate indicator of nationality. As a side-eect, as Hobsbawm has noticed,
this forced everybody to choose a `linguistic nationality' on the occasion of a census.164
While in the 1860s Bismarck had been reluctant to monitor nationalities in Prussia
more closely, now a standardised question about an individual's mother tongue was in-
troduced. The results were published four years later in a table combining the features
of mother tongue, citizenship and gender.165 Figures on confession were published and
analysed in detail for the `three major religions'  Catholic and Protestant Christians,
and Jews  including a separate table displaying children born in Christian  Jewish
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inter-marriages.166 While the reintroduction of confessional statistics certainly pleased
antisemitic fractions, the criteria applied did not correspond with their racial denitions.
Bökh  who had advocated the reintroduction of language statistics since 1860 in sup-
port of Engel's agenda  followed the humanist tradition, linking language and nation,
rather than lineage.167 He considered Yiddish a German dialect and hence subsumed
speakers of the language amongst the Germans (thereby inating their numbers com-
pared to the Polish population).168 Thus the question about mother tongue was not
helping to single out Jews. But also the questions on confession would not produce the
results anti-Semites were interested in, since it would ask for the `äuÿere (rechtliche)
Angehörigkeit zu einer Religionsgesellschaft oder Weltanschaungsgemeinschaft ', again
`neglecting' descent.169 Nonetheless, these changes in census practices not only reect
the shift to an increasingly exclusive understanding of nationality  but rather are its
medium, showing how a certain demographic could be isolated from or integrated into
the German `Volk ' by choice of criteria.170
The decision to reintroduce confessional and language statistics was thus suited to fur-
ther the exclusive aspects of nationality and an understanding of state membership based
on descent.It also correlated with the widened denition of `Germaness' or `Deutschstäm-
migkeit ' in the subsequent censuses. In an eort to include every German in the 1900
census, trade ships had to register Germans aboard and report them to the statistical
oce via the Hamburg trade association.171 However, this was just an intermediate step
as Zahn commiserated:
Erwünscht wäre noch eine Feststellung des Bevölkerungsstands für das G r ö-
ÿ e r e D e u t s c h l a n d, d. h. für Deutschland und seine K o l o n i e n.
Doch dies muÿ einer späteren Volkszählung vorbehalten bleiben, gegenwärtig
läÿt sie sich selbst mittels bloÿer Schätzungen unserer Kolonialbehörden und
Forschungsreisen nicht bewerkstelligen.172
Inclusion of the population in German colonies was just one aspect of the broader deni-
tion of belonging to the German nation. The population growth in Germany was seen as
indicator of Germany's growing power and inuence; consequently, the census of 1905 in-
troduced the category of Auslandsdeutsche and registered Germans abroad who did not
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necessarily hold German citizenship but were `deutschstämmig ' (of German descent).173
This was widening the hiatus of citizenship and nationality in yet another direction 
anticipating the further cementing of citizenship based on the ius sanguinis in 1913.
1913 `Volk ' vs. `Bevölkerung '
In 1913 the debate about nationality and citizenship that had been ongoing for the past
two decades came to a close. The 1870 Gesetz über den Erwerb und den Verlust der
Bundes- und Staatsangehörigkeit was ambiguously comprising elements of both ius soli
 remnant of the absolutist territorial state  and ius sanguinis linked to the nation
state.174 The debate since had shifted in favour of the principle of descent. Two main
factors shaped the debate: migration of mobile poor from the east and the situation
in the colonies. And as anticipated by the census in 1900, this change concretised in
two ways. The 1913 Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz made it easier for German
expatriates and their ospring to maintain German citizenship by removing the loss
of citizenship after ten years of absence. On the other hand it increased hurdles to
naturalisation. Notably, even the proponents of elements of ius soli on the political left
never challenged the idea of descent as the main criterion for citizenship. But the changes
in citizenship were also motivated by changing migration patterns. Statistician and
chairman of the Pan-German League until 1908, Ernst Hasse, in favour of a proposition
backed by conservatives and national liberals, spoke to the Reichstag, quoting extensively
the statistics on mother tongue and confession. Due to Germany's population growth,
he argued, there was no need for immigration but rather an Überschuss an Volkskraft.
Immigration of Sprach- und Rassefremder  namely Jews and Poles  were believe to
be harmful to national homogeneity.175 He nevertheless had to concede:
Im Gegensatz zu anderen Kulturvölkern, dem französischen, italienischen
und englischen, ist ja an sich schon das deutsche Volk sehr wenig homogen
gestaltet.176
But the logic of national homogeneity also included an extension of citizenship to the
Auslandsdeutsche.177 The proposal was accompanied by two further legislative initiatives
calling for a stop to Jewish immigration, and for expulsion of foreign Jews. A quote from
Freiherr von Langen, signatory of Hasse's initiative, is illustrative for an atmosphere in
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which anti-Semitism and anti-Gypsyism went hand in hand, when he tried to explain
why Jews could not be German:
Ein Zigeuner wird kein Deutscher durch die heilige Taufe, so hoch ich in
religiöser Beziehung deren Werth anerkenne; ebenso wenig wird ein Jude
durch die Taufe Deutscher.178
The 1913 law clearly opted for ethnic homogeneity in Germany. The extension of Ger-
man citizenship to descendants of Germans abroad was meant to strengthen their ties
to Germany. But `The Preservation of Germandom Abroad'179 was more complicated
in the colonies. When German colonialists had children with local women the patri-
lineal aspect clashed with the paradigm of ethnic homogeneity.180 Under the lead of
the Pan-Germans, the conservative fractions were advocating a ban on intermarriages
and restrictions on the access to citizenship according to racial criteria. Foreshadow-
ing the Weimarer Koalition, their move was successfully blocked by a new coalition of
social democrats, Catholics and the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei. The resulting com-
promise omitted the question of intermarriages. It maintained patrilineal citizenship in
the homeland while it allowed deviations in the colonies.181 Citizenship of women still
depended on that of their husbands.182 The inclusion of Auslandsdeutsche also posed
questions regarding the Wehrgerechtigkeit (fairness of the draft). Since 1812 citizenship
and military service were intimately linked; but only few Auslandsdeutsche returned to
complete their military service. The Navy looked on German seaman aboard foreign
vessels as a resource in an upcoming war and favoured their inclusion despite neglected
service. However, the army successfully maintained that being lax on Germans abroad
would undermine the concept of conscription altogether.183 While the citizenship law
of 1913 certainly reects the move towards an ethno-cultural concept of citizenship, it
stopped short of being downright racist, as it left the problem of intermarriages unsolved,
held onto the patrilineal principle of citizenship and eventually put fairness of the draft
over the inclusion of the Auslandsdeutsche. And even though the 1913 citizenship law
had been designed with war in mind, when the Great War came about it changed the
meaning of citizenship.184
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2 The `Volk ' contested
Heute zum ersten Male steht das ganze Volk in Waen. Und nicht das Heer
allein kämpft, leistet und leidet, sondern jede lebende Seele des Landes.1
This chapter will cover the development of concepts of state membership in statistics and
registration over the course of the First World War and the Weimar republic. During
the war  marked by rst attempts at `total registration'  statistics helped promote the
image of the Volk as a statistically organised entity. In this context I will reexamine
the notorious Judenzählung arguing that it marked the return to the long lasting trend
towards an exclusive understanding of German state membership.
2.1 Brief Clearance
With the onset of the war in 1914 the internal front lines, hardened by `negative Integra-
tion', seemingly became volatile. Emperor Wilhelm II.'s speech to the Reichstag on 4th
August, calling for a Burgfrieden, ensured inclusion for all those previously ostracised
in exchange for their pledge of loyalty. While this move's main intention was to ensure
the Social Democrats' consent to the war credit bills other groups with a precarious
status felt invited to join the new national unity.2 Social Democrats voted in favour of
the bills. Virtually all German-Jewish organisations called their brothers to arms. Vice
versa antisemitic voices were mued by censorship. In stark contrast to the long-lasting
trend towards an ethnically exclusive understanding of Germaness the initial enthusi-
asm  later referred to as the Augusterlebnis and Geist von 1914  opened up a more
inclusive perspective. Moreover, it helped to mobilise Germans of all convictions and
walks of life for the war eort  including Germany's Jews. Though Katz points out that
this newfound unity was never acceptable for the hardline anti-Semites.3 Nevertheless,
1. Walther Rathenau, Von kommenden Dingen (Berlin: Fischer, 1918), 275.
2. Cf. Jerey Verhey, Der `Geist von 1914' und die Er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the new inclusiveness manifested in increased numbers of naturalisations during the rst
years of the war.4 And even the military had begun to allow Jews into higher ranks.5
In September deputy Reich Minister of War Franz Gustav von Wandel introduced a
decree `Ergänzung der Oziere während des Krieges ' that opened up an ocer's career
to Jews.6 This phenomenon occurred in almsost all the states involved in the Great War
so Sigbert Feuchtwanger summarised the initial perception of the atmosphere as follows:
So schien die Judenfrage nach allen Richtungen gelöst. [. . . ] Des Kriegs
hatte es bedurft, um den Sinn der Geschichte endlich klar zu stellen und
die sinnvolle Entwicklung von Hemmungen zu befreien: von dem Judentum
blieb nichts übrig als höchstens in jedem Staate, in Ruÿland, Deutschland,
Frankreich etc. russische, deutsche, französische etc. Staatsbürger jüdischen
Glaubens.7
The new upward mobility for Jews was prominently embodied in Walther Rathenau,
who in August 1914 became director of the Kriegsrohstogesellschaften (KRA) (War
Raw Materials Department) within the Ministry of War. This was a seismic change as
recalled by his former colleague Otto Goebel 16 years later:
Ein Industrieller und Jude als Abteilungschef in der konservativsten aller Be-
hörden! Nur Ahnung der ungeheuren Gefahr, die der deutschen Kriegführung
von der Rohstoseite her drohte, konnte die Feder des entscheidenden Mannes
in jenem Augenblicke der Errichtung der KRA geführt haben.8
Fine assesses, that German Jews were overly enthusiastic in the rst month of the war.9
Jeery Verhey has convincingly shown, war enthusiasm that purportedly dominated the
general public in August 1914 was limited to certain social strata. Similarly, Mommsen
describes a new phenomenon in nationalism, an intellectual mobilisation.10 Verhey ar-
gues that although in the initial days crowds lled the streets, it would be a mistake to
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on modern Jewish history 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 11.
10. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Die Urkatastrophe Deutschlands der Erste Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918 (Stut-
tgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), 19.
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interpret their actions as sheer enthusiasm. Instead, his analysis of testimonies attributes
a carnivalesque quality to the Augusterlebnis in which the public's tension manifested.11
The fragile internal unity was furthermore accompanied by external closure at the
borders, setting an end to the liberal era of laissez faire that had ubiquitously dominated
passport aairs in most of the countries involved. From July 1914 for all German men it
was not just entering the country that was restricted. To prevent escape from military
service, draftees had to produce exit passports to cross the border. By the end of 1914
everybody crossing the border in either direction had to present a passport including: a
personal description, photograph, and the signature of the bearer, along with an ocial
certication that the `bearer is actually the person represented in the photograph'.12
Simultaneously, the concept of state membership underwent a process of further clos-
ure, in which citizenship lost its signicance. In Alsace-Lorraine, for instance, 7.000
residents were deprived of their citizenship based on their alleged French nationality.13
In general, nationality was used to tell friend from foe and enemy aliens were expelled,
interned or compelled to remain at their jobs depending on the state administration's
calculations of German interests.14
Though the war had led to a postponement of the measures agreed upon by the 1911
Gypsy Conference and the work of Munich's Zigeunerzentrale was hampered by the
draft diminishing the sta, the tightening of passport regulations made it more dicult
for non-German `Gypsies' to enter Germany. Those already on German territory were
 despite their citizenship  suspected by the military as being foreign spies. Hence, in
1917 the Ministry of War ordered their internment.15
1913's law on citizenship  designed to conscript Germans abroad  yielded few results.
Quite to the contrary the threat of expatriation proved to be a favour to German's
abroad suering from the measures introduced against aliens.16 The draft was organised
utilising the data of the Standesämter (Registry Oces).17 Unlike the register oces
where individuals were listed alphabetically, these oces  due to their capacity for
11. Cf. Verhey, Der `Geist von 1914' und die Erndung der Volksgemeinschaft, 48-50.
12. John Torpey, `Documenting individual identity: the development of state practices in the modern
world', chap. The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Passport System, ed. Jane Caplan (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 2001), 257270, 259.
13. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 189.
14. Nathans, 185.
15. It is however unclear, whether this was eventually put into practice. Cf. Bonillo, `Zigeunerpolitik',
222.
16. Factually, an amnesty for desertion and failure to report for duty issued by Chancellor Friedrich
Ebert in December 1918 prevented expatriation for most cases. Nathans, The politics of citizenship, 189.
17. Erich Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei, 6., ed. Kurt Daluege (München: Jehle, 1942),
47.
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recording life data  were able to list age cohorts, as required for the draft. Yet, since
these records were maintained at the place of birth they could not be used to localise
individuals. Nevertheless, due to the high compliance with public calls for recruits,
Germany did well in mobilising human resources, as was the case with basically any
other country during the rst phase of the war, in which there were more volunteers
than the army was equipped to train.18
The external pressure helped to introduce a series of interventionist measures and a
drive towards centralisation. In 1914 Moellendor and Rathenau had brought forward
the idea of centralised management of raw materials in order to cope with the economic
duress caused by the British blockade. In consequence, the administration increasingly
relied on statistical surveys to monitor supply and demand. In 1916 Friedrich Zahn, the
Director of Bavaria's statistical Oce reported on the impact the war had on statistics:
Seit Ausbruch desselben hat die amtliche Statistik, die zunächst alle ihre
bisherigen nicht vor dringlichen Arbeiten zurückstellte, ein so gewaltiges
Pensum zu erfüllen, wie wohl in keinem früheren Stadium der Geschichte.19
The vast majority of these surveys monitored supply of food and raw materials on behalf
of the Kriegsgesellschaften. Some, on behalf of the military, monitored the population in
occupied territories or convalescence of wounded personnel. The statistical eorts were
coordinated by the central statistical oce and, if published at all, aus kriegstaktischen
Erwägungen natürlich nur in beschränktem Umfang.20
Only in 1916, when the battles at the Somme and Verdun put supply chains of both
men and material at a test and the distribution of labour had been seriously aected
by the withdrawal of manpower to the front lines, did the government decide to in-
terfere with the labour market.21 To eciently distribute the German workforce, the
Gesetzes über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst (Auxiliary Services Act) obliged all men
aged between 17 and 60 and not liable for military service to work in companies graded
kriegswichtig (`vital to the war eort'). Hence respective age cohorts had to attend their
18. Holger Aenbach, ``Bis zum letzten Mann und letzten Groschen?' Die Wehrpicht im Deutschen
Reich und ihre Auswirkungen auf das militärischeFührungsdenken im Ersten Weltkrieg', in Die Wehrp-
icht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung, ed. Roland G. Foerster,
Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 43 (München: Oldenbourg, 1994), 7190, 76-79.
19. Friedrich Zahn, `Die amtliche Statistik und der Krieg', Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und
Statistik / Journal of Economics and Statistics (Stuttgart) 51 (106), no. 1 (1916): 95103, 95.
20. Cf. Zahn, 100.
21. Cf. David Meskill, Optimizing the German workforce: labor administration from Bismarck to the
economic miracle, Monographs in German history 31 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 68.
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place of residency's Einwohnermeldeämter (Register Oces) to rectify registers.22 Once
again the population was in charge of the thorough implementation of registration and
as a result the eect of the law was limited as Goebel  echoing the antisemitic discourse
 judged in 1928:
Der gewohnheitsmäÿige Drückeberger und der Kriegsschieber aber fand nach
wie vor Auswege genug, sich auch der Wirkung des Hilfsdienstgesetzes zu
entziehen.23
So, more importantly, the Auxiliary Service Act reected a change in attitudes. For the
rst time Totalerfassung (comprehensive registration) of men and material had become
an explicit goal of the administration.24 And while the management of human resources
and raw materials during the war was mainly an economic decision in an eort to cope
with Germany's economic duress, it helped to promote a perspective on the population as
a statistical entity, in which supply with soldiers was just one parameter in the equation
of a wider supply chain.25 Thereby the war also helped promote an image of an organised
society and a common economy (Gemeinwirtschaft) as it had informed the opening
quotation of Walter Rathenau. While before 1914 this kind of thinking was limited to
ocials and experts, Meskill has highlighted how it was amplied on both sides of the
political spectrum.26
Like the Augusterlebnis, the mobilisation was soon to be exploited politically and fused
with the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft brushing aside inequalities within the German
society.27 In contrast to the unity displayed earlier, with the defeats on the battleeld
fear and suspicion of traditional outgroups increased. In the wake of `total mobilisation',
both Jews and `Gypsies' were suspected to be `shirkers'. Those considered `inländische
Zigeuner ' were to be drafted  though Bonillo points out, that the majority of German
`Gypsies' already served in the army  or otherwise held under careful supervision. In
Saxony a special Meldepicht for `Gypsies' was imposed.28
22. Eugen Rüdiger Hägele, Die Rechtsentwicklung des Paÿ- und Meldewesens; Nach d. Recht Preuÿens
u. d. Reichs (Schramberg: Gatzer & Hahn, 1940), 88.
23. Goebel, Deutsche Rohstowirtschaft im Weltkrieg: einschlieÿlich des Hindenburg-Programms, 80.
24. Cf.Meskill, Optimizing the German workforce, 73.
25. Cf. Aenbach, `Wehrpicht', 85.
26. Meskill, Optimizing the German workforce, 73.
27. Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 179.
28. Cf. Bonillo, `Zigeunerpolitik', 217219.
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2.2 Judenzählung
In the case of Jews in addition to the suspicion of shirking came the accusation of
unproportionally proting from the war. The military's initial permeability for Jewish
cadets already staggered when the war came into its second year.29 Despite the calls for a
Burgfrieden, on 28th August 1914 anti-Semites under the lead of the Reichshammerbund
demanded Jewish inuence be monitored and called for statistics on Jews in the army.30
A fortnight before the Verband deutscher Juden had issued quite a similar call, al-
beit with the explicit task of gathering statistical data on Jewish participants of the
war, in order to rebut allegations of `Jewish shirking' or disloyalty.31 By February 1915,
backed by 12 Jewish organisations, the Büro für Statistik der Juden was established.32
With 1916's change to `total mobilisation', the heightened attention for the distribu-
tion of manpower between army and industry and thus the issue of shirking, voices
disputing Jewish loyalty grew constantly louder. In spring 1916 a `deluge of letters' of
complaint  often sent anonymously  regarding `Jewish shirking' arrived at the War
Ministry.33 In March the Reichshammerbund 's Theodor Fritsch and Alfred Roth sent
a renewed memorandum to the Kaiser and leading politicians.34 On 11th October 1916
the order for a Judenzählung was disseminated within the military. The results were
to be returned to the ministry by 1st November. More than a week later on 19th Mat-
thias Erzberger, member of the Reichstag for the Zentrum party demanded a census
be conducted among the sta of the Kriegsgesellschaften  exempt from serving on the
front-lines  to substantiate the allegations of a Jewish over-representation.35 Though
his proposal was supported even by the national-liberals, it did not result in a survey
 still it created displeasure amongst German Jews. It was only on 3rd November that
the ministry informed the Reichstag, and thus the public, about its Judenzählung.36
Prompted by several accusations by social democrat and liberal deputies, Wrisberg felt
29. Cf. Rosenthal, `Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre
Folgen, 83.
30. Cf. Michalka and Vogt, Judenemanzipation und Antisemitismus, 110.
31. Werner T. Angress, `The German army's `Judenzählung' of 1916. Genesis-consequences-
signicance', (Oxford) Year-book / Leo Baeck Institute Oxford, Vol. 23, (1978): 117137, 123.
32. From autumn 1916 on operating as Ausschuss für Kriegsstatistik. Cf. Angress, 123.
33. Angress, 121.
34. Cf. Peter C. Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War (London:
Vallentine Mitchell, 2014), 246.
35. Cf. Angress, `The German army's `Judenzählung' of 1916. Genesis-consequences-signicance',
125. Michalka, obviously unaware of Angress' study, believes Erzberger's Reichstag's speech to have
triggered the survey. Cf. Michalka and Vogt, Judenemanzipation und Antisemitismus, 111.
36. Angress, `The German army's `Judenzählung' of 1916. Genesis-consequences-signicance', 125.
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compelled to admit that a Judenstatistik had been ongoing to test allegations of `Jewish
shirking' even before the issue was brought before the Reichstag.
The ministry was heavily attacked for the survey. During the same Reichstag 's ses-
sion some initial allegations against the military were made. Resulting from the decree,
Jewish conscripts had been transferred into rear echelons so that they counted amongst
the `shirkers'.37 Representatives of the Central Verein and the Verband der deutschen
Juden tried to get the ministry to acknowledge the parity of the Jewish contribution
to the war eort. Instead, in January 1917 Reich Minister of War Hermann von Stein
conceded to quote him saying that the census was not caused by the conduct of Jews
during the war.38 In addition to the unease caused by the fact that Jews were singled
out, the survey itself was harshly criticised for being ill-devised and inconclusive.39 Di-
vided into the dierent sections of the army Feldheer, Etappe and Besatzungsheer, the
questionnaire asked for the total number of Jewish soldiers, whether they volunteered,
the number of fallen and their decorations. For the Etappe a separate column was added
to specify the numbers of those t for combat service. The questionnaire was to be
completed by the `Batallionsschreiber' (clerk of the batallion) and even though the text
of the original decree was circulated with the questionnaire, no further instruction as to
where and how to retrieve the correct information was given.
A common misconception regarding the Judenzählung is the claim that due to Jewish
intervention the military did not record the recruit's confession.40 The Prussian War
Archives have been destroyed during World War II, so that these assumptions went
hitherto uncontested. However, a manual for the maintenance of the Kriegsranglisten,
that has previously evaded attention, proves this assumption wrong. The Kriegsrang-
listen registered all members of a military unit and its fourth column recorded `religion'.41
A register-based survey would thus have produced more reliable statistics.42 The survey
did not adhere to the statistical standards established during the previous century. The
overall return of results was not monitored.43 Baden for instance refused to return results
37. Rosenthal, `Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre
Folgen, 64-68.
38. Rosenthal, 73.
39. Angress has published a template of the questionnaire. Angress, `The German army's `Juden-
zählung' of 1916. Genesis-consequences-signicance', 136-137.
40. Cf. Hans-Joachim Becker, Von der konfessionellen Militärstatistik zur `Judenzählung' (1916) 
Eine Neubewertung (Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz, 2016), 306.
41. Cf. Schmidt, Die Kriegsstammrolle und ihre Führung. mit einem Anhange: Verfahren bei Sterbe-
fällen und bei Vermiÿten, 2. (Oldenburg i. Gr.: Stalling, 1916), 10.
42. Cf. Rosenthal, `Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre
Folgen, 80.
43. Franz Oppenheimer, Die Judenstatistik des preuÿischen Kriegsministeriums, Fragen der Zeit
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altogether.44 Considering the numerous statistics produced by ocial statisticians on
behalf of the ministry, it is remarkable that the Judenzählung of all surveys was designed
without their involvement. After all, it seems not unlikely that, due to these obvious
aws the ministry refused to publish the results  in particular when compared with the
standards applied by the statistical oce of the Jewish organisations.
The Büro für Kriegsstatistik 's collection of data was supervised by Heinrich Silbergleit,
the director of Berlin's statistical oce, and compiled by statistician Jacob Segall. In
contrast to the ocial statistics these organisations carried on collecting data through-
out the war, the registration on counting cards was based on the individual, and hence
reproducible.45 Their ndings are now still the most reliable source if one is to answer
the question of `Jewish shirking' or `Jewish loyalty'. However, since the private statisti-
cians were denied access to ocial documents and data from Posen and Alsace-Lorraine
was not available after the war, their results were also far from exhaustive.46 Jews
without connection to Jewish organisations would remain unaccounted for and for the
territories not contributing data, gures had to be extrapolated.47 Whereas nal results
were published only in 1921, the gures for East Prussia were already published in a
small brochure in 1919.48 Neither the `ocial statistics' nor the `Jewish statistics' can
claim to be `correct'  as Appelbaum does for the latter  or even comprehensive, but
Segall oers transparency regarding acquisition and compilation of the gures.49 Right
after the survey was made public, Jewish representatives were quick to announce seeing
no malicious intent on the ministry's side, whilst unavailingly advocating for a public
declaration by the ministry, recognising Jewish parity regarding the war eort.
Rathenau's initial hopes were shattered even before the Judenzählung took place.50
In August 1916 he wrote:
The more Jews fall in this war, the more enduringly their opponents will
show that they will have sat behind the front and proted from the war.
The hate will double and treble.51
(München: Verl. für Kulturpolitik, 1922), 10.
44. Michalka and Vogt, Judenemanzipation und Antisemitismus, 113.
45. Cf. Oppenheimer, Die Judenstatistik des preuÿischen Kriegsministeriums, 11.
46. Cf. Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War, 270.
47. Cf. Rosenthal, `Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre
Folgen, 119.
48. Walter Leiser, Die Juden im Heer: eine Kriegsstatistik (Berlin: Philo, 1919).
49. Cf. Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War, 300.
50. As cited in Appelbaum, 260.
51. As cited in: Appelbaum, 245.
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He had resigned from his post at the K.R.A. more than a year earlier. This is to say,
even before the census, most Jews were well aware anti-Semitism was not to be abolished
by decree  the early establishment of the Büro für Kriegsstatistik is a clear indicator
of the limited trust the Jewish organisations involved had in the Burgfrieden.52 Michael
Grünwald has observed that testimonies of Jewish soldiers do not mention the survey
and concluded the survey was not perceived as turning-point.53 However, it may not be
an indicator of the soldiers' equanimity but rather their lack of knowledge. Other than
Grünwald reports for the case of Julius Marx,54 an actual count of Jewish soldiers was
never intended and thus unlikely, since the original decree did not require the presence
of those counted; it would furthermore have proven impossible for the fallen.55 For many
front line soldiers the decree may just have gone unnoticed.
Historiography has identied a number of dispositions that allowed the conduct of the
survey, of which I want to highlight a few. In the wake of the Hindenburg-Programm's
attempts to mobilise the entire population, public attention was brought to the issue of
`shirking'. Wehler has identied a long-standing tradition within the military that linked
Jewish emancipation and democratisation and saw the closure of the higher positions for
Jews as a last bulwark against the democratisation of the army.56 The fear after the war
Jewish organisations, presenting their own gures and claiming access to military careers,
could jeopardise the military's integrity, compelled the ministry to produce gures of
their own.57Even Minister of War von Stein, had to admit the malicious consequences
of the survey on the occasion of a subsequent attempt to single out Jewish soldiers in
Stettin which was immediately stopped due to von Stein's intervention.58
52. Cf. Tim Grady,German-Jewish soldiers of the First World War in history and memory (Liverpool:
Liverpool-Univ.-Press, 2011), 30.
53. Michal Grünwald, `Antisemitismus im Deutschen Heer und Judenzählung', ed. Michael Berger,
(Paderborn), 2012, 143. A similar view is held by Fine, Jewish integration in the German Army in the
First World War and Grady, German-Jewish soldiers of the First World War in history and memory
and disputed by Appelbaum with ample evidence. Cf. Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German
army in the Great War 57-207.
54. Cf. Grünwald, `Antisemitismus im Deutschen Heer und Judenzählung', 141.
55. Marx testimony, which forms the source for Grünwald's conclusions, features a high degree of
literarisation as he recalls being asked for his birth date, while the original questionnaire did not entail
any such detailed individual questions. Furthermore this process has a serious methodological aw as
it assumed that the Jewish identity of the soldiers was already known to those conducting the census.
56. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen
Staaten 1914-1949, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte / Hans-Ulrich Wehler; 4. Band (Verlag C.H. Beck,
2008), 129-130. Cf. Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War, 297, and
Albrecht, `Preuÿen, ein `Judenstaat'. Antisemitismus als konservative Strategie gegen die Neue Ära
 Zur Krisentheorie der Moderne', 470.
57. Cf. Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War. 247-248; and Rosenthal,
`Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre Folgen, 15-16.
58. As cited in: Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War, 256. Wehler
mentions several similar occasions where the ministry remained idle. Cf. Wehler, Vom Beginn des
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The original decree made use of antisemitic tropes and its design would inevitably
lead to results compromised to Jewish disadvantage. It would thus be inappropriate to
claim that the survey was not initiated to cater to antisemitic beliefs.59 Gavin Wiens has
recently suggested the Judenzählung is best understood in a wider context of measures
against national minorities.60 On the other hand we can learn from his research that
these cases were grounded in existing nationalist tensions. The measures were regionally
limited, similar measures were enacted in almost all countries participating in the war
and no attempt was ever made to single out any other group in the entire army. Most
importantly, none of these measures sparked a public debate comparable with that of
the Judenzählung.
2.3 Reich and Republic
Many things can and have been said about the Weimar Republic that ocially remained
the Deutsche Reich. I will instead focus on two aspects only. I will rst briey cover the
continuing discussions on the `Judenzählung ' that formed a focal point for the republic's
nationalist opposition. Then I will analyse the rst attempts at a nationwide alignment
of registration initiated in 1928.
After the war a `battle of statistics' began, that put a minority-census at the heart
of the discussions about a future Germany.61 The fact that the results of the `Juden-
zählung ' were never ocially published gave rise to suspicions on both sides. While
anti-Semites saw their expectations sustained, arguing if the survey had rebutted their
claims, the ministry, they always had suspected of being too friendly to Jews, would
certainly have published them. Jewish organisations on the other hand claimed just the
opposite. Though statistics played a major role in these disputes, the general public was
not interested in statistical questions but rather in how statistics could be deployed.62
Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914-1949, 131.
59. Hans-Joachim Becker, Von der konfessionellen Militärstatistik zur `Judenzählung' (1916)  Eine
Neubewertung (Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz, 2016).
60. Gavin Wiens, `A Mixed bag of Loyalties: Jewish Soldiers, Ethnic minorities, and State-Based
Contingents in the German Army 1914-1918', ed. Edward Madigan and Gideon Reuveni (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 149170, 139.
61. Cf. Rosenthal, `Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre
Folgen, 116.
62. The following publications shaped the post-war discourse: Otto Armin, Die Juden im Heere:
eine statistische Untersuchung nach amtlichen Quellen (München: München: Deutscher Volksverlag
Dr. E. Boepple, 1919) Otto Armin is Alfred Roth's pseudonym composed of Bismark's rst name and
a refecence to Arminius, chieftain of the Cherusci. ; In December 1919 the conservative Kreuzzeitung
published excerpts from Armin's brochure. Cf. Rosenthal, `Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Juden-
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The rst publication that was seriously dedicated to statistical questions focused on the
obstacles such an enterprise entails. In 1917, prior to the publication of any gures,
May called his study `Konfessionelle Militärstatistik' underlining the impossibility of a
separate `Jewish' survey.63 He utilised data of the previous censuses to determine the
dierences in the demographic structure of the three major confessions. In particular
Oppenheimer's critique was informed by May's preliminary thoughts, but also Segall's
`Die deutschen Juden als Soldaten im Kriege 1914-1918'.64 Even statisticians who dis-
agreed had to acknowledge that the study was mit seiner umfassenden Beherrschung
und meisterhaften Kombination des statistischen Materials ein Musterstück statistischer
Feinarbeit.65 Finally, even Otto Armin referred to this study when he wrote: und keine
jüdisch zurechtgebogene Statistik vermag jene Tatsachen [the alleged `Jewish shirking']
in der Meinung des Volkes auszulöschen.66 Interestingly, neither the design of the survey
nor the public debate brought up the question of converted Jews and thus of `race'.67
However, beside the methodological shortcomings of the original survey, Armin's pub-
lication features a series of aws, the biggest of them simple mistakes in calculation that
have been analysed in detail by Rosenthal. In addition to the divergent gures, Armin
miscalculates to the Jewish disadvantage.68 It was these obvious aws in the data's
compilation that made Oppenheimer utter his frequently quoted judgement:
zählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre Folgen, 118; Walter Leiser, Die Juden im Heer: eine Kriegsstatistik
(Berlin: Philo, 1919); Otto Armin, Die Juden in den Kriegsgesellschaften und in der Kriegswirtschaft:
unter Benutzung amtlicher und anderer Quellen dargestellt (München: Deutscher Volksverlag Dr. E.
Boepple, 1921); Wrisberg, Ernst von, Heer und Heimat 1914 - 1918, Erinnerungen an die Kriegsjahre
im Königlich Preussischen Kriegsministerium / von Ernst von Wrisberg; 2 (Leipzig: Koehler, 1921);
Jacob Segall, Die deutschen Juden als Soldaten im Kriege 1914 - 1918: eine statistische Studie (Berlin:
Philo-Verl., 1921); Franz Oppenheimer, Die Judenstatistik des preuÿischen Kriegsministeriums, Fragen
der Zeit (München: Verl. für Kulturpolitik, 1922).
63. R. E. May, Konfessionelle Militärstatistik, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 13
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1917).
64. Oppenheimer, Die Judenstatistik des preuÿischen Kriegsministeriums; Jacob Segall, Die deutschen
Juden als Soldaten im Kriege 1914 - 1918: eine statistische Studie (Berlin: Philo-Verl., 1921).  being
published only in 1921 it did not inuence the public discussion even though it may up till today be
the most conclusive source, if one were willing to discuss `Jewish loyalty'.
65. Johannes Müller, `Deutsches Reich', Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik / Journal of
Economics and Statistics (Stuttgart) 58 (113), no. 1 (1919): 8990, 90.
66. Armin, Die Juden in den Kriegsgesellschaften und in der Kriegswirtschaft: unter Benutzung amt-
licher und anderer Quellen dargestellt, 4.
67. Michalka and Vogt, Judenemanzipation und Antisemitismus, 111.
68. Instead of  according to his own gures  at least 12.78% of the Jewish population he claims only
10% have served. And even the gures he uses for comparison are faulty. Where Armin claims 20% of
the average German population had served, the actual proportion was 12.73 %. Cf. Rosenthal, `Die
Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten': die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre Folgen, 120.
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Wenn die E r h e b u n g schon verdächtig ist, so ist ihre V e r a r b e i t u n g
unbestreitbar die gröÿte statistische Ungeheurlichkeit, deren sich jemals eine
Behörde schuldig gemacht hat.69
After 1945 the Judenzählung was usually discussed in the context of the murder of the
European Jews. Angress concludes most German Jews were ready to shrug the survey o
as yet another manifestation of Rishes.70 Yet, Rosenthal holds that `it was nevertheless a
critical point in the continuity that led to the rise of the Nazis and their eventual seizure
of power'.71 It is worth mentioning that Grünwald records a steady level of antisemitic
incidents within the army, before and after the survey.72 Considering the long-term
trend in the concept of German citizenship it seems that rather than representing a
rupture the Judenzählung marks a return from the exceptional period of the Burgfrieden
back to the ethno-cultural concept of citizenship. Thus the Judenzählung may not have
been perceived as a watershed by the majority of Germany's Jews but rather, as Julius
Marx put it, as realer Ausdruck der realen Stimmung.73 More than anything the
signicance of the Judenzählung lay in the antisemitic discourse that evolved from it.
The combination of the reproach of `Jewish' shirking and proting and the connectivity
to the forming Dolchstoÿlegende accelerated the exclusive tendencies and pointed them
in one direction after Germany had lost most of its minorities.74 Its signicance was
already noticed by contemporaries. Social-Democrat Scheidemann estimated
about this decree that after the war there will clearly be two separate dir-
ections for which the country can ght: a direction of freedom, or one of
nationalist demagoguery.75
69. Oppenheimer, Die Judenstatistik des preuÿischen Kriegsministeriums, 14.
70. Angress, `The German army's `Judenzählung' of 1916. Genesis-consequences-signicance', 135.
Rishes Yiddish for anti-Jewish sentiment.
71. As cited in: Grady, German-Jewish soldiers of the First World War in history and memory, 14.
72. Cf. Grünwald, `Antisemitismus im Deutschen Heer und Judenzählung', 144.
73. As cited in: Wehler, Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen
Staaten 1914-1949, 130.
74. Cf. Boris Barth, Dolchstoÿlegenden und politische Desintegration: das Trauma der deutschen
Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914 - 1933, Schriften des Bundesarchivs 61 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003).
75. As cited in Appelbaum, Loyal sons: Jews in the German army in the Great War, 259.
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2.4 Standardisation of registration and the
Reich-Länder divide
The Weimar discourse on registration was a marginal topic embedded in a wider one
aiming for a general overhaul of the federal system. From early Weimar days the federal
system had been looked at by ocials and politicians on the national level as an obstacle
to the formation of an ecient, centralised modern state and to the nalisation of Ger-
man nation building. Hence a thorough Reichsreform was discussed, while opposition
formed among politicians from the federal states. In October 1920 a Reichskommissar
für die Vereinfachung und Vereinheitlichung der Reichsverwaltung often referred to as
Spardiktator had been commissioned but his proposals immediately faced opposition
and were fruitless.76 Consequently, a board representing national and federal govern-
ments was summoned, presided from 1923 onwards by a Reichssparkommissar, tasked
with a reform of the administrative structures that was primarily expected to lower the
costs.77 But the federal states  Bavaria in particular  saw their competences jeopard-
ised and thus solicited chancellor Wirth to declare that the government respected the
federal competences.78 Prussia on the other hand understood further centralisation as
a means with which to acquire increased inuence over Reich politics, so the dualism
of national and federal governments was represented by Prussia and Bavaria.79 Not
only did the discussions widen the gulf between north and south, but also split parties.
Two memoranda by the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior sparked a discussion that
questioned the general constitution in administration calling for a thorough Reichsre-
form. Despite drawing a lot of public attention, it incited defence of mutually exclusive
particular interests, polarising across party lines.80 The complex front lines did not fur-
ther the cause of unication. Instead it produced a deluge of pamphlets that Gerhard
Schulz has understood as discourse on the future shape of the republic, but that did not
result in constitutional changes.81 Unication oundered in Weimar's federal system.
The peak of discussions about a Reichsreform was marked by a federal conference from
76. Cf. Gerhard Schulz, Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichsreform in
der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960), 522.
77. Schulz, 528.
78. Schulz, 392.
79. Wolfgang Hofmann, Städtetag und Verfassungsordnung: Position und Politik der Hauptgeschäfts-
führer eines kommunalen Spitzenverbandes, Schriftenreihe des Vereins für Kommunalwissenschaften e.V.
Berlin Bd. 13 (Stuttgart, Berlin, 1966), 65.
80. Hofmann, 66.
81. Cf. Schulz, Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur, 606.
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1928 to 1930 trying to appease the fractions by promoting the `dezentralisierten Ein-
heitsstaat ' (decentralised unitary state) but to no avail. The eorts towards unication
and standardisation of administration were overshadowed by Weimar's crisis. But the
'Gleichschaltung der Länder' during the rst years of Nazi rule built on the discourse
around the Reichsreform.
Registration in Weimar
In Prussian, registration had hardly changed since 1836. Attempts towards standard-
isation were rst made in 1902 by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior by issuing a
decree on registration but it went unnoticed and petered out. But in 1904 general dir-
ectives were issued regarding minimum standards for local police regulations, according
to which the local registration regulations had to ascertain:
 obligation to notify the local register oce when moving away (Abmeldung)
 indication of the former address
 issuance of a cancelling of registration form (Abmeldeschein)
 registration on arrival (Anmeldung)
Furthermore, the registration oces were instructed to inform their counterparts when
ever a change of residence was brought to their attention.82 This `Rückmeldung' (report-
ing requirement), however, was not formalised and hence had next to no eect. Whether
records were maintained in books, lists or registers was still for the local authorities to
decide. The Weimar Republic inherited these registration regulations unaected by the
change of the political system.83
Due to its federal structure, the national government could not exercise police sov-
ereignty in the federal states. Registration again was one of the genuine police com-
petences. Hence registration diered throughout the republic. In rural areas, where
migration was rare, a mayor  usually in charge of all administrative aairs  possibly
saw little need for meticulous registration. Cities on the other hand  often character-
ised as places where everybody is a stranger  in particular growing cities like Berlin
or seaports like Bremen and Hamburg had developed quite advanced registration sys-
tems. In addition, the victorious parties of the Great War prohibited the establishment
of centrally organised police forces and thus cemented the already existing dichotomy
82. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 59.
83. Cf. Mühlbauer, 59.
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of national and federal competences which made eorts to standardise regulations by
way of passing laws on the national level more dicult. But on 1st June 1931 Prussia
passed the Polizeiverwaltungsgesetz that introduced standards for registration and can-
cellation thereof. Still, these standards had to be implemented by police regulations on
the municipal level resulting in about 10,000 dierent decrees in Prussia.84 The state of
regulations in Prussia can be seen as exemplary for the condition in the entire Reich.
Nonetheless, in the course of discussing a Reichsreform eorts towards a standardisation
 not only of registration but of the entire Weimar administration  were made. Yet,
the rst results regarding registration were only achieved in Weimar's nal years. When
Prussia resorted to issuing template regulations in 1930, Prussia's Ministry of the In-
terior could only decree obligatory standards, hence regulations still diered locally and
implementation was not monitored. The Prussian reform was based on directives agreed
upon by all federal states at a conference in 1928. Registration was not the focal issue
of the event in an inn called Warburg Gasthof in Eisenach. Nevertheless, the results
deserve closer analysis since they provided the basis for the rst initiatives regarding
registration by the National Socialist government.
The Eisenach Conference 1928
The Reichsreform had hitherto been discussed on a theoretical level only and was mainly
motivated by expected savings and increased eciency. Concrete need for reform was
triggered by international agreements to simplify visa aairs at the League of Nations
1926 International Passport Conference and a successive Trac Conference in 1927 both
taking place in Geneva.85 To full the obligations, Germany had to standardise visa
and passport regulations. Hence, a conference in Eisenach dedicated to the Pass- und
Fremdenpolizeiwesen gathered upper grade ocials from all federal states as well as
from the Ministry for the Exterior. It aimed at a standardisation of passport and visa
regulations and registration was just a minor aspect of the discussions that started on
31st May 1928 and went on until 9th June. The discussions during the meeting mirror
how questions of aliens' control, labour market, citizenship, nationality and freedom of
movement were intertwined and overshadowed by the contention over the federal states'
competences.
84. Cf. Kurt G. A. Jeserich and Hildegard Bartels, eds., Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte; 4: Das Reich
als Republik und in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus, vol. 4, Das Reich als Republik und in der Zeit des
Nationalsozialismus (Darmstadt: DVA, 1985), 410-411.
85. Cf. Hägele, Die Rechtsentwicklung des Paÿ- und Meldewesens; Nach d. Recht Preuÿens u. d.
Reichs, 35. Respective sources can be consulted in BArch R 901 74615.
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All parties approved an easing of visa regulations for most aliens except Poles and
Soviet citizens, some of whom were only transiting Germany to embark in Bremen or
Hamburg and leave Europe for good. Others came to work and a fair amount of time
during and after the conference was spent discussing conditions for migrant labourers and
the protection of Germany's labour market. But two groups in particular were seen as
a threat: so-called `ostjüdische Elemente' from Poland and Soviet citizens.86 The Reich
Ministry of the Interior and its Prussian counterpart championed the disestablishment
of exit visas and a general extension of validity to six months The perceived heightened
threat by unregistered aliens should thus be counteracted by aliens' police regulation on
the federal level.87 For better control of these individuals the Ministry for the Exterior
recommended the limitation of the duration of their visas. All regulations were based
on mutuality. Since all other states adhered to the standards agreed upon in 1927 this
measure allowed the targeting the Soviet Union ohne dass der Wortlaut eine Maÿnahme
gegen die Sowjetunion erkennen liesse.88 On this basis exceptional clauses would permit
issuance of limited visas to targeted individuals providing closer oversight by the police.
To allow nationwide tracking of the these individuals an `Ausweisungsnachrichtenstelle'
(A.N.St.) (central register for expulsion) was established in Berlin's Police Department
in September 1928 to which every such expulsion was to be reported.89 The nal move
of these provisions was expected to come from the federal side, required to dispense with
their right to extend visas.90
Bavaria opposed this, as the Ministry for the Exterior's envoy Dr. Kraske reported to
his superior Georg Martius in Berlin:
Die Angelegenheit spielte sich so ab, dass Preuÿen gemäÿ den letzten Ber-
liner Vorbesprechungen den Vorschlag der Reichsregierung unterstützte, der
alsbald auf den entschiedensten Widerstand des bayrischen Vertreters stiess.
Hierfür waren weder Rücksichten auf die Reinheit des Systems  Passpol-
izei : Fremdenpolizei  noch ostjudenfreundliche Neigungen sondern allein
die Abneigung maÿgebend, sich in fremdenpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten ir-
86. BArch R 901 26070, Auswärtiges Amt an Herrn Martius, 2nd of June 1928, 52. Cf. Hägele, Die
Rechtsentwicklung des Paÿ- und Meldewesens; Nach d. Recht Preuÿens u. d. Reichs, 34.
87. BArch R 901 26070, Der Reichskommissar für die Überwachung der öentlichen Ordnung an das
Reichministerium des Innern, Betrit: Aufhebung des Reisesichtvermerks, 26th of April 1928, 10.
88. BArch R 901 26070, Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.) Moskau, den 27. Mai 1928 15 Uhr, 32-33.
89. BArch R 901 20670, Der Preuÿische Minister des Innern, Entwurf eines Erlasses an die Oberpräsid-
enten und die Reg. Präs. über die Einrichtung einer Ausweisungsnachrichtenstelle, approx. August
1928, 273.
90. BArch R 901 26070, Aufzeichnung über die Paÿ- und Fremdenpolizeikonferenz in Eisenach vom
31. Mai bis 9. Juni 1928. Referent: V.L.R. Kraske, 65-66
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gend etwas von Reichsstellen vorschreiben zu lassen oder auch nur freiwillig
irgendwelche Bindungen zu übernehmen. Die übrigen Länder hatten der
Frage keine besondere Bedeutung beigelegt, wurden aber teilweise natürlich
hellhörig, als sie merkten, dass es sich um ihre Hoheitsrechte handle.91
It is not necessary to follow this controversy in detail but Mayer's report illustrates both
the lines of conict as well as the racial subtext of the discussions. As Mayer estimated,
Bavarian opposition was neither sparked by the content of any of the propositions nor
by a specic interest apart from preserving their authority. Eventually Kraske could
overcome Bavaria's resistance by asserting that the limitation of visas would be targeted
to the Soviet Union and as an exceptional measure (`Kampfmaÿnahme' ) only.
Registration per se was only one of four items on the conference's agenda and the
necessity of nationwide standardisation was uncontested. The attendees agreed upon
non-binding provisions. While many aspects of the guidelines were hitherto covered by
local legislation, the biggest change was one in principle. The conference's nal document
sets in: Die Meldebestimmungen der Länder sollen grundsätzlich in gleicher Weise für
Inländer und Ausländer Anwendung nden.92 Though the provisions still allowed for
exceptions for instance in border regions, the conference agreed that registration in
Germany should be extended from alien control to citizen control. The regulations should
be both easy comply with for the population and more comprehensive. Looking at the
history of registration its biggest challenge had been compliance.93 By extending respites
to up to a week and providing the necessary forms free of charge it was expected to
obtain more comprehensive registers. Complementary, rst  albeit vague  nationwide
notication obligations were included. Registration Oces now were instructed to notify
their counterparts in all cases in which circumstances suggested that registration had
not been cancelled at the last residency to ensure the whereabouts of a given person were
continuously documented. Furthermore, the new directives provided for a wider use of
the registries. Anticipating the idea of a database of the population the nal document
stated:
Der Inhalt der Meldungen ist so auszugestalten, dass er auch für andere
Zwecke der Verwaltung ( z.B. für Wahl- und Steuerzwecke) alle wissenswer-
ten Angaben enthält. Deswegen kann auch in diesen Formularen auf die
Spalte `Staatsangehörigkeit' und `Religion' nicht verzichtet werden. [. . . ]
91. BArch R 901 26070, BArch R 901 26070, Auswärtiges Amt an Herrn Martius, 2nd June 1928, 51.
92. BArch R 901 26070, Eisenach Conference Closing Document (II B 8106/3.7.) 9th June 1928, 124.
93. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 10.
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Hinsichtlich der Frage nach der Religion wurde festgestellt, dass diese Frage
der Reichsverfassung nicht widerspricht.
Notably, this was the only dissent that surfaced in the records of registration aairs from
Eisenach.
One more item on the conference's agenda, though only loosely connected to regis-
tration, shall be briey discussed. It relates to Germans of undocumented citizenship
abroad and shows how `völkisch' concepts, that had already manifested in the 1913 act
on citizenship, were embedded into Weimar politics. Germans in Poland in particular
should not be incited to move to Germany in order to maintain citizenship, as they were
seen as leverage regarding German claims on Polish territory.
Um die Abwanderung deutschstämmiger Elemente aus Polen zu verhindern,
erschienen [. . . ] fremdenpolizeiliche Maÿnahmen weder politisch tragbar,
noch auch geeignet, das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zum deutschen Volkstum
zu stärken und zu erhalten.
Hence the conference agreed to go easy on `ethnic' Germans infringing aliens' law. Ac-
cording to the majority of federal envoys this already was commonly practised. But
police could of course apply aliens' law wenn auch sonstige erhebliche Gründe die Ent-
fernung der betreenden Person angezeigt erscheinen lassen. Once again, this time for
`ethnic Germans' the question of a denition or criteria was raised. Instead of entering
into lengthy discussions, the conference took a practical approach to the issue:
Von einer allgemein gültigen Festlegung des Begries der Deutschstämmig-
keit wird Abstand genommen. Jedoch soll der deutsch-österreichischen An-
schlussbewegung dadurch Rechnung getragen werden, dass Angehörige der
Österreichischen Republik ohne weitere Prüfung als deutschstämmig angese-
hen werden. Auch wird bei Angehörigen der Freien Stadt Danzig die Deutsch-
stämmigkeit im allgemeinen bejaht werden können.
Austrians should generally be treated like legal Germans.94 People from Gdansk were to
be treated with a little more suspicion. Polish Germans again were not even mentioned,
suggesting a subtle ranking. Regarding clear-cut criteria, the conference realised that
ozielle Vorschriften über eine Vorzugsbehandlung der deutschstämmigen Ausländer
[. . . ] rechtlich und politisch nicht möglich [sind].
94. BArch R 901 20670, Eisenach Conference Closing Document (II B 8106/3.7.) 9th June 1928,
124-129.
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Implementation therefore mirrored the process of arbitrary exclusion as it was similarly
subject to individual ocials' judgement.
The conference agreed that all regulations in the nal document should be in eect
by 1st January 1929. The central register for expulsion (A.N.St.) was established that
same year, Prussia's registration regulation template was issued in 1930 but regarding
the other agreements even a year later Prussia's Ministry of the Interior stated that auch
jetzt noch nicht alle Hindernisse beseitigt sind, die einer Neuregelung der Passverordnung
im ganzen entgegenstehen.95 Yet another year later, in August 1931, the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior informed the Ministry for the Exterior that
die Vorarbeiten für die neue Arbeitsmarktverordnung, die nach der Eisen-
acher Paÿ- und Fremdenpolizei Konferenz von 1928 als ein wichtiger Teil
der geplanten Neuregelung auf paÿ- und fremdenpolizeilichen Gebiet gedacht
war, noch nicht abgeschlossen werden konnte.96
Due to the entanglement with the various administrative elds discussed with the Reichs-
reform, reform eorts in general remained in gridlock.
Registration in the early 1930s
The Eisenach conference brought the benets of a unied registration system to the
attention of the federal states and brought about a general understanding of the main
items. Regulations for registration were seemingly not contested at all, with the ex-
ception of the inclusion of a question about religion in registration forms. While this
prepared the ground for a more thorough standardisation over the coming years, the
directives were all vague and left room for interpretation by the federal authorities. The
agreement reached was far from aecting the underlying structure of federal police sov-
ereignty. Due to the complexity of the issues discussed, the need for consultation with
the various parties involved (diplomatic missions, police departments, the Ministry for
the Exterior and federal ministries, etc.) the conference yielded few results during the
Weimar years. For Prussia the conference resulted in template registration regulations
in April 1930 adapted in Berlin on 1st July that same year. According to the guidelines
it advised:
95. BArch R 901 20670, Der Reichsminister des Innern an die Landesregierungen, Betrit: Herabset-
zung der Passgebühren. 25th April 1929, 327.
96. BArch R 901 25416, Der Reichsminister des Innern an die Landesregierungen, Betrit: Neuregel-
ung des Paÿwesens, 5th August 1931, 8.
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 registry oces to be located at the local police departments
 registration on arrival (Anmeldung)
 obligation to cancel registration when moving away (Abmeldung)
 regulations for registration for secondary residence, inns, hospitals, homeless shel-
ters, etc.
 issuance of a cancelling of registration form (Abmeldeschein)
 introduction of the `Groÿer Meldeschein' as the standard form for registration
which asked for:
 rst and family name
 maritial status
 occupation
 date of birth
 place of birth
 religion
 indication of the former address
 (sub) tenancy
Thus the `Musterpolizeiverordnung' ensured an unprecedented degree of consistency for
Prussia. The establishment of the A.N.St. and the Munich `Zigeunerstelle' marked the
start of centralisation of police administration. The Prussian Polizeiverordnungsgesetz
(PVG) that came into force in June 1931 authorised the Prussian Ministry of the Interior
to decree police regulations for all of Prussia.
3 A racial state
The National Socialists' core promise was to replace the constantly changing modern
society with the supposedly more harmonious Volksgemeinschaft. The concept of the
Volksgemeinschaft had been conjured by almost all political parties during the Weimar
era, but with the political right it soon got a `völkisch' interpretation.1 Analysis of the
nexus of statistics, registration and concepts of state membership has thus far shown a
long-lasting trend in which further unication and centralisation of the German state was
accompanied by an increasingly exclusive understanding of state membership. National
Socialists promised to implement the idea of congruency of `Volk ' and `race' once in
power.
Germany was to be turned into the Racial State.2 In its 1920 Manifesto the NSDAP
had tied citizenship to the concept of `race'.3 State membership should from now on
be based on `German blood'. It was thus up to the new rulers to endow with meaning
the hitherto oating signiers of Volk and Volksgemeinschaft and its complementing
ideology  anti-Semitism. To transform both from cultural code into (legal) practice
and institutions, authorities had to acquire information on the descent of the resident
population
Numerous initiatives aimed at producing racial indices of the population, varying in
administrative responsibilities as well as in the concepts of race. However, an imple-
mentation of any of these initiatives depended on clear-cut criteria of `race'. Similarly,
a reform of the police registration system had to consider `race' as an important factor.
Only when this dispute was decided in September 1935 did eorts for a unied registra-
tion system gain momentum.
I will now outline the early attempts towards racial registration and statistics and the
diculties encountered in the period between 1933 and 1937 with particular focus on
1. Cf. Steen Bruendel, Volksgemeinschaft oder Volksstaat: die "Ideen von 1914" und die Neuordnung
Deutschlands im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Akad.-Verl.).
2. Michael Burleigh, The racial state: Germany 1933 - 1945, ed. Wolfgang Wippermann (Cambridge,
1991).




the intended methods of data acquisition. I will show how these attempts failed, res-
ulting in the 1937 decision to integrate racial aspects in the police registration system.
This evolutionary process would eventually lead to the establishment of the Volkskartei.
But before getting to the issue of race and registration, I will examine the early discus-
sions around the racial concepts and show how their outcome eventually inuenced the
registration system.
3.1 Prioritising `race'
When at the end of 1932 a NSADAP-led government seemed foreseeable, Achim Gercke,
director of the NS-Auskunft in charge of tracing the descent of party members, and thus
familiar with the diculties of the matter, wrote a memorandum concerning the racial
questions a future racial state had to answer. Mainly addressing citizenship of `Jews
of mixed-blood' it also included the draft of a `Rassescheidungsgesetz ' (Racial Segreg-
ation Act). The three main concerns, he argued, were a) the conceptual segregation
of races, b) the classication of the population according to a), and c) the legal enact-
ment of segregation.4 Any segregation required the respective classication of the entire
population.
This, however, proved to be more dicult than anticipated. The new regime's form-
ative rst two years were characterised by serious inghting, with SS and SA as the focal
points, directly aecting racial policies. It was a conict over administrative compet-
ence as well as the content of racial policies. Not only was the denition of those to
be excluded from the Volksgemeinschaft contended, but the racial dierences within it.
Dr Lothar Loeer from the Kiel Institute for Anthropology only observed a common
opinion amongst racial scientists, when in 1934 he said:
Das deutsche Volk ist ein Rassengemisch, dessen Gehalt an den verschiedenen
an seinem Aufbau beteiligten Rassen in der Geschichte geschwankt hat und
noch heute Schwankungen unterliegt.5
Racial scientists did not agree on the number of races that formed the European and
thus the German population. While Günther posited the existence of six, Fischer found
four, Deniker six primary and four secondary races.6 Even more contested, however, was
4. Cf. Cornelia Essner, Die `Nürnberger Gesetze' oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933 - 1945
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 80.
5. Lothar Loeer, `Grundlagen rassenhygienischer Bevölkerungspolitik', ed. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
Standesbeamten Fachverbände e.V., (Frankfurt am Main) 17 (1934), 311.
6. Loeer, 134.
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the alleged hierarchy among these races. The fact that Germans could not be considered
a homogeneous race posed a severe problem which was tackled in two opposing ways:
one approach favoured the idea of a forming `German race' that would include all the
dierent races identied in Germany with the exception of Jews and `Gypsies'. Those
racists who did not entirely ignore genetics advocated `Aryan' superiority. Both positions
had political implications. The concept of a superior Aryan race was more elitist and thus
more appealing to SS circles, whereas the concept of a forming `German race' was more
inclusive and its proponents were thus to be found with the SA.7 Any attempt to take
inventory of Germany `racial' composition had to decide which concept of race it would
take into account. Furthermore, the treatment of `Jews of mixed-blood' hinged on the
outcome of these discussions since both positions were tied to two competing concepts
of anti-Semitism that had formed about the turn of the century. The proponents of a
`German race' also believed in the `contaministic' paradigm  that was widely publicised
by Dinter's novel `Die Sünde wider das Blut'  according to which Jewishness was passed
on like an infection from male to female during sexual intercourse, so that future children
of (non-Jewish) women would be Jewish even if the contact did not result in pregnancy.8
The Nordicists on the other hand were inuenced by modern genetics and would argue
the case for eugenics, that is the `Aufnordung ' of the German people.9 In consequence
for Nordicists, Jewishness was acceptable to a certain degree as it could be `mendelised'.
Proponents of the German race concept believed even the slightest trace of `Jewish
blood' spoiled the hereditary factors. The dierent approaches to the question of the
composition of the `Germans' directly aected the treatment of `Jews of mixed-blood'.
During the night of the long knifes in 1934 not only was the inuence of the SA di-
minished but also that of their racial scientists. In October the director of the Rassepol-
itisches Amt (Oce for Racial Policy)  established in April 1934 to straighten out
racial-policies  sent a condential letter to all those concerned with racial matters pro-
scribing the use of the term `German race'. The most outspoken proponents of the
concept Merkenschlager and Saller were banned from the party and lost their positions
in early 1935.10 While the SS and thus the Nordicists won the conict, National Socialist
racial policy would keep oscillating between concepts and remnants of the contaministic
paradigm would surface again, in particular with the `Blutschutzgesetz'.
7. Essner, `Nürnberger Gesetze', 69-72.
8. Essner, 32-40.
9. Cf. Essner, 15.
10. Cf. Essner, 69.
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An intricate denition
On the 7th April 1933 the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums intro-
duced a denition of race. In an eort to cleanse the administration of unwanted person-
nel it introduced several criteria under which former ocials could be sent into retire-
ment. While mainly targeting political opponents, its third paragraph read: Beamte,
die nicht arischer Abstammung sind, sind in den Ruhestand zu versetzen.11 It took
three more days until the rst implementing provision dened `Aryan descent':
Als nicht arisch gilt, wer nicht von arischen Eltern oder Groÿeltern abstammt.
Es genügt wenn ein Elternteil oder Groÿelternteil nicht arisch ist. Dies ist
insbesondere dann anzunehmen, wenn ein Elternteil oder Groÿelternteil der
jüdischen Religion angehört hat.12
Thus the law established the concept of `Vierteljuden'. Instead of dening `Aryan des-
cent', the provision established criteria for `non-Aryans'. According to this denition,
ocials with one Jewish relative in the grandparents' generation were sent into retire-
ment. Targeting state employees, its scope was limited to a specic social strata, but
more importantly the law still was vague as the `Jewish religion' of ancestors was seen
as an indicator rather than evidence. Cases of doubt were to be settled beim Reichs-
ministerium des Innern bestellten Sachverständigen für Rasseforschung. The oce of
the Sachverständigen für Rasseforschung (Expert in Racial Science) was lled by Achim
Gercke. Being a proponent of the `contaministic' paradigm Gercke  rather dissatised
by the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums denition  noted:
Dann tun wir so, als sei jüdisches Blut, das z.B. in der Urgroÿelternreihe
eingedrungen ist, gar nicht vorhanden oder bedeutungslos.13
Statistics and racism
But the new law's terminology also raised the cautious objections of scientists measuring
and mapping the subject of modern government. In 1934 Berlin statistician Karl Keller
sketched out the obstacles to racial statistics as well as ways to overcome them. As a
statistician, Keller was interested in individual features only as they formed a general
trend. He dened the task of racial statistics accordingly:
11. RGBl I, 1933, 175. Tentatively, exceptions were made for German Jews who had fought at the
front lines during the Great War or lost serving family members.
12. RGBl I, 1933, 195.
13. As cited in: Essner, `Nürnberger Gesetze', 81.
64
Diese hat es nicht mit einzelnen Merkmalen zu tun, sondern mit festen Ver-
bindungen von Erbeigenschaften, in denen wir das Wesen der verschiedenen
Rassen erblicken; sie sucht die Personenguppen, welche Träger dieser Ver-
bindung sind, zahlenmäÿig zu erfassen, ihren Bestand und seine Veränder-
ung, ihren inneren Aufbau und ihre Lebensäuÿerungen.14
After giving a synopsis of the contemporary positions in racial science, he unequivocally
sides with the Nordicists when he directly addressed diejenigen, welche die Formung
einer `deutschen' Rasse als Ziel [. . . ] hinstellen:
Die Schaung einer Volksgemeinschaft kann von der Politik ins Auge gefaÿt
werden; ob dies für die Schaung einer Rasse möglich ist, erscheint auÿeror-
dentlich zweifelhaft.15
Keller observed, that the forming of the Volksgemeinschaft did not equate with the
long-term racial goals of the Nordicists. Hence, he continued to examine the problem of
analysing the racial composition of the German population, with the statistician's focus
on workable denitions:
Also wagen wir es ruhig, mit unseren primitiven Rassebegriffen den Pro-
blemen zu Leibe zu gehen! [. . . ] Natürlich müssen wir uns, wenn wir
eine deutsche Rassenstatistik einrichten wollen, für eine der Einteilungen
entscheiden [. . . ].16
Opting in favour of Günther's concept, Keller proposed the establishment of a culmin-
ative hereditary index for which data was to be registered on the occasion of draft,
appliance for Ehestandsdarlehen etc. and from which preliminary data could be extra-
polated on a geographical basis in near-time.
Since the cumulative approach would not guarantee a representative sample, for the
long-term Keller proposed the establishment of regional hereditary indices located at the
registry oces to register the hereditary features of the entire population  a plan that
was already pursued by Achim Gercke.17 Reliable data regarding the racial features of
the population, he argued, could only be gathered through registration and examination
by specially trained medical personnel. Furthermore, since genotype and phenotype
14. Karl Keller, `Zur Frage der Rassestatistik', Allgemeines statistisches Archiv (AStA) Journal of the





of a person dier so that the examination of an individual could not yield conclusive
information on the hereditary factors, these examinations had to include ancestry and
ospring. In order to produce a clear display of the population's hereditary factors,
Keller suggested the individual factors be collated into a single racial-score.
Every thirty years, he reckoned, the quinquennial censuses' counting cards could pass
the hereditary index to assign the racial score and thus produce reliable racial statistics.
Keller raised important points. The new racial policy required a system for knowledge
management to maintain and provide the necessary information. Furthermore, to gather
statistical data on the population's racial composition, physical screening of the entire
population was required.
Regarding a racial denition of Jews, Keller could be expected to face conceptual
diculties similar to those described above, as he ascertained:
[. . . ] in Wirklichkeit sind die Juden keine Rasse, sondern ein aus mehreren
Rassen gemischtes Volk.18
Producing statistics on Jewish racial composition would prove as complicated as with
non-Jewish Germans. But instead of discussing the minutiae of the racial composition
of Jews he comes to a pragmatic realisation:
Seitdem in Deutschland der Nationalsozialismus die Macht ergrien hat,
ist damit begonnen worden, auch in der Statistik zwischen `Ariern' und
`Nichtariern' zu unterscheiden. [. . . ] Wenn das neuere Beamten- und Stu-
dentenrecht sich des Wortes `arisch' bedient, so meint es aber damit etwas
ganz anderes, es denkt gar nicht daran, etwa die Deutschen dinarischer Rasse
anders zu behandeln, als die nordischer Rasse; hier bedeutet `arisch' oen-
bar nur den Gegensatz zu `jüdisch' [. . . ] oder `farbig'. Die Unterscheidung
zwischen `Arier' und `Nichtarier' in der Statistik ist also im wesentlichen mit
einer Unterscheidung zwischen Juden und Nichtjuden gleichzusetzen, wobei
man auf jeden Fall nicht an die Konfession, sondern an die Abstammung
denken muÿ. [. . . ]
From a racial perspective Germans were racially mixed and hence the majority of Ger-
mans could not claim Aryan ancestry. Keller realised that the terminology for instance
of the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums ' was rather blurry and nour-
ished fears in the population racial policies would eventually exclude not only Jews. On
the other hand he realised, the antisemitic measures already introduced were  in a strict
18. Keller, `Zur Frage der Rassestatistik', 136.
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sense  not racially dened, but rather aimed at revoking emancipation, as becomes clear
from the ending of this paragraph:
Die Feststellung der jüdischen Abstammung bietet deshalb keine besonderen
Schwierigkeiten, weil vor der Judenemanzipation die Zugehörigkeit zur jü-
dischen Konfession und zum jüdischen Volkstum sich im wesentlichen deck-
ten. Mithin brauchen nur die Übertritte der letzten 130 Jahre aus den
Kirchenbüchern und Standesamtregistern festgestellt zu werden, um die Ab-
stammung zu ermitteln.19
Keller observed the inconsistency of the `Aryan'/ `Non-Aryan' terminology and realised
it was better expressed in the dichotomy of Jewish and non-Jewish, which was easier
to apply since it adhered to the clear-cut criteria of religion, albeit claiming otherwise.
Compared to the project of breeding a race, he considered revoking emancipation a
relatively straightforward aair. Still he estimated a time-span of several decades to
fully implement the project. Keller was not the only one who saw decades of thorough
screening and cumulative registration ahead in order to realise the preconditions for
racial segregation and melioration of the remaining German population.
Path dependencies
The party manifesto had linked German citizenship to `German blood'. Yet, regarding
the question of citizenship German paperwork was  despite a century's eort  far from
comprehensive. For most Germans determining citizenship proved dicult as Friedrich
A. Knost noted in 1934, kaum irgend jemand, weder sie selbst, noch ein Rechtsberater,
noch eine Behörde kann feststellen, welchem Staat sie angehören.20 Proof of citizenship
had thus far only had to be produced in cases of doubt, for those who were doubtlessly
German no consistent records existed in that regard.21 He thus carried on:
In jedem Staate muÿ ein K a t a s t e r d e r S t a a t s a n g e h ö r i g e n
eingerichtet werden, ein Verzeichnis, in das alle Personen einzutragen sind,
die diesem Staate angehören. Es bestehen ja auch Bücher, in die alle Grund-
stücke eingetragen werden.22
19. Keller, `Zur Frage der Rassestatistik', 137-138.
20. Knost, `Staatsbürgerlisten, Familienregister, Reichssippenkartei. Der Weg vom Standesamt zum
Sippenamt', 325.
21. See chapter`Continuance of Eisenach', 77.
22. Knost, `Staatsbürgerlisten, Familienregister, Reichssippenkartei. Der Weg vom Standesamt zum
Sippenamt', 325.
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Since citizenship was already based on descent, Knost reasons, to certify an individu-
als' belonging muÿ vielmehr nicht selten auf die Staatsangehörigkeitsverhältnisse des
Vaters, Groÿvaters oder noch weiter zurückgegangen werden.23 As the Standesämter
were already recording vital data, he suggested following Wuerttemberg's example and
adding a question for citizenship to the forms. Furthermore, he endorsed Wuerttem-
berg's Familienregister, recording health data of entire families, from which conclusions
regarding the individuals' `hereditary value' could be drawn. Achim Gercke who was
actively pursuing the establishment of a kinship index at the registry oces and still
opposed to the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums ' for being too lax,
spoke in 1934 to the participants of an administrative congress:
Wer glaubt, daÿ sich die Rassegesetzgebung bereits auf dem Höhepunkt
bendet, der irrt. Ein Anfang ist gemacht worden. Weiterbauen zu können,
verlangt ein sehr gründliches Studium und eine vielleicht jahrzehntelange
mühsame Kleinarbeit. In dieser Arbeit wird die Reichssippenkartei stehen
und vorrausschauend Grundlagen für zukünftige Entwicklung schaen.24
In particular he argued a reshaped law on citizenship could only be enacted after the
necessary data was acquired.25 To realise his plans, Gercke had managed to nd high-
ranking backers. During the same event Minister of the Interior Frick spoke, sketching
a process of massive data collection:
Denn das Wichtigste undWesentlichste [. . . ] wird die Aufgabe sein, in treuer,
eiÿiger Arbeit alles zusammen zu tragen, was für die Bewertung des Ein-
zelnen in körperlicher und geistiger Hinsicht, in gesundheitlicher und staats-
rechtlicher Beziehung von Bedeutung ist und werden kann. [. . . ] Denn nicht
die Gesundheit eines Einzelnen, sondern die Erbgesundheit, den Erbwert
einer Sippe wünschen wir festzustellen.26
Gercke had already devised plans to collect the data during a genealogical census (auf
familienkundlicher Grundlage). Professor Scheidt from Hamburg doubted the feasibility
of this approach:
23. Knost, `Staatsbürgerlisten, Familienregister, Reichssippenkartei. Der Weg vom Standesamt zum
Sippenamt', 325.
24. Achim Gercke, `Die Reichssippenkartei. Ihr Wert und ihre Bedeutung', Zeitschrift für Standesamt-
swesen. Personenstandsrecht, Ehe- u. Kindschaftsrecht, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (STAZ) (Frankfurt
am Main), 1934, 297300, 300.
25. Cf. Diana Schulle, Das Reichssippenamt. Eine Institution nationalsozialistischer Rassenpolitik
(Berlin: Logos, 2001), 137.
26. Wilhelm Frick, `Vom Standesamt zum Sippenamt', Zeitschrift für Standesamtswesen. Personen-
standsrecht, Ehe- u. Kindschaftsrecht, Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (STAZ) (Frankfurt am Main), 1934,
377379, 377.
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[. . . ] d a s w i c h t i g e s i n d d i e g e n e a l o g i s c h e n Z u s a m m e n -
h ä n g e. Die Bevölkerung im Sinne einer Volkszählung ist kein Volkskörper.
Die Volkszählung liefert nur einen Querschnitt durch den Volkskörper, an
dem die zentralen Fragen der Genetik nicht untersucht werden können.27
In a central point, however, he agreed with Gercke. To produce an overview of the
biological features of the population he suggests the establishment of a `bevölkerungsbio-
logisches Reichsarchiv ' to accumulate and process respective data forwarded by doctors,
teachers and courts. Combining these `manifestations of life' in a single index, he ex-
pected the archive,
die gesamte Bevölkerung so zu repräsentieren, daÿ vom `Repräsentanten'
einer jeden Person ohne weiteres die wichtigsten [. . . ] Zusammenhänge zu
erfahren sind.28
He envisaged a paper copy of the people that, frequently updated, would allow the
authorities to answer all sorts of upcoming questions and help adjust policies accordingly.
Knost also was intrigued by the idea of a single central index, pointedly articulating the
vision, shared by many of those concerned with the matter:
[. . . ] daÿ darin das ganze deutsche Volk  und bald nicht nur das lebende,
sondern wirklich der ganze Volkskörper  vertreten, zur Auskunft an einem
Ort anwesend wäre. Man könnte in 2 Stunden daran vorbeigehen, während
das wirkliche Volk, wenn es in Viererkolonnen marschiert, dazu 8 Monate
brauchte.29
Knost and Scheidt were focused on the eugenic aspects a kinship index would facilitate
but Gercke was also aware of its potential in terms of providing the data required to bring
about racial segregation. To manage the population's racial composition he suggested
the establishment of a central `Reichssippenkartei ' (Reich Kinship Index). Increased
internal migration, he argued, inuenced the racial composition of the population and
had to be monitored from a centralised oce.30 Complementary to the central index, on
the district and the local level, prospective kinship oces were to maintain hardcover
27. As cited in: Knost, `Staatsbürgerlisten, Familienregister, Reichssippenkartei. Der Weg vom
Standesamt zum Sippenamt', 328.
28. As cited in: Knost, 328.
29. Knost, 329.
30. Gercke, `Die Reichssippenkartei. Ihr Wert und ihre Bedeutung', 297.
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Sippenbücher recording the biological features of individual families.31 Instead of estab-
lishing a whole new branch of administration the Standesämter (registry oces) were
designated for a transformation to Sippenämter (Kinship Oces).
However, the breadth of the index was controversial. A draft from autumn 1933, in
which Gercke and the Sachverständigenrat für Rassen- und Bevölkerungspolitik (Com-
mittee for Racial and Population Policy) presided by Gütt set out the Kinship Oce's
responsibilities and procedures, the kinship index was to list German `Volksgenossen'
only. This implied that the issue of segregation had already been claried elsewhere.
In a new draft from 1934 the index was intended to comprise the entire population,
incorporating information on criminal activity and anti-social behaviour from the police,
on the hereditary value provided by the Gesundheitsämter, and the Standesämter 's
genealogical documents.32 In turn the Sippenkartei would feed its information into the
dierent branches of administration and also serve to compile a `Reichsjudenliste'. With
the index Gercke was thus aiming to provide the data required for antisemitic measures
and `racial hygiene' within the Volksgemeinschaft.33 He proposed strict segregation in
daily life for a transitional period, and in the long-term  anticipating the approach of
the coming years  a centrally directed emigration of Germany's Jewish population. This
central kinship index was mainly intended to facilitate the long-term project of a Neubau
des Volkes nach rassischen Gesichtspunkten within the Volksgemeinschaft, for which
racial segregation was only a precondition.34 Gercke had also won over the registrars of
the Standesämter, looking forward to increased importance and a standardised system.
Friedrich A. Knost expressed his expectations as follows:
Hoen wir, daÿ der Weg vom Standesamt zum Sippenamt bald gegangen, der
Traum vom Reichssippenamt, dem zentralen (Reichs-) Zivilstandsamt, der
alten Honung der meisten, die als Fachleute mit der standesamtlichen Or-
ganisation seit Jahren zu tun gehabt haben, als im Zuge der gesamten staat-
lichen Entwicklung im neuen Deutschland liegend bald verwirklicht wird.35
Despite the existing dierences in racial policies in early 1934 it only seemed realistic
that a nation wide Sippenkartei would soon be established, functioning as the main index
31. Gercke, `Die Reichssippenkartei. Ihr Wert und ihre Bedeutung', 298; Cf. Schulle, Reichssippenamt,
138-139.
32. Cf. Essner, `Nürnberger Gesetze', 88.
33. Essner, 80.
34. Gercke, `Die Reichssippenkartei. Ihr Wert und ihre Bedeutung', 299.
35. Knost, `Staatsbürgerlisten, Familienregister, Reichssippenkartei. Der Weg vom Standesamt zum
Sippenamt', 324.
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to administer the population, form the Volksgemeinschaft, and provide data for racial
policies both within the Volksgemeinschaft as well as identifying those to be segregated.
Position of points
Gercke had fought hard to secure his position that, on sole charge of assessing party mem-
ber's descent, granted him enormous powers. But other branches in administration saw
their inuence on racial policy dwindling and began interfering with Gercke's proceed-
ings. From within the Frick ministry overseeing Gercke's oce, a competing initiative
was launched by Artur Gütt. As in other elds of administration during the Weimar
era, there had been a growing call for standardisation of healthcare on the national
level. In June 1933 under Gütt's aegis a law drawing on arguments from the Weimar
period was drafted that added the new paradigms in racial and population policies. Its
attempt to nationalise health care led to the stark opposition of the communal envoys
in the Deutscher Gemeindetag while the Reich Ministry of Finance stressed, the tre-
mendous costs of such an enterprise rendered it unfeasible. The NSDAP's department
for Volksgesundheit favoured the nationalisation of health care, hoping this facilitated
the subsequent incorporation into party structures  which again was met by Gütt's
refusal, who was not willing to surrender competences to the party. A second draft from
October retained the communal competence of the Gesundheitsämter but controlled by
a state staed senior consultant. Though it took until June 1934 to put through, the
basic design of the second draft was eventually accepted and put into practice. However,
it did not result in a more cohesive system but rather permeated the structural conict
of communal and national administration in the sphere of health care.36 Gütt's plan
earmarked the Standesämter for transformation to Sippenämter ; but only in subordin-
ate function, collecting and processing documents for the Gesundheitsämter, that would
conduct examinations and have the nal say regarding the individuals' hereditary value.
In October 1934 Gercke was replaced in his function as director of the NS-Auskunft, by
Gerhard Wagner. Under the pretext of  175 that prohibited same-sex relations, Gercke
was removed from his oce as Sachverständiger für Sippenforschung. In March 1935
Kurt Mayer was appointed  other than Gercke a Nordicist, Untersturmführer of the
SS, and head of a department in Himmler's Rasse- und Siedlungs- Hauptamt(RuSHA).37
36. Cf. Johannes Vossen, Gesundheitsämter im Nationalsozialismus : Rassenhygiene und oene Ge-
sundheitsfürsorge in Westfalen 1900 - 1950, Düsseldorfer Schriften zur neueren Landesgeschichte und
zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens 56 (Essen: Klartext-Verl., 2001), 204-222.
37. Cf. Essner, `Nürnberger Gesetze', 90.
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The conict over the monopoly of knowledge about the population's descent that sur-
faced after Gercke's removal involved dierent actors within the Ministry of the Interior
and the Ministry of Justice, but it also touched on the issue of separation of state and
party competences. The Ministry of Justice intended to revise the Personenstandsgesetz
(PStG) (Law on civil status) that had dened the work of the Standesämter includ-
ing matrimonial law since 1875. As eliminating intermarriages was an essential part
of segregation, Gütt suggested joining the legislative eorts. Initially, Hitler's Deputy,
Heÿ, supported the merger because it would have left the nancial responsibilities with
the communes instead of with the party. Both Gercke's ally Knost and the Interior
Ministry's Rassereferent Bernhard Lösner objected to combining these legislative un-
dertakings for fear of watering down the racial aspects. Moreover, this would have given
the Ministry of Justice decisive inuence on racial policies.38 The controversy was ongo-
ing for more than a year until in February 1937 this policy saw a sudden shift, when Heÿ
brought all eorts to combine the legal work and transform the Standesämter to a halt
on behalf of Hitler. Future Sippenämter, he stated, were to administer the population of
German blood only unter Ausschaltung von Juden, Mischlingen und Fremdblütigen.39
Since this would decrease the number of individuals registered, the party could aord
to take over the administrative competence, whereas the Standesämter would certify
and maintain the vital data of the entire population. While this did not seal the faith
of the Sippenämter the decision claried that the Sippenkartei would not be the device
to identify those `of German blood'. Quite to the contrary, the decision presupposed
identication of Jews, Mischlingen und Fremdblütigen had already been achieved by
other means. Obviously, by February 1937, the administration had gured out other
ways to identify the unwanted parts of the population. I will come back to this point in
the chapter `Finalising the Reichsmeldeordnung '.40
Though the project of a grand-scale racial revision of the population indices was
never ocially abandoned, with the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, the concept of the
Reichssippenamt as it was envisioned by Gercke became obsolete and the oce was for
the time being limited to examining cases of doubt and issuing Abstammungsbescheide
(decisions on descent) and collating archival material.
38. Cf. Schulle, Reichssippenamt, 262 and Essner, `Nürnberger Gesetze', 89.
39. As cited in Schulle, Reichssippenamt, 272.
40. `Finalising the Reichsmeldeordnung ', 103.
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`Racial hygiene' or anti-Semitism
With Hitler's proclamation of the `Nuremberg Laws' in the course of 1935's party rally, a
process was started that led to the separation of the issues of segregation and `racial hy-
giene' within the Volksgemeinschaft. The Reichsbürgergesetz established a dierentiated
concept of state membership.
Das Reichsbürgergesetz unterscheidet zwischen dem `Staatsangehörigen' und
dem `Reichsbürger'. Durch die Trennung dieser Begrie wird mit einem
Hauptgrundsatz der liberalistischen Zeit gebrochen. Dannach besaÿen alle
Staatsangehörigen ohne Rücksicht auf Rasse, Volkstum, Konfession u. dgl.
gleiche Rechte und Pichten.41
Henceforth, only the Reichsbürger were to enjoy full political rights, whereas the cat-
egory of Staatsangehörige, in Frick's words, only served der Abgrenzung des Deutschen
vom Ausländer und Staatenlosen.42 A future Reichsbürgerbrief would certify the indi-
viduals belonging to the Volksgemeinschaft and allow for separate administration of the
Reichsbürger. Yet, the certicate's introduction was postponed, and the rst paragraph
of the implementation provision provisionally extended Reichbürgerschaft to all those
`of German or kindred blood' eligible to vote in the Reichstag elections.43 But most im-
portantly, in acknowledgement of Germans' racial inhomogeneity, the law introduced a
new terminology, replacing the term `Aryan'. The new substitute `of German or kindred
blood' allowed the setting aside of the internal inhomogeneity of the Volksgemeinschaft
and instead enable to focus on the real target of `racial' policies.44 Frick laid out this
negative logic:
Ausgehend von der Tatsache, daÿ das Rassenproblem für Deutschland das
Judenproblem bedeutet, sollen dannach die Angehörigen des jüdischen Volkes
41. Wilhelm Frick, Das Reichsbürgergesetz vom 15. September 1935 und das Gesetz zum Schutze des
deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre vom 15. September 1935 mit Ausführungsverordnungen vom
14. November und 21. Dezember  mit Übersichtstafeln, Schriftenreihe des Reichsauschusses für Volks-
gesundheit (Berlin: Reichsausschuÿ für Volksgesundheitsdienst, Reichsdruckerei), 3.
42. Frick, 4.
43. Obviously, theWahllisten were considered the most reliable source to determine citizenship. These
surage registers were compiled by theWahlkommission. But their work was based on theMeldeämter 's
data that usually registered the declared credentials without further proof  cases of doubt exempt. Cf.
Georg Kaisenberg, ed., Die Wahl zum Reichstag: Führer für die Reichstagswahlen, 3rd ed. (Berlin:
Stollberg, 1928), 17-23.
44. Frick, Das Reichsbürgergesetz vom 15. September 1935 und das Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen
Blutes und der deutschen Ehre vom 15. September 1935 mit Ausführungsverordnungen vom 14. Novem-
ber und 21. Dezember  mit Übersichtstafeln, 4.
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von jedem Einuss auf das Eigenleben des deutschen Volkes ausgeschaltet
werden. [. . . ] Da ein Jude nicht Reichsbürger sein kann, war eine Vorschrift
notwendig, die ein für allemal klarstellt, wer als Jude anzusehen ist.45
This provision was provided only with the fth paragraph of the Erste Verordnung zum
Reichsbürgergesetz dated 14th November 1935. The legislation's underlying logic of a
denition ex negativo had, however, been present in an earlier attempt to dene the
members of the Volksgemeinschaft or `Volksgenossen' in the NSDAP's 1920 manifesto:
Staatsbürger kann nur sein, wer Volksgenosse ist. Volksgenosse kann nur
sein, wer deutschen Blutes ist, ohne Rücksichtnahme auf Konfession. Kein
Jude kann daher deutscher Volksgenosse sein.46
Fifteen years later the approach remained basically the same. While only those of
`German blood regardless of religous denomination' were supposed to be included, what
it meant to be `of German or kindred blood' could only be dened by the exclusion of
Jews.
To the dissatisfaction of the remaining `contaministic' hardliners, in 1935 the concept
of Mischling was limited to that of `Halbjuden' (the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des
Berufsbeamtentums instead excluded `Vierteljuden' ) that were, political reliability provi-
ded, to be absorbed by the Volksgemeinschaft. Also diering from theGesetz zur Wieder-
herstellung des Berufsbeamtentums, the main genealogical reference for Jewishness was
the grandparents' generation, whose Jewish religion was `ohne weiteres ' evidence for
Jewishness. In the terminology provided by the implementing provision, one Jewish
grandparent would make the ospring in the second generation `Mischling 2. Grades,
who were, according to the provisions of the Blutschutzgesetz, allowed to marry Staat-
sangehörige deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes and thus be integrated into the Volks-
gemeinschaft, whereas the descendents of two Jewish grandparents were legally dened as
Mischling 1. Grades. The group created by this denition was only with special permis-
sion allowed to marry Staatsangehörige deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes, Mischlinge
2. Grades included, while they could marry Jews and Geltungsjuden (according to the
1935 acts those with three Jewish grandparents) rendering their own ospring Jewish.
Finally, the law banned marriage and extramarital aairs of Jews and Staatsangehörige
45. Frick, Das Reichsbürgergesetz vom 15. September 1935 und das Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen
Blutes und der deutschen Ehre vom 15. September 1935 mit Ausführungsverordnungen vom 14. Novem-
ber und 21. Dezember  mit Übersichtstafeln, 4-5.
46. NSDAP, `25-Punkte-Programm der NSDAP', 4. The following 5 suggested Jews be subjected
to a specially devised aliens law.
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deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes. Thus, the Gesetz zum Schutz des deutschen Blutes
und der deutschen Ehre put the Nordicist's approach that to a certain degree Jewish-
ness could be mendelised into legal practice, whilst  with its combination of racism
and sexism  catering to the contaminists. For those Staatsangehörige destined to form
the Volksgemeinschaft, the Gesetz zum Schutz der Erbgesundheit des deutschen Volkes
(Ehegesundheitsgesetz) issued on 18th October 1935 set out the basic principles of `racial
hygiene'. Instead of employing the concepts of `German or kindred blood' it referred
to the Volksgemeinschaft. It banned marriage when one spouse was incapacitated, had
a mental defect or carried a disease that could possibly impair the ospring's health
or that was included in the 1933 Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses. Once
again, the implementation of an obligation to provide an Ehetauglichkeitzeugnis (Certi-
cate of Qualication for Marriage) was for the time being limited to cases of doubt and
introduction for the entire Volksgemeinschaft was postponed.47 Thus the Nuremberg
laws, the Erbgesundheitsgesetz, and the subsequent implementation provisions, deviated
from the original plan to combine segregation and internal `racial hygiene'. Instead, both
projects were separated and the implementation of the latter postponed indenitely.
3.2 Indexing the `Volk '
As a consequence of the decisions in the course of the Parteitag neither the Standesämter
nor the Gesundheitsämter acquired their designated functions. However, authorities
were not planning to loosen their grip on the population. Though the discussions on
the registration of racial descent and the pending state of the Reichsreform had a dilat-
ory eect, when the decision was taken at the end of 1935, eorts to standardise the
registration system picked up pace. However, the `traditional' ways of recording data
on the population had not been neglected. Two major projects of the Weimar era were
realised in 1933: the long-expected census and registration regulations that implemented
the results of the Eisenach agreement in Prussia. Bringing this chapter to a close I will
discuss these developments.
Census 1933
The republic had intended to adapt the quinquennial rhythm for censuses established
during the Kaiserreich, but the census of 1925 was the last one taken. For the next one
47. RGBl I, 1246,  8.
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it was intended to extend the questionnaire now asking for citizenship, religion, mother-
tongue and former residence. It also introduced cohort analysis to produce reliable
projections of future population growth or shrinkage. But when the preparations for
the 1930 census increased in pace, several federal states began questioning the relevance
of censuses in general. In October 1929 Wuerttemberg's Minister of Finance argued, in
absence of conscription, that there was no need to determine the number of conscripts
each state had to contribute. The equalisation payments of the (Ländernanzausgleich)
did not depend on a census since sucient results could be produced by analysis of
the nancial ministries' annual tax-related Personenstandsaufnahme and the migration
statistics, avoiding the costly censuses altogether. Finally, he argued, the federal states
 having to bear the costs  did not see any gain in a census:
Ausserordentliche Ausgaben, die wie bei der Volkszählung, im hauptsäch-
lichen Interesse des Reiches gemacht werden, sollten auch von Reich übernom-
men werden.48
Yet, the representatives of the Städtetag, though equally in nancial distress, were press-
ing hard for a timely implementation.49 The data from the 1925 census had clearly shown
a dramatically increased population for all city states, with the exception of Königsberg.
For the territorial states it had registered an overall decrease in numbers. These gures
did not show in the population registers. Since the internal migration patterns were not
likely to change and tax revenues were shared out in proportion to the population, every
new census directly entailed a nancial loss for the territorial states. Due to the related
costs, the Ministry of Finances favoured a postponement whereas the interior and n-
ancial ministries, both depending on accurate data, were unwilling to accept any delay.
Instead they accepted the limitation of the scope of the survey.50 The quinquennial ar-
ray was internationally adapted and allowed for comparison with other nations; leaving
the cycle was only possible at the expense of comparability. Even more importantly, the
sta compiling the census had been hired in 1925 and until 1930 paid from the 1925
census' coer. The subsequent census was expected to cover the cost for the next ve
years. When the census was eventually postponed the statistical oce had thus claimed
special expenses. As a result of these complex patterns of competing interests and the
general dead lock in Weimar's politics the census was postponed twice and eventually
48. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Nr. 3962, Wütt. Finanzministerium an das Reichsnanzministerium, 28th
October 1929, 81.
49. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Nr. 3962, Reichsstädtebund an den Herrn Reichswirtschaftsminister, 6th
June 1931, 165.
50. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Nr. 3962, Minister des Innern, Auf das Schreiben vom 21.10.1929, betreend
Bereitstellung der für die Volkskzählung 1930 erforderlichen Mittel, 13th November 1929, 11.
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scheduled for 16th June 1933. It combined population, vocational, trade and agricul-
tural statistics and introduced family statistics. And even though the new questions
of the family statistics t well into the policy of the new regime, that introduced the
Ehestandsdarlehen in September 1933 to increase birth rates, they were, like the entire
census, laid out in the years before. However, this did not prevent Friedrich Burgdörfer
from praising the Regierung der nationalen Erhebung for overcoming
imWege der durch das Ermächtigungsgesetz ermöglichten vereinfachten Form
der Gesetzgebung die bisherigen Hemmungen und Widerstände einzelner
Länder,
and to enable what he considered die Durchführung einer neuen Inventur des deutschen
Volkes.51 Nevertheless, the 1933 census was not the rst to be ordered centrally.
Whereas prior to 1919 censuses had been agreed upon by the Bundesrat and imple-
mented by legislation on the federal level, the subsequent counts were based on national
law.52 But like prior ones, the 1933 census still required separate implementation orders
in each federal state.53 Furthermore, the federal statistical oces were also in charge of
preparing the questionnaires, organising the conduct of the census and the analysis. The
method of processing was also a decision of the federal oces. During the 1925 survey
Saxony and Prussia had been the rst to compute the census utilising punch card ma-
chines from dierent manufacturers operated by the oces' sta. In 1933 only Prussia
used machines, provided by the German branch of IBM, Dehomag. By leasing the ma-
chines, providing the punch cards and most importantly organising the count's analysis,
Dehomag had successfully managed to exclude its competitors.54 Dehomag's organ-
isers chose a 60-column punch card that left 11 empty columns, in case it was decided
aus irgendwelchen staatspolitschen Erwägungen heraus weitere Angeben der Haushal-
tungslisten auf die Lochkarte zu übernehmen.55 Aly and Roth concluded in 1984: Sol-
che `staatspolitischen Erwägungen' gab es tatsächlich, es waren die Sonderauszählung
51. Friedrich Burgdörfer, `Die Volks-, Berufs- und Betriebszählung 1933', Allgemeines statistisches
Archiv (AStA) Journal of the German Statistical Society (Heidelberg) 23 (1933): 146155, 146.
52. Cf. RGBl 1919, 652; RGBl I, 19.
53. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Nr. 3963, Der Präsident des Statistischen Landesamtes Berlin an den Herrn
Präsidenten des Statistischen Reichsamtes in Berlin, 4th March 1933, 85.
54. The Berlin based Powers GMBH producing the machines and Euler paper mill producing
punch cards led complaints with the Reich Ministry of the Interior. In order to refute their complaints
Dehomag agreed to use `German' raw material only and ascertained most of the machine parts were
made in Germany. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Nr. 3963.
55. Ludwig Hümmer, `Die Aufbereitung der Volks- und Berufszählung 1933 im Hollerith-
Lochkartenverfahren', Hollerith-Nachrichten (Berlin) 28 (August 1933): 343355, 345.
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der Juden und Ausländer.56 However, the correspondence of Berlin statistical oces'
director Dr Saenger and Burgdörfer does not suggest an extension was even considered.
Quite to the contrary Saenger remarked, that in den letzten Wochen in auÿerordentlich
starkem Maÿe an den Tabellen gekürzt worden ist, and that fernere Abstriche am Aus-
zählungsprogramm were unfeasible es sei denn, daÿ man auf eine der vier Erhebungen
vollkommen verzichtet.57 Beyond that, the 1933 census did consider `racial' aspects, to
the extent possible at that time. As Friedrich Burgdörfer explained retrospectively:
Eine statistische Erfassung des gesamten im Reich ansässigen Judentums
(der Rasse nach) war nicht möglich, da bei der Erhebung nicht nach der
Abstammung gefragt worden war. Eine entsprechende Frage hätte damals
auch nicht gestellt werden können, da zur Zeit der Zählung 1933 der Begri
der deutschen bzw. jüdischen Abstammung noch nicht gesetzlich festgelegt
und abgegrenzt war.58
But the data aggregated on `confession' was analysed excessively. Parameters like sex,
age, vocation, citizenship, place of birth were collated and thereafter published in sep-
arate tables, which Burgdörfer related to the `Judentabellen' of the previous century.
While the census was used to gather statistical data on German Jews, there is no record
that the data was used to identify individuals.
Continuance of Eisenach
As with the census, in the eld of registration, the period after the change of the polit-
ical order was marked by great continuity. The Polizeiverordnung über das Meldewesen
of 22nd April 1933 adopted most paragraphs of 1930's template verbatim.59 The only
addition was  22 regulating registration of volunteers in the labour service.60 And even
though the Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder allowed the implementation of nation-
wide legislation, the fact that registration was a competence of the municipalities and the
56. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 23.
57. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Nr. 3963, Der Präsident des Statistischen Landesamtes Berlin an den Herrn
Präsidenten des Statistischen Reichsamtes in Berlin, 4th March 1933, 85.
58. Friedrich Burgdörfer, `Die Juden in Deutschland und der Welt. Ein statistischer Beitrag zur biolo-
gischen und sozialen Struktur des Judentums in Deutschland', in Forschungen zur Judenfrage. Sitzungs-
berichte der Dritten Münchner Arbeitstagung des Reichsinstituts für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands
vom 5. bis 7. Juli 1938, vol. 3, Schriften des Reichsinstituts für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands
(München: Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des Neuen Deutschland, 1938), 152170, 152.
59. Cf. Hägele, Die Rechtsentwicklung des Paÿ- und Meldewesens; Nach d. Recht Preuÿens u. d.
Reichs, 90.
60. See chapter `Trials in registration', 92.
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pending state of the Reichsreform detained the establishment of a new nationwide regis-
tration system. Based on the June 1931 Polizeiverordnungsgesetz the regulations were
limited to Prussia and had to be eected by local police regulations. All previous regu-
lations were suspended. The rst state-wide obligations for Abmeldung on the occasion
of moving from a registration district (that is a district with an independent registra-
tion oce), Anmeldung when moving into a registration district or Ummeldung moving
within a district were established. The new form `Groÿer Meldeschein' required all the
data agreed upon in 1928, including religion and adding a question for vocation  that
was expected to be answered as precisely as possible  and citizenship.61 Regarding this
question an additional note was required as to whether citizenship was veried providing
a passport, naturalisation certicate, Staatsangehörigenausweis or Heimatschein. Fur-
ther, the issuing authority had to be specied. Changes or rectications of citizenship
had to be reported to the registration oces by the respective authorities. Nevertheless,
authorities stressed that the data on citizenship in the index remained unreliable since
the administrative authority in the eld of citizenship lay with the federal police depart-
ments while the local registration oces depended on the registrant's information.62 As
provided by the 1928 templates, the respite for registration was extended to a week in
order to increase the populations' compliance and the registrars were expected dem Pub-
likum die Ausübung der Meldepicht durch höiche Belehrung und bereitwillige Hilfe
zu erleichtern.63 The obligation to register lay in the case of families with the (male)
head of the family, including domestic workers and / or subtenants, or otherwise with
the moving individual. Since these measures did not help to increase the populations
compliance, within a year many municipalities resorted to issuing police decrees on the
local level, which reintroduced the lessor's liability under penalty of 50 RM or a week
imprisonment.64 From the registrant's side, the new regulations did not discriminate
nationals from aliens  but it did on the side of substantive law. The implementation
provisions required every registration of aliens to be reported to the Ortspolizeibehörde
or the mit der Bearbeitung der Ausländerangelegenheiten beauftragten Stelle der Pol-
izeiverwaltung.65 In addition, registration forms for aliens had to be marked with a
61. See page 58.
62. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 105 Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Regierungspräsident Oppeln Herrn
Preuss. Minister des Innern, 20th October 1933, 9.
63. Heinz Steens, Polizeiverordnung über das Meldewesen vom 22. April 1933: mit e. Anhang: Vors-
chriften über d. Einrichtung u. Führung von Meldekarteien, Kommunale Schriften 1 (Berlin: Dt. Ge-
meindeverl., 1935), 23.
64. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd. 1, Ausschnitt Schlesische Zeitung No 258,
18th Septermber 1934, 33.
65. MBl. 1933, 603.
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black, triangular label in the upper right corner. In order to produce migration statist-
ics for immigrants and emigrants alike, counting cards had to be completed and led or
if existent, send to the respective Zentralmeldestelle. A copy of each registration had to
be immediately forwarded to the tax authorities. Other branches of administration were
obliged to feed their data into the registration oces' indices respectively. Standesämter
had to report changes in civil status to the registration oces in order to rectify records;
the criminal police, wanted suspects, whose index cards were then marked with a note
in red ink and coloured tabs. On the material side, the implementation provision for
the rst time specied that records had to be kept in the form of card indices, detailing
the size of the cardboard cards and a colour code. Male individuals and their respective
families were registered on `chamois' cards, female divorcees and widows on `light-blue'
and unwed women on `orange' cards. The concept of `family' was limited to that of the
nuclear family comprising the parents, legitimate, and foster children. Stepchildren were
registered on individual cards, as were domestic workers and / or subtenants. A special
eld for remarks should be used to clarify the family connections between the index
cards once the children were registered on individual cards.66 The obligatory move from
list-based registration to card indices that  with the exception of the nuclear family
 registered one individual per card had several merits. It made it far easier to locate
individuals by name, to update existing data and trace their places of residence.
Prussia's Ministry of the Interior dened rules for disclosure of personal details.
Private individuals were allowed to access some personal details of every other per-
son including former residence, date and place of birth, religion and citizenship against
payment of a fee. Other branches of the administration were provided with all inform-
ation free of charge. Apart from that the ministry stated: Über sonstige Verhältnisse
von Personen sind Auskünfte an Privatpersonen nicht zu erteilen.67
The matter of disclosure was frequently addresses in reports from Prussia's Regier-
ungspräsidenten after the provisions were passed. In order to expose marriage swind-
lers, it was suggested to include the marital status among the data possibly disclosed.
Furthermore, a number of Regierungspräsidenten objected to the disclosure of citizen-
ship. Answering in writing theMeldestelle would produce documents on citizenship even
though the data in the registers might be faulty and only the Regierungspräsidenten (in
their capacity as Ortspolizeibehörde) were authorised to issue such documents. After
stating that requests were particularly common wenn die Vermutung besteht, dass der
66. RdErl. des Pr. MdI `Bestimmungen über die Neueinrichtung und Führung der staatlichen Melde-
register vom 11. Juli 1929.
67. RdErl. des MdI vom 8. Juni 1933.
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betreende Ausländer ist, the rapporteurs of Oppeln's Regierungspräsidenten argued,
such disclosures appeared bedenklich, weil sie gewöhnlich zum Nachteil des Gemeldeten
ausgewertet werden wird.Why higher ranking ocials would care about some aliens'
privacy becomes clear when the rapporteurs specied their concern:
Noch schlimmer würden sich Auskünfte aus den Melderegistern über die
Staatsangehörigkeit in den Fällen auswirken, die von einer höheren Ver-
waltungsbehörde durch ausweichende Auskunft verdeckt wurden. Und sol-
che Fälle sind gerade im hiesigen Grenzbezirk gegenüber den fast alles er-
fassenden polischen Anfrage, denen meistenteils militärische Interessen zu-
grundeliegen, besonders leicht möglich.68
During the 1920s Polish consulates had started to investigate the citizenship of Prussi-
ans of Polish descent, whose Prussian citizenship was questionable as a consequence of
the Vienna or Geneva peace treaties. Cases of doubt were settled by the Polish-German
conciliation committee. The new regulations facilitated these attempts. Furthermore,
a report from Hannover, mainly dealing with cases of `Polish' workers in the indus-
trial regions, also voiced concern for those Germans abroad with dual-citizenship, not
only because die betroenen Personen schwere persönliche und wirtschaftliche Nachteile
erleiden können, sondern auch aus politischen Gründen.69 Since population and migra-
tion statistics utilised the registration oces' data these changes would alter the ratio
of national minorities on either side of the border to Germany's disadvantage. The Re-
gierungspräsidenten's objections to the disclosure of citizenship were thus not so much
motivated by concern for the aected. Rather the individual's citizenship was a token in
a wider Volkstumspolitik for which statistics provided the arguments. In order to curb
unwanted corollaries from respective requests, the district presidents ordered subordinate
oces to forward suspicious request to their oces.
Apart from that, registration oces noticed an increase in requests as a result of
the political change. Various party branches showed interest in personal information.
Their members often failed to adhere to the party's internal registration regulations.70
More importantly, the introduction of Arierparagraphen in a number of laws demanded
proof of descent as precondition for certain positions. Kinship researchers increasingly
made use of the registers to complete family trees revealing both the new importance
registration had gained as well as the downsides of a system of case-to-case assessments.
68. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 105 Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Regierungspräsident Oppeln Herrn
Preuss. Minister des Innern, 20th October 1933, 10-11.
69. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 105 Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Regierungspräsident Hannover an
den herrn Preussischen Minister des Innern, 12th July 1933, 2.
70. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 105 Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin an den
Herrn Minister des Innern, 11th November 1933, 25.
4 Unied registration system
The following chapter will analyse the genesis of the Reichsmeldeordnung. Two factors
impeded the introduction of a standardised system: the insuciency of the Prussian
registration system and the discontinuation of the eorts for aReichsreform that was to
provide the legal framework for nationwide police regulation.
4.1 Reichsreform and Gleichschaltung
The NSDAP's manifesto stated that, once in power, the party would create a `starke Zen-
tralgewalt'. Inspite of Hitler's sparse utterances regarding a Reichsreform making clear
that centralisation, the Führerprinzip and the Volksgemeinschaft undoubtedly formed
the corner stones, various actors in Reich Ministry of the Interior, the party and the
federal governments had various, often conicting ideas for the state's future structure.
The prospective reform comprised a territorial reorganisation and one of administration.
The reform of registration was only a minor part of this larger Reichsreform that was
discussed from the very beginning of the Weimar Republic. As much as the discourse
evolving around this reform was motivated by expectations of a more ecient adminis-
tration it was also fused with the notion that a unied administration was the nalisation
of German state-building.
The early measures that helped disrupting Weimar protocol and consolidate the Nazi
rule leaned on the previous discourse about centralised administration and the Reichs-
reform. The March 1933 Ermächtigungsgesetz allowed the new government to deviate
from the constitution. With the Vorläuges Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder and
the nalised second version of April 7th the oce of a Reichsstatthalter was established,
to act as an intermediary between Reich and federal governments, turning the Weimar
era oce of the Kommissar into a steady one.1 At the end of January 1934 the Gesetz
über den Neuaufbau des Reiches and the successive implementation order surrendered the
federal state's sovereign rights to the Reich thereby legally establishing the Einheitsstaat
1. RGBl I, 173.
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long called for by bureaucrats.2 As it transferred sovereign rights of the federal states to
the Reich it provided the legal basis for further centralisation. In consequence, for the
rst time it established all-German citizenship.3
But within the Reich Ministry of the Interior the act was only seen as the starting
point das gesamte öentliche Recht zu vereinheitlichen, d.h. reichsrechtlich zu regeln.
In May 1934 the Reich Ministry of the Interior thus approached all Reich ministries to
propose elds of law for standardisation.4 One of these elds was registration. Beginning
in summer 1934 on the Ministry of the Interior's Abteilung Verwaltung und Recht (VuR)
(Department for Administration and Law) planned the nationwide implementation of
the Prussian registration system and had delegated the handling to Arthur Kääb and
Ferdinand Kerstiens, who both had already been involved with the reform of registration
system in the republic's administration.
The reform touched on issues of registration as the centralisation of the police was
legally based on the transferral of federal sovereign powers to the Reich. In some dis-
tricts registration was a competence of the police and a privilege of the municipal au-
thorities in others.5 A coherent system of registration and consistent competences had
required a reorganisation of the fundamental administrative structures. Hence, besides
the standardisation of regulations, a thorough reform of the administrative structure was
discussed. In an article for the National Socialist Lawyer's journal `Deutsche Verwal-
tung' that Kääb had excerpted and led, the author argued in favour of centralisation
of registration on the municipal level. The central registration oces were to register
any changes in personal data and report it to all authorities involved. The benets of
such a centralised system lay, according to the author, in the clarity of display, that
would in return help reduce the tedious duplicate work of several authorities registering
personal data independently. Resulting from this clarity, statistical evaluation of the
data present in the register would lead to more current and reliable statistics resulting
in Wegfall der mit groÿen Kosten verbundenen Volkszählungen, Personenstands- und
Betriebsaufnahmen.6
2. RGBl I, 75.
3. RGBl I, 85.
4. BArch R4901 181, Der Reichsminister des Innern an die Herren Reichsminister 25th May 1934.
5. In Prussia the registers were maintained by the communal administration. Except for the bigger
cities with police departments, where police and city administration each maintained a copy of the
registers. In Saxony, Baden, Hessen, Braunschweig, Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck the police depart-
ments were in charge of the records. Whereas in Thuringia and Bavaria registration was communal in
general with the exception of Bavaria's bigger cities Munich, Nuremberg and Augsburg. Cf. GSTA HA
I Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 17 Sonderakte Bd 2, 163.
6. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd. 1, Abschrift aus Deutsche Verwaltung
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The replacement of surveys by card indices, however, was not so much a result of the
eorts towards a `Reichsreform, but a general trend in statistics as Adam Tooze has
shown for the economic branch of German statistics, in which specic questionnaires
were replaced by the aggregation of raw data in card indices. In the mid-30s Walter
Grävell planned to established decentralised statistical oces to which all rms had
to report business data regularly. The raw data was to be collated to decentralised,
constantly updated card indices forming a data base, from which statistics could be
generated comparatively quickly and without prior knowledge of the question. This sys-
tem, however, was not uncontested as other statisticians favoured more and increasingly
complex centralised censuses for their high degree of comparability.7 These competing
approaches were part of a process of `self-destruction of the statistical oce' in the late
30s, caused by competing factions dissociating from the oce, instead cooperating more
closely with party organisations.8 But during the consolidation of the Nazi system, the
statistical oce was rst aected by a merger, when in the wake of Gleichschaltung and
Neuaufbau des Reiches Prussian administration and ministries were fused with their
Reich counterparts. By October 1934 the Prussian Statistical Oce merged with the
Reich Oce.9
During the phase of consolidation, eorts towards a Reichsreform proceeded quickly,
as they provided the means to secure the party's grip on power. But after passing the
Neuaufbau act, eorts stagnated since more detailed plannings for a National Socialist
Reichsreform did not exist. Furthermore, the territorial reorganisation met with resist-
ance from the federal governments, so that it was never followed through  in spite of
changes to some federal districts and Labour Service and the Wehrmacht anticipating
a territorial reorganisation when laying out the districts of their organisations. This
decision would soon cause problems with the draft because the incongruence of admin-
istrative districts of civil and military administration hampered inter-agency exchange
of information.
Despite the legal changes towards centralisation, the Reich ministries' ability to im-
plement nationwide legislation was still limited, not least because of the strengthened
position of the Reichsstatthalter that had at the same time strengthened the federal
administration. In March 1935 a meeting of the Reich Ministry of the Interior's state
vom 20. August 1934, Organisationsfragen im Lichte der Gleichschaltung zwischen Reich und Ländern,
Präsident Dr. Boenicke, Berlin, 97-99.
7. Tooze, Statistics and the German State: 1900 - 1945: the making of modern economic knowledge,
243, 223-251.
8. Cf. Tooze, 244-245.
9. Tooze, 185.
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secretaries on the issue of a nationwide reorganisation of education concluded, [. . . ]
daÿ die derzeitigen Befugnisse der Reichsregierung nicht ausreichen, um den Ländern
gegenüber das Erforderliche durchzusetzten.10 In this particular case resistance to the
changes came from Hamburg and Munich. But a mounting number of similar complaints
reached the Reich Ministry of the Interior from several places, so that Frick felt com-
pelled to press deputy Heÿ on Hitler's further plans. This resulted in an unpublished
circular from April 1935 banning further public discussions on a Reichsreform.11 In early
December 1935 and by proxy of state secretary Pfundtner, Hitler informed the Reich
Ministry of the Interior,
daÿ er den Zeitpunkt der Weitertreibung der Reichsreform selbst zu bestim-
men wünsche. Wenn unter diesen Umständen Wesentliches und Grundsätz-
liches nicht zu erwarten ist, wird jedoch andererseits dafür Vorsorge getroen
werden müssen, daÿ im Falle neuer Weisungen des Führers alles vorbereitet
ist, um die einschlägigen Arbeiten schnell und zielsicher fortzuführen.12
To the civil servants involved, this vague statement indicated they should proceed with
their work in order to be prepared for sudden changes of heart. But this pending state
did not last for long. By the end of January 1936, Hitler had decided against any
territorial changes. All oces involved were furthermore informed:
Der Führer und Reichskanzler hat sich scharf gegen jede Zentralisation aus-
gesprochen und ausdrücklich festgestellt, daÿ die Verantwortung für die Ver-
waltung nach wie vor bei den Leitern der Länderregierungen läge.13
While this was not the end of dicussions, it took the momentum o the eorts and
those elds of administration expecting centralisation could not rely on a grand-scale
initiative to bring it about. The legal situation for nationwide initiatives remained ill-
dened. By and large the reform eorts were left unnished when Germany engaged
in war.14 After a period of halfhearted centralisation the power balance began shifting
back to the periphery.
10. BArch R4901 276, Abteilung Z II (Graf Rantz) a 1228/35 m, E III, E V An den Herrn Reichs-
und Preuÿ. Minister des Innern, 28thof November 1935, 219.
11. BArch R4901 180, Der Reichs und Preuÿische Minister für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksb-
ildung, Abschrift: Erörterungen über die Reichsreform 18th of January 1936, 4.
12. BArch R4901 276, Abteilung Z II (Graf Rantz) II a 3599, 3335/35 M an den Herrn Reichs- und
Preuÿ. Minister des Innern, 222.
13. BArch R4901 277, Reichs- und Preuÿischer Minister für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung,
Z II a Nr. 7/36, Reichsreform, Behandlung von Entwürfen für Reichsgesetze, 31st January 1936, 66.
14. Cf. Walter Baum, `Die "Reichsreform" im Dritten Reich', Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte
(München) 3, no. 1 (1955): 3656, 37.
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Hitler's change of heart must be viewed on the backdrop of the eroding trust in
the established institutions of the state to bring about the anticipated unity of the
Volksgemeinschaft, that showed in Frick's demotion and Himmler's placement as head
of the German police later in 1936.15 The initiative for centralisation of the police had
hitherto been taken by the Reich Ministry of the Interior and thus Frick; the change in
policy now paved the way for Himmler's approach that will be subject of the chapter
entitled `Second planning stage'.
4.2 Prussian registration as national standard
In 1935 Ministry of the Interior still intended to base national legislation on the Prussian
precedent. But the nationwide draft for the Labour Service revealed that a simple
adaption of the Prussian provisions in the entire nation would not provide a seamless
registration system.
Attempts at standardisation
One of the admininstrative elds determined for nationwide standardisation was regis-
tration. To ocials such as Arthur Kääb and Christian Kerstiens working in Prussia's
Police Department's Abteilung Verwaltung und Recht (VuR) (Department for Admin-
istration and Law) and in charge of the future Reichsmeldeordnung, the authoritarian
system promised a much-anticipated, unied approach to the registration of residents in
the Meldeämter (Register Oces) formerly hampered by the federals states' insistence
on their competence. Rather than emphasising the needs of total mobilisation and the
seamless tracing of individuals, Kääb deployed the language of Weimar's discourse on
the Reichsreform.
Eine weitere Verbesserung von nicht zu unterschätzender Bedeutung kann
jetzt nach Gründung des Einheitsstaates vollständig durchgeführt werden,
d. i. die Zentralisierung und Verheinheitlichung des Listen- und Meldewesens.
[. . . ] Auÿerdordentliche Ersparnisse und verwaltungmässige Verbesserungen
sind dadurch möglich.16
15. Thomas Childers, Jane Caplan and Charles M. Maier, eds., Reevaluating the Third Reich (New
York: Holmes & Meier), 107.
16. GStA, HA I Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a Sonderakten Bd. 1, Arthur Kääb, note for the le 1935,
96.
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The main objective of the reform was thus a nationwide standardisation of registration
that would help save costs and streamline administrative tasks, including of course a
widened control of the population. The nationwide implementation was not expected
to dier signicantly from the Eisenach agreement. On 1st February 1935 Frick had
announced that he intended a nationwide standardisation of registration regulations,
based on the Prussian provisions from 1933.17 In that regard he expected proposals from
the local departments. Similar requests had been send to the federal governments before
by the civil servants in charge of the reform, but with few results. Frick had ordered the
return of the requests by mid-March and in particular requested, die Erfahrungen der
gröÿeren Meldebehörden zu verwerten. As a result, the Abteilung Verwaltung und Recht
started receiving reports from the Regierungs- and Polizeipräsidenten from March on
that illustrate the disparate situation of registration in the federal states. A more detailed
report was expected by the end of March from Berlin, Düsseldorf and Königsberg. While
Düsseldorf and Königsberg replied almost in time, the Berlin police department asked
for additional respite of a month but eventually returned the report only in October
1935. Preparing the combined Wehrmacht and Labour Service draft had occupied the
oce's sta so that other activities were put aside.
When Berlin nally handed in its report in response to Frick's call in spring it in-
cluded the experience of the summer's draft. The 15 -page report listed and extensively
commented the existing faults and gaps in the 1933 decree in detail. A main concern was
one of principle. In accordance with the Eisenach standards, the Prussian registration
decree of April 1933 was informed by the realisation that seamless registration depended
on the population's compliance, and thus tried to keep the registrants obligations to a
minimum. The registrars had thus to complete the forms and forward them to the rel-
evant authorities. The police department strongly advised a shift of this balance, as it
increased the workload for the registrars without necessarily increasing the accuracy of
the registers.18 In that regard the department insisted registrants attend in person in
order to immediately reject illegible forms and if need be provide missing information.
Like so many others, the department favoured the involvement of the landlord in the
registration process. Further issues remained with the registration of interim residencies
of labourers, youth groups in hostels or camps, the Labour Service and the Wehrmacht,
hospitals etc. For all these cases Berlin's police suggested requiring the respective organ-
17. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd1, Der Reichs- und Preussische Minister
des Innern an die Landesregierungen 1st February 1935, 74.
18. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Polizeipräsident Berlin an den
Herrn Reichs- und Preuÿischen Minister des Innern, 17th October 1935, 80-87.
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isation to register their members when the stay exceeded a month. The register oce
of the former residence would then be informed via the notication system.
Prior to 1935 the Ministry of War was not directly involved in the considerations re-
garding a unied registration system and there is no evidence of correspondence. How-
ever, in January 1935 the Trac Minister, on his ministry's behalf and that of the War
Ministry, enquired about the possible inclusion of a question regarding car ownership
on the registration forms in connection to the register oces' obligation to notify the
respective vehicle registration oce.19 While the notication obligation would keep the
vehicle registration oces' data up to date, the War Ministry was interested to know the
identities of car owners and holders of driving licenses. This matter remained a cause for
regular correspondence and was only settled with the passing of the Reichsmeldeordnung.
The reports from Mecklenburg and Bremen are representative for the disparate state
of registration in the city states and rural areas. While most of the incoming reports
endorsed the general idea of a `reichseinheitliche Regelung ' based on the Eisenach agree-
ment, most of them also stressed the decits of the Prussian regulations compared to
the ones they already had in place. The timely report from Mecklenburg, however,
voiced concerns, that might represent the reluctance to registration in rural areas most
articulately. In reply to Frick's request from 1st February, Schwerin's Staatsministerium
doubted the demand for detailed provision on the national level suggesting
nur kurze Rahmenbestimmungen seitens des Reiches zu geben und im übrigen
die Ausführung in Anpassung an die Verhältnisse des Landes den Landes-
regierungen, Regierungespräsidenten usw. zu überlassen.
While making clear that Mecklenburg ocials saw no need for a unied system, they
also maintained that the same regulations had to apply for citizens and aliens alike. But
the most important concern was the Prussian provision that prescribed registration in
writing, since erfahrungsgemäss die Ausfüllung umfänglicher Formulare dem Publikum,
besonders auf dem Lande und in kleineren Städten, Schwierigkeiten bereitet. Mainly
arguing that self declaration of registrees rendered the documents illegible, this quote ad-
dressed the Achilles' heel of registration, that of compliance. In particular in  albeit not
limited to  rural areas, people resented completing forms. Thus Mecklenburg proposed
that the ocials ll in the forms. This was an approach that, as the Staatsministerium
conceded, may not be feasible for bigger cities with a higher occurrence of registrations.
19. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 17, Sonderakte, Bd. 2, Der Reichs- und Preuÿische Verkehrsmin-
ister an den Herrn Reichs- und Preÿischen Minister des Innern, 12th March 1936, 69-70.
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With regard to 23 of the Prussian Meldeverordnung regulating registration obligations
of `Persons of no xed address roving from place to place' Mecklenburg doubted the
feasibility of the measure and remarked: In der Regel werden derartige Personen diese
Meldepicht doch nicht innehalten. However, the reply from Mecklenburg also records
dierences within the state's administration. The bigger cities demanded that future
registration forms contained information on the registree's parents in order to cater to
future kinship research. While reporting the demands for inclusion of the parents cre-
dentials, the ministry once again underlined that these demands could only be met if
the regulations abstained from making registration in writing mandatory.20
The reply from Bremen addressed the issue of registration in writing from quite a
dierent perspective. Bremen had developed a meticulous registration system with a
Zentralmeldestelle at its core. Nevertheless, it criticised the Prussian requirement to
register in writing as well. But Bremen's main concern was to ensure that the registree
had to show up at the registration oce instead of postal registration that was possible
in Prussia. Much like the counterparts in Mecklenburg, the rapporteur favoured registra-
tion in person. However, rather than the population's reluctance to complete forms, his
main concern was the administrative benets. While conceding that postal registration
was legally possible, the report highlighted the benets of registration in person: Die
üblichen Rückfragen, die bei schriftlichen Meldungen oft erforderlich werden, fallen bei
persönlicher Meldung fort.
In general, however, the report found the Prussian provisions far too lenient. Both
with regard to the coherence of the system as to the practice of disclosure. With regard
to the latter, the report from Bremen makes a point for privacy, unparalleled in the
entire correspondence on disclosure. Current practice in Bremen generally refrained
from disclosing any personal details to private individuals, except wenn triftige Gründe
vorgebracht werden können. The data disclosed in these exceptional cases was limited
to place and date of birth and matrimonial status. But before disclosure the arguments
were closely examined, as the report carries on: Bei der Prüfung dieser Gründe wird
auch bedacht, ob die nachgefragte Person mit dieser Auskunftserteilung einverstanden
sein würde. Notably, the author of the document refrains from using the language of
the `nationalsozialistische Einheitsstaat ' instead remaining within the referential frame
of the Eisenach agreement. The reasoning behind Bremen's disclosure practice also
seems to rest on a liberal understanding of a relationship between citizen and state,
based on mutual rights and duties.
20. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd1, Mecklenburgisches Staatsministerium,
Abteilung Inneres an Herrn Reichs- und Preussischen Minister des Innern zu Berlin, 8th March 1935,
139-141.
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Die Aufgabe der Polizei ist es, das öentliche Interesse wahrzunehmen; sie ist
nicht berechtigt, noch verpichtet, privaten Interessen zu dienen. [. . . ] Den
Meldepichtigen ist auch nur zu diesem Zwecke eine Meldepicht auferlegt
und diese haben daher grundsätzlich Anspruch darauf, daÿ über den Inhalt
des Melderegisters Amtsverschwiegenheit beobachtet wird.
However, when the report mentions the benets of Bremen's system it uses the same
factual tone to slip into genuine National Socialist subjects. Registration in Bremen had
always asked for the registree's parents' credentials in order to ensure clear identication
of eponymous individuals. With the changed political paradigms the aggregated data
had gained new value. Bremen's rapporteur explained, not without pride:
Beim jetzigen Aueben der Rasseforschung sind Melderegistraturen mit um-
fangreichen Personalangaben kaum entbehrlich. Die bremische Melderegis-
tratur geht bis 1885 zurück und die toten oder ausrangierten Jahrgänge der
Registratur sind jetzt schon eine wahre Fundgrube für Familienforschung
geworden.
Though Bremen and Mecklenburg argue from almost opposite perspectives, they do have
some points in common in terms of rejecting the extension of the Prussian regulations
over the federal states. In particular, they opposed the establishment of a single regis-
tration system for the entire nation. Much like the report from Mecklenburg, Bremen
petitioned
die zu erwartende Reichsmeldeordnung so zu gestalten, daÿ sie als Man-
telgesetz den Ortspolizeibehörden noch die Möglichkeit gibt, durch Ortspo-
lizeivorschriften den besonderen örtlichen Verhältnissen  auch in Bezug auf
die vorhandenen Melderegistraturen  Rechnung zu tragen.21
But once again the Bremen perspective was quite dierent from that of Mecklenburg.
Bremen had directed enormous resources into its meticulous registration system. The
introduction of a nationwide index system with possibly lower standards seemed to
jeopardise the `Hanseatic' systems.
The `Hanseatic' system
As port cities, Bremen and Hamburg experienced a high uctuation of inhabitants, which
led to an increased need for control, so both established centralised registration relatively
21. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd1, Der Regierende Bürgermeister Bremen
an den Herrn Reichs- und Preuÿischen Minister des Innern, 13th March 1935, 147-151.
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early.22 Furthermore as city states both were characterised by an administrative particu-
larity, missing die hemmende Teilung zwischen Reichs-, Landes- und Gemeindebetrieben
[. . . ].23 These particular administrative responsibilities allowed centralised registration
operated by specially trained sta.24
Two principles governed the Hanseatic registration system: all data that would enter
the registration sheets had to be veried by other documents; this Ausweiszwang en-
sured the registers' high degree of reliability. Furthermore, registration was centralised.
During the Weimar era both cities had mechanised their registration system unter er-
heblichem Kostenaufwand. The core element of this system was an index of zinc plates.
Each plate represented one individual and had the personal details engraved. These zinc-
plate indices were centrally maintained by the statistical bureau in Hamburg, the police
department in Bremen respectively. Utilising so called Adrema Machines  Adrema
being an acronym for `adressiere maschinell '  the zinc plates were used to print forms,
in order to provide alle in Frage kommenden Stellen mit Material (Meldungen über
Zuzug, Umzug, Abzug, über kirchliche, steuerliche, gewerbliche und andere Veränder-
ungen)[. . . ]. In both cities the Adrema device formed the central Bevölkerungkartei to
which all changes in a person's status were reported. In turn the updated information
was disseminated to the relevant authorities. The Hanseatic system thus established
a clear system of notication that, at the same time, spared the registrants from the
obligation to register with dierent branches of the administration. This simplied regis-
tration and thus increased compliance rates. Moreover, the centralised maintenance of
the registries combined with the comparatively strict regulations had made the nancial
authorities' annual tax survey Personenstandsaufnahme (tax survey) obsolete.
But it had also made registration more complex as it increased the number of questions
asked on behalf of the nancial authorities.25 Similar achievements had been made by
Nuremberg, Frankfurt a.M. and Kiel. In the early 1930s Berlin and numerous other cities
had introduced the Adrema-system for taxing and electoral lists.26 While these systems
acquired their data from the register oces, they were not centrally maintained as in the
22. 1885 in Bremen and 1891 in Hamburg.
23. GStA, HA I Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr 107a Sonderakten Bd. 1, Arthur Kääb, note for the le 1935,
96.
24. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Polizeiherr in Hamburg an den
Herrn Senator der inneren Verwaltung, Betr. Neuregelung des Meldewesens 4th March 1935, 126.
25. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Polizeiherr in Hamburg an den
Herrn Senator der inneren Verwaltung, Betr. Neuregelung des Meldewesens 4th March 1935, 126.
26. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Entwurf (Jeske) zur Umorganisation
des polizeilichen Meldewesens 16th December 1934, 58-59.
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Hanseatic cities but on district level.27 Aly and Roth stated that the Reichsmeldeordnung
was based on this `Hanseatic model', but as we will see the core elements of this system,
the centralised and mechanised maintenance of data and the Ausweiszwang in particular,
were not adapted for the nationwide registration system, that refrained from regulating
the material side of registration.28
Inter-agency exchange
The Ministry of the Interior encouraged participation of all relevant authorities while
drafting the Reichsmeldeordnung. Besides consulting the police departments and district
presidents it was in contact with other ministries on the Reich level and the Statistical
Oce. When Kääb intended to achieve extraordinary savings by a reform of registration,
he expected these to result from making the tax oces' annual Personenstandsaufnah-
men obsolete. Each October the tax oces would compare their data with that of the
police registration system in a labour-intensive, hence costly, process in order to deliver
the tax forms. The Ministry of Finances favoured a registration system that would
provide independent information. Bremen and Hamburg had established a registration
system so comprehensive and accurate it could reliably be used for taxation and the
inter-agency exchange of data in general.
When, in 1934, the system of national taxes had been revised, the Ministry of Finance
introduced a separate registration obligation with the tax oce in order to cope with
the disparate state of registration throughout the nation. Clearly this was onerous for
the public as well as the administration. Well aware that the introduction of a system
comparable to that of Hamburg on a national level was unfeasible since it required costly
mechanisation, the ministry proposed including an obligation for the registry oces, to
forward a copy of the registration form to the local tax oce and furthermore to include
the relevant question on the registration forms. In the long term, the ministry would
readily refrain from the annual tax survey.29 Since the Ministry of the Interior did not
reply in time, the provisions for tax registration remained unchanged. Only in February
did a reply promise the unied registration regulation would be in force within the year.30
27. Details to the tax survey's can be found in: BArch R 36 646
28. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 52.
29. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Reichsminister der Finanzen an
den Reichsminister des Innern, 25th October 1934, 70-71.
30. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Reichs- und Preussische Minister
des Innern an den Herrn Reichsminister der Finanzen 18th February 1935, 100.
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Trials in registration
Since the regulations had been passed in 1933, it was intended to standardise national
procedures by adapting them in the other German states. However, on the occasion of
the 1934 referendum on merging the oces of chancellor and president in succession of
Hindenburg's death, the election lists (Wahllisten) were synchronised with the popula-
tion registers (Melderegister). The process revealed several aws in the Prussian system
since both the Wahllisten and the registers contained faulty and out-of-date data. Ber-
lin, with its high uctuation in population, was particularly aected by non-compliance
of the ordinary population. But various authorities also failed to comply with the regis-
tration regulations, as the Berlin police department reports:
Hierbei stellte sich heraus, daÿ zahlreiche Personen die sich bereits im Arbeits-
dienst oder zur Arbeitsleistung, zum Besuch von auswärtigen Schulen und
Lehranstalten, in Kranken- Irren-, Heil-, Bewahr- oder Fürsorgeanstalten
und in Schutzhaft oder Kozentratioslagern auÿerhalb Berlins benden, in
den Berliner Melderegistern geführt werden, ohne daÿ es der für die bis-
herige Wohnung zuständigen Meldestelle bekannt ist, seit wann und wo sich
die Personen auÿerhalb Berlins aufhalten.31
Criminologist Ernst Liebermann von Sonnenberg reported several cases in which fugitive
youths managed to go unregistered for weeks or month by joining party organisations.
Both Hitler Youth and the SA had unwittingly allowed wanted individuals to escape
registration by providing accommodation.32 Rostock led a similar complaint regarding
hospitals.33 As the only noteworthy deviation from the Eisenach guidelines, Prussia's
1933 registration regulations added a 22nd paragraph regarding the voluntary labour
service (Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst / FAD). Based on the provisions for youth hostels,
hospitals and `lunatic asylums', labour camp leaders had to report volunteers to the
relevant registration oce on a weekly basis. To that end, supervisors had to maintain
records of their volunteers in the form of books, lists or an index.34 Similar regulations
had been adapted in the other federal states.
31. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Der Polizei-Präsident Berlin an den Herrn
Reichs- und Preuÿischen Minister des Innern, Betrit Neuregelung des Meldewesens, 17th October 1935,
81.
32. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin an den
Herrn Preussischen Minister des Innern, 14th August 1934, 171-173.
33. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Der Generalstaatsanwalt beim Mecklen-
burgischen Oberlandesgericht in Rostock an den Herrn Reichminister der Justiz, 21st March 1935, 204.
34. Cf. Steens, Polizeiverordnung über das Meldewesen vom 22. April 1933: mit e. Anhang: Vors-
chriften über d. Einrichtung u. Führung von Meldekarteien, 14.
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The lax provisions of 21 and 22 presented a major loophole and similar reports
reached the Ministry of the Interior from all regions. And while all these cases were
problematic from the stance of seamless registration, many reports highlighted the labour
service as a particular nuisance. The mayor of the town Hagen, for instance, complained:
In diesen Formationen wird die polizeiliche Meldepicht nicht einheitlich, sondern auf
verschiedenste Weise oder gar nicht ausgeübt.35 Since the labour service operated on
the national level the An- und Abmeldung of its volunteers unintentionally turned into a
test case for the nationwide registration system that was in continuous planning at the
Reich Ministry of the Interior.
Unlike in the other elds discussed, where the rst year of Nazi rule was marked by
great continuity, the Labour Service was undergoing a drastic change in character since
Weimar times. The new leader of the service Konstantin Hierl was securing his inu-
ence over the service replacing proven Labour Service leaders by `alte Kämpfer ' from
the NSADAP ranks. While this helped to secure the service from an ideological stand-
point and even more importantly secure a position within the NSDAP's internal power
struggles, it did not further a professionalisation of the Labour Service. Instead, internal
investigations uncovered corruption and abuse of power. Camp leaders often featured
an anti-statist attitude and believed they were beyond legal trivia, registration regula-
tion included.36 Apart from cases of non-compliance, the regulations could not ensure
seamless tracing of residence. For the time a volunteer remained with the labour service
he could not be located through enquiry at the last known residency's registration oce,
since the service's registration oces did not report back.37 Local police at the former
place of residence were thus unable to know whether, when and whereto a volunteer had
left residence in order to join the Labour Service. Similarly, once volunteers had served
their term and registered elsewhere their abode could not be seamlessly reproduced,
since the Labour Service's registration oce was not notied. The service occurred in
a time of heightened mobility in the draftees' biography and often volunteers did not
re-register with their former residency's register oce. As things were, service with the
Labour Service potentially provided a way to evade registration, rather than tightening
the authorities' grip on the volunteers.
35. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Der Polizeipräsident in Berlin an den
Herrn Minister des Innern 22nd September 1934, 65.
36. Cf. Kiran Klaus Patel, Soldiers of labor: labor service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America,
1933 - 1945, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press /
German Historical Institute, 2005), 85.
37. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Arbeitsgauleitung 20 a Westfalen Nord
an die Gruppen des Arbeitsgaues 20a Westfalen-Nord, 15th March 1935, 4.
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Municipalities all over Prussia could not help but notice the insuciencies of 22 and
numerous requests reached the Reich Ministry of the Interior inquiring whether and
when a `reichsrechtliche Regelung des Meldewesens would plug these gaps. Alternately,
respondents suggested this could be achieved by issuing local directives. Oberregierung-
srat Kääb, responsible for the revision of a nationwide registration system persistently
answered all sorts of requests regarding a future unied registration system with a brief
answer: Der Zeitpunkt des Erlasses reichsrechtlicher Meldevorschriften ist derzeit noch
nicht vorauszusehen.38 While the development of the public registration system stag-
nated, unintentionally the registration system of the labour service oered a testing
ground for registration and draft, unhampered by bequeathed federal structures. Des-
pite, out of diplomatic considerations, publicly announcing otherwise, the labour service
had always been looked on by party ocials as a vessel for underlying military goals. In
preparation for the introduction of compulsory labour and military service Hierl started
a second overhaul of the service. In consequence, about 80% of the service's leaders
were replaced in 1934. Hierl was promoted Reich Commisioner for the Labour Service.
The service  now dubbed NS-Arbeitsdienst  was revised on an organisational level and
gained independence from the Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosen-
versicherung and established independent registration oces. These Meldeämter für
den Freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst introduced a new registration procedure that had been
planned in coordination with the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Berlin police
department. Hierl introduced the new system in a letter to the Reich Ministry of the
Interior by rst criticising the shortcomings of the Prussian registration system's pro-
visions in  22 that obliged the camp leaders to forward lists of volunteers on a weekly
basis.
Diesen Listenmeldungen kann daher nur ein ordnungspolizeilicher Wert bei-
gemessen werden, schon der kriminalpolizeiliche Wert dieser Meldungen ist
ein sehr beschränkter [. . . ] Dagegen ist durch die Neuordnung der Sta-
tistik der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes ein Meldeverfahren eingeführt,
das durch seine karteimässige Verwendungsmöglichkeit und den amtlichen
Charakter der An- und Abmeldung (die Meldestellen sind Reichsbehörden)
die Gewähr bietet, dass sowohl ordnungspolizeiliche, wie die kriminalpoli-
zeiliche, als auch bevölkerungsstatistische Auswertung durchgeführt werden
kann.39
38. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Reichs-u.Pr.Min.d.Innern an Herrn A.R.
Schuster Buchbinderei, 7th August 1935, 2.
39. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Der Reichskommissar für den freiwilligen
Arbeitsdienst  Reichsleitung  an das Reichsministerium des Innern 24th May 1934, 7.
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The new system was, according to Hierl, introduced to facilitate the service's own stat-
istical requirements. Like the entire economy, the Labour Service attached considerable
importance to evaluability, sustaining an independent statistical oce to monitor the ser-
vice's productivity and if need be underscore its relevance. Moreover, the Labour Service
attached considerable importance to assign what was considered the right composition
of volunteers to each camp. These decisions were based on detailed information such
as confession (catholic or protestant), political and landesmannschaftlicher background
etc.40 The most important change in that regard was the establishment of card-based
registration, that allowed for reorganisation of the individual cards in order to serve
tasks like sorting the groups for certain camps or statistical evaluations. For the regis-
trant, the Labour Service had designed a new form. TheMeldebogen für den Freiwilligen
Arbeitsdienst, had to be completed by the local registration oces by providing the per-
sonal details including proof of former residences, vocation, citizenship, religion, place
and country of origin, and family status. From the registration oces, the form had
to be forwarded to the police's department for criminal investigations inquiring pos-
sible former convictions. The latter would forward the form to the political police, who
noted potential misdemeanours before forwarding it to the labour services' registration
oces. Promoted to a Reichsbehörde, the labor service also had (other than most party
branches) gained ocial clearance for disclosure of these personal details. For the time
in service, the Arbeitsdienstbuch was meant to provide prove of residence. While the new
system was facilitating the labour service's internal demands and addressed the problem
of subsequent tax registration by providing an extra copy of the cancelling of registration
form to be forwarded to the nancial authority, it did not address the issue most press-
ing for the police registration system  that of seamless registration. The registry oces
at the last place of residence were still unable to determine the whereabouts of volun-
teers despite forwarding their own information to the labour service's oces. During the
second half of 1934 ocials at the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Labour Service
agreed that the volunteers had to cancel the registration with the local oces. Once
again the population was put in charge of the thorough implementation of registration,
but the new provisions introduced a coercive mechanism. To register with the labour
services' registration oce, volunteers had to provide a cancellation form, that was led
away with their registration card, and only handed back once their service term had
ocially ended. Now the service was in a position to insist:
40. BArch R2 RFM 4521, Der Reichsarbeitsführer an den Herrn Reichsminister und Chef der
Reichskanzlei 12th February, 135.
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dass die polizeilichen Meldestellen keine polizeilichen Anmeldungen, ins-
besondere solcher Personen, die sich im Arbeitsdienstpichtigen Alter (17-25
Jahre) benden, entgegennehmen, die nicht durch gleichzeitige Vorlage eines
polizeilichen Abmeldescheins einen ununterbrochenen Nachweis über ihren
Aufenthalt führen.41
In 1935 compulsory military service was introduced in March and compulsory labour
service in June. The close link between labour and military service, that had always
been intended, was underlined when fullment of labour service was made a prerequisite
for military service. The Reichsarbeitsdienstgesetz issued on 21st May formalised the
new registration procedures.
Meanwhile, Arthur Kääb varied his reply to the frequent requests regarding the state
of the reform of registration:
Die Vorarbeiten für die reichsrechtliche Regelung des Meldewesens sind mit
Absicht zurückgestellt worden, um gröÿere Aufgaben, die die Meldebhörden
im Laufe der nächsten Monate zu bewältigen haben, nicht zu gefährden.42
And indeed, registrars all over the nation were occupied preparing for the draft of the
cohorts born in 1914 and 1915. During the First World War the draft had been prepared
by the Standesämter as their data was organised by cohorts. The downside of this
approach was that once people moved the Standesämter lacked the means to locate
them. Due to generally increased mobility, this approach was not considered feasible
anymore. Instead, the enlistment now relied on the police registration system. The
cohort of 1914 would rst serve their term with the Wehrmacht and the Labour Service
successively, the cohort of 1915, vice versa. Candidates were examined by a joint draft
commission so that the Labour Service's registration oces acted as enlistment oces
for both services.43
But despite the organisational changes, lack of compliance remained a problem. The
Deutscher Gemeindetag approached the Reichsarbeitsdienstführer [u]m zu vermeiden,
dass sich Unzuträglichkeiten besonders bei der Erfassung der Heeresdienstpichtigen
ergeben. A number of cases were brought to his attention, including some in which:
41. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Protokoll über die Verhandlung zur
Neuregelung des polizeilichen An- und Abmeldewesens des Arbeitsdienstes zwischen Herrn Oberregier-
ungsrat dr. K r a u s e vom Reichsministerium und des Arbeitsführers T i e m a n n sowie Feldmeister
S c h r o p p von der Reichsleitung, Dienstamt 2. 2nd June 1934, 26.
42. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Note to the les, Arthur Kääb, 8th March
1935, 175.
43. BArch R2 4533, Vermerk Betrit: Reichsarbeitsdienstgesetz, March 1935, 15.
97
[. . . ] der Lagerleiter die Arbeitsmänner trotzdem diese einen Meldeschein
abgegeben haben, der Ortspolizeibehörde nicht anmeldet mit dem Bemerken,
dass eine polizeiliche Meldung nicht erforderlich ist. Desweiteren melden sich
die zum Arbeitsdienst eintretenden Arbeitsmänner vielfach nicht polizeilich
von ihrem letzten Wohnort ab. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass dadurch die
Einwohnermeldelisten groÿe Ungenauigkeiten aufweisen.44
In consequence, police and the Labour Service instructed their ocials to strictly abide
by the new regulations. The public was informed of their obligations through announce-
ments in newspapers. With the draft notice, draftees received a new form, the `An-
weisung zur polizeilichen Anmeldung ', that also featured an excerpt of the relevant re-
gistration regulations. The form had to be completed by the recipient and signed by the
local registry oce. The registry oce would then single out the draftee's index cards or
add a note to their registry, specifying the relevant Labour Service's registry oce. With
the end of service the former conscripts were subject to several additional registration
obligations, devised to ensure the subsequent draft by the Wehrmacht. Within three
days of moving, former conscripts had to register with their local registry oce and
inform their former Labour Service register oce about their new residence in writing.
The cohort of 1915 was subject to these tightened regulations until they were drafted.
The cohort of 1914, rst drafted by the military, were informed that failure to register
would immediately trigger a tracing procedure. As a result of the varying local regis-
tration regulations they were moreover obliged to enquire which other authorities they
had to register with.45 Laying out the military districts the Wehrmacht had anticipated
a territorial reorganisation, expected as a core element of a future Reichsreform. The
Labour Service's districts were almost identical to the Wehrmacht 's districts. Since the
political map remained unaltered, administrative districts diered from those of Labour
Services and the military.46 As a result, conscripts of the same enlistment oce could
be subject to dierent registration regulations at their place of residence.
The registration procedure developed for the Labour Service and the Wehrmacht in
1935 highlighted the need for a unied registration system. It established initial unied
registration procedures and a unied registration form. The case also shows how, in
order to maintain a clear display of the population, dierent authorities had to sustain
44. BArch R 36 1950 (87183), Deutscher Gemeindetag an die Reichleitung des Arbeitsdienstes, Berlin
Juni 1935.
45. BArch RFM 4521, Merkblatt: Meldepicht im Herbst 1935 aus dem Arbeitsdienst entlassener
Wehrpichtiger bei Wohnungswechsel.
46. Cf. Patel, Soldiers of labor: labor service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933 - 1945,
116.
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a system of mutual notications. In the case of the cohorts of 1914/15, this problem
was transitionally solved by substituting notication obligations for increased duties for
the registrant. Nevertheless, a future registration system had to serve various branches
of the administration and organise a regulated ow of information.
The development of the Labour Service's registration system shows how achieving the
necessary compliance proved dicult even on a limited eld. Volunteers, recruits and
camp leaders had to align with the normative state's formalities in order to guarantee
a seamlessly working ow of paper. Besides familiarising the male adolescents with
military order, the Labour Service also made them accustomed them to the paper-
work required to implement a strict regime of registration. Registration was made the
prerequisite for further steps. As part of the coercive mechanisms the Wehrpass or
Arbeitsdienstbuch were handed back to former recruits only after successful registration.
As these documents acted as proof of former residence, they were required when applying
with other authorities, in particular the labour oce. So Patel concluded: Given the
increasingly perfected system of registration and punishment, it was nearly impossible to
avoid the Labor Service altogether after 1935.47 But the enlistment process of 1935 still
revealed blatant loopholes in registration as Regierungspräsident of Arnsberg reports:
Nach den bisherigen Beobachtungen  insbesondere bei der diesjährigen Mus-
terung der Jahrgänge 1914/15  hat sich herausgestellt, daÿ sowohl in den
Städten, als auch auf dem Lande ein Groÿteil der Dienstpichtigen meldeamt-
lich nicht erfasst war. In einer Anzahl von Fällen konnten die Gestellungs-
befehle wegen unbekannter Wohnung nicht zugestellt werden.48
Due to the patchwork of regulations and practices the notication of the relevant re-
gistration oces and the return of the documents often failed to the former recruits'
disadvantage.49 The transition from Labour Service to the Wehrmacht proved to be
problematic, as the Labour Service's registry oces were often too slow to process the
cancelling of registration with the Labour Service. The army had to turn down recruits
who showed up at the right draft oce at the right time, but were unable to provide
a seamless proof of residence.50 Rather than establishing a complete and functioning
47. Patel, Soldiers of labor: labor service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933 - 1945, 128.
48. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Regierungspräsident in Arnsberg
an den Herrn Reichs- und Preuÿ. Minister des Innern, Betrit: Änderung der Polizeiverordnung über
das Meldewesen 11th September 1935, Bl. 216.
49. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Der Regierungspräsident in Aurich an
den Reichs- und Preussischen Minister des Innern, 3rd July 1936, 239.
50. GSTA I HA Rep. 77. Tit. 343, Nr. 17, Sonderakte Bd 2, Der regierungspräsident in Wiesbaden
an den Herrn Reichs- und Preuÿischen Minister des Innern, 30st November 1935, 52.
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system of registration, the combined draft in 1935 helped reveal the weaknesses of the
provisions in place. However, the registration and cancelling registration forms provided
by the labour service introduced the rst unied registration form in Germany.
4.3 Second planning stage
After the draft, planning for a Reichsmeldeordnung resumed. On 8th November 1935,
Kääb informed Frick that he had nished a rst draft of the Reichsmeldeordnung.51
Only a few more details were to be agreed during consultations set for late 1935 and the
Reichsmeldeordnung was expected to come in force in early 1936. During a meeting of
Kääb and Oberregierungsrat Lichter on behalf of the Reich Ministry of the Interior with
the statistical oce's expert for population statistics Burgdörfer and Dr Schnieber in
December 1935, the statisticians had only few demands regarding a future registration
system. Tourism- and migration statistics depended on continuous proof of residence
regarding internal migration and data on place of origin or destination in case of immig-
ration or emigration respectively. Statistics on tourism were compiled from the entries
in hotels and hostels, which were obliged to register and report the number of tourists
and the country of origin. Further issues were not discussed.52
In January Kääb met with Oberregierungsrat Homann and Amtsrat Schulz, rep-
resenting the Ministry of Finances. The ministries' main concern, the omission of a
separate obligation for tax registration, was already solved. During the meeting Schulz
and Homann brought up the issue of a lack of legal basis for nationwide police decrees,
an issue that was expected to be solved by the Reichsreform and thus postponed for
later consideration. Regarding the basic design of the registration system the nancial
ocials clearly favoured the Adrema-based system, that had so successfully been ad-
apted by various cities throughout the Reich, pointing out the possible the omission of
the annual tax survey. If a similar system could, due to the associated costs not be
established on a nationwide scale, registration forms should at least be typed to spare
the civil servants the tedious and time-consuming task of deciphering handwriting.53
Otherwise, Kääb and the nancial ocials agreed the future registration system had to
be umfassend, aber so einfach wie möglich und mit möglichst wenig Belästigung für
51. GStA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd 1, Vorentwurf Verordnung über das
Meldewesen Herrn ORR.Dr.Kääb 12th November 1935, 275-286.
52. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Reichs- u.Pr.Min.d.Innern,
Betrit:Reichsrechtliche Regelung des Meldewesens, Vermerk, Arthur Kääb, 16th December 1935, 287.
53. The ministry estimated to process the data of Berlin's more than 4 million inhabitants, ten ma-
chines were required, costing up to 6000 RM each.
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das Publikum.54 Contrary to Berlin's police department, the Ministry of Finance and
Kääb's Department Administration and Law (Abteilung Verwaltung und Recht) were
willing to trade a higher workload for the registrars for higher compliance rates. The
authorities involved and the issues discussed above are characterised by an almost linear
continuity from Weimar's last years and in early 1936 it only seemed a matter of months
until the Reichsmeldeordnung nally be eected.
To date, registration had been a marginal topic for most ministries, but towards the
end of 1935 interests in the matter were voiced by parties formerly uninvolved indicating
that a simple extension of the Prussian registration system would not suce to full the
needs of National Socialism for they surpassed the scope of a registration system as
it was currently planned. The draft of the summer had made the Ministry of War
aware of the registration issues. In July 1935 the ministry had contacted Kääb in order
to address the need to combine data from registry and register oces (Standes- und
Meldeämter), to facilitate the draft. On 6th September 1935 Minister of War Werner
Blomberg commented on Kääb's draft. The notication system between register oces
of the civil administration, the Labour Service and the Wehrmacht had to be tightened.
He furthermore criticised  23 of the Prussian regulations on `roving persons' clearly
employing the anti-gypsy clichés of espionage brought up during the First World War and
before, describing them as lichtscheues Gesindel, dass nicht selten Handlangerdienste
in Verrats- und Ausspähungsfällen leistet.55 But most importantly Blomberg repeated
the demand of a conjunction of the registry and the register oces' data to facilitate
the draft process. In late 1935 the revision of the Law on Civil Status and the function
of the Standesämter was still under consideration. An additional merger of register and
registry oces would have inuenced a future law on civil status and linked the progress
of both projects. Yet, beyond mutual notication obligations such linkage was intended
by neither of the oces involved.
Nevertheless, the Ministry of War had made clear the current Prussian system was
unt for a coming war, as it still required the combined eort of four dierent authorities:
the registry oces (Standesämter) and civil or police Einwohnermeldeämter, the Labour
Service's and the Wehrmacht 's registration oces. This system that had proven to be
inecient and prone to mistakes. To make this coordination obsolete, the registration
54. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd. 1, Der Reichs- u.Pr.Min.d.Innern,
Vermerk, Arthur Kääb, 30st January 1936, 293.
55. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd1, Der Reichskriegminister und Oberbe-
fehlshaber der Wehrmacht an den Reichs- und Preussischen Minister des Innern 6th September 1935,
212-213.
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oces had to organise their data in age cohorts rather than alphabetically. But the
coordination of register and registry oces or the introduction of a nationwide ling
system considerably surmounted existing plans for registration. As shown earlier, the
transformation of the Standesämter was eventually stopped in 1937 and their function
not signicantly altered.56 A comprehensive population index based on age groups thus
had to be established elsewhere.
The second important initiative inuencing the further development of registration
reached Kääb's oce the day after the proclamation of the Nuremberg Laws. The
note to the les dating 16th September 1935 cited the subject: Judenfrage; Erhebung
über Rassezugehörigkeit und Verwertung der Ergebnisse durch die polizeilichen Melde-
behörden.57 Notably, the document still employed the racial terminology predating the
Nuremberg denitions, as the implementation provisions were not yet published. The
document reviewed possible ways to collect data on `race' (Rassezugehörigkeit) and add
it to the les of the registration system. Earlier considerations by Lösner's oce and
Daluege in July 1935 resulted in two alternatives: a grand-scale survey or the utilisa-
tion of the population registers as cumulative data base. To implement the latter, new
registration regulations would simply add a question on descent to the forms, obliging
the registrant to disclose Jewish descent up to the grandparents' generation. On the
occasion of registration or cancelling of registration, the registrars would mark the index
cards or registration forms of `Non-Aryans' with a specic label. But the document also
lists the downsides of this approach. It would add to the work load of the registrars and
put them in the position to produce documents on descent, albeit this being the sole
privilege of the Reichsstelle für Sippenforschung. The second approach, considered more
feasible, was to include a question on descent with the nancial ministry's annual tax
survey (Personenstandsaufnahme) and collate the results with the population registers.
The document attributes the proposal to Kerstiens who in 1933 had been involved in
the utilisation of the Prussian tax survey to identify medical personnel and was hence
aware of the possibility. A simple addition of the relevant question to the tax survey
would solve the problem of the lack of legal framework, as the tax act of October 1934
already admitted the inclusion of additional surveys.58 On the other hand the ministry's
56. See chapter `Position of points', 70.
57. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd. 1, Zu den Verhandlungen über das
polizeiliche Meldewesen, Vermerk Kääb, Betr. Judenfrage; Erhebung über die Rasszugehörigkeit und
Verwertung des Ergebnisses durch die polizeiliechen Meldebehörden, 198-201.
58. See chapter `A Survey of medical personnel', 123 and GSTA I HA Re. 77. Tit. 343, Polizeisachen
Bd. 12-13, RdErl. d. MdI v 23.8.1933  III a 958/33, 304 and Der Minister des Innern Karlsruhe an
den Herrn Preussischen Minister des Innern, 1st March 1934, 356.
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surveys were known to produce unreliable results and comprised only the taxable pop-
ulation. The initiative regarding this survey remained with Lösner's oce and did not
occupy Kerstiens or Kääb in the further planning of the Reichsmeldeordnung. These
new demands for a registration system voiced in autumn 1935 initiated a process that
eventually resulted in the Volkskartei and I will return to the further development of
the eorts to identify Germany's Jews in the chapter `Identifying `the Jews''.59
The implementation of the nationwide registration system was slowed down once
again. A Reichsreform was ocially postponed in January 1936, posing the question of
the legal basis for nationwide police decrees. In consequence, standardisation of regis-
tration had to be implemented without a wider legal framework.
Nevertheless, a week after Himmler's appointment as Chef der deutschen Polizei on
17th July 1936, Kääb was proud to report: Mit dem Abschluÿ der Vorbereitungen für
die reichsrechtliche Regelung ist in absehbarar Zeit zu rechnen.60 But in September
he expected several more months to conclude the groundwork.61 The main reason for
the suspense in late 1936 were changes in personnel. The appointment of Himmler had
a direct impact on the Department of Administration and Law, as its head, Kerstiens,
was deemed politisch nicht mehr tragbar. It is not exactly clear what caused the
antagonism, but the head of the German police insisted:
[. . . ] daÿ M. R. Dr. Kerstiens, auch sachlich, nicht die Erkenntnis und
den Blick gehabt hat, der für die nat. sozl. Aufbauarbeit, auch auf seinem
Spezialgebiet des Polizeirechts, als selbstverständlich verlangt werden muÿ.62
When it came to develop a National Socialist police law and in particular to Daluege's
and Himmler's negotiations over their respective competences in the future structure of
the police, Kerstiens  despite his contribution to the question of identifying Germany's
Jews  had become an obstacle. Kerstiens was pressured several times to retire but since
he refused he was eventually sent back to a minor post in the administration of Münster
on the basis of the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums.63Kerstiens died
in January 1942 in Münster at the age of forty-eight.
59. 110.
60. GSTA I HA Rep. 77. Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd 1, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der
Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern, Ref O.R.R. Dr.Kääb an den Herrn Oldenburgischen
Minister des Innern, 24th July 1936, 241.
61. GSTA I HA Rep. 77. Tit. 343, Nr. 107a, Sonderakte Bd 1, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der
Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern, Ref O.R.R. Dr.Kääb an den Herrn Regierungs-
präsidenten in Darmstadt, 10th September 1936, 243.
62. BArch R 1501 207893, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Chef des Hauptamtes
Ordnungspolizei an Herrn Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schütze, July 1936, 214.
63. BArch R 1501 207893, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Gauleitung Westfalen Nord,
Der Gauleiter an Herrn Ministerialdirektor Dr. Schütze, 24th Decmber 1936, 247.
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Finalising the Reichsmeldeordnung
When Himmler was appointed Chef der deutschen Polizei in 1936, police forces were re-
organised and Gestapo and criminal police were combined to form the Sicherheitspolizei
under Heydrich as the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei. The oce of Verwaltung und Recht
remained under Daluege as head of the Ordnungspolizei. In January 1937 Erich Lieber-
mann von Sonnenberg was deposed from the criminal police in a corruption scandal and
instead joined the Department for Administration and Law to replace Kerstiens.64
In late 1936 the decision to disentangle the alignment of registration regulations from
the introduction of a unied ling system was taken. The Reichsmeldeordnung would
largely continue the legacy of Weimar's Reichsreform. Only in a second step would a
unied card index be established, providing for the demands of the Volksgemeinschaft,
that is the organisation of military and economic mobilisation, and the segregation of
Jews as required by the 1935 Reichsbürgergesetz.
After the reorganisation of the police the Department Administration and Law was
headed by Werner Bracht as part of the Daluege's Ordnungspolizei. Kääb was put in
charge of trade inspectorates, while Sonnenberg continued the reform of the registration
system and the design of the card index.65 Simultaneously, the interdependence of the
Personenstandsgesetz, (PStG) (Law on Civil Status) and Reichsmeldeordnung was lifted,
when in February 1937 the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
reported that Hilter, in the course of his general decision to abandon the plans for
a Reichsreform, did not support a transformation of the registry oces into kinship
oces.66 This brought about a change in dynamics allowing for the swift implementation
of a legal reform of the registry oces. On 3rd November 1937 a new Law of Civil Status
was introduced that did not signicantly alter the registry oces' function as they still
maintained the records of civil status while the Health Departments were in charge
of controlling marriages.67 The decision pointed several authorities to the question of
racial segregation, since the issue of reliable determination Reichsbürgerschaft remained
unsolved.
But the changed approach also opened up a way for the reform of registration, un-
impeded by further dependencies. The reform had hitherto been a marginal part of the
64. Cf. Patrick Wagner, Volksgemeinschaft ohne Verbrecher: Konzeptionen und Praxis der Kriminal-
polizei in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik und des Nationalsozialismus, Hamburger Beiträge zur Sozial-
und Zeitgeschichte 34 (Hamburg: Hamburg, Christians, 1996), 234-235.
65. BArch R 19 5/f, Geschäftsverteilungsplan Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei 1937, 172.
66. See chapter `Position of points', 70. Cf. Schulle, Reichssippenamt, 271.
67. RGBl I, 1146-1152.
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Reichsreform and when this project lost momentum registration was not a priority to
Frick. With the reorganisation of the police, though, registration fell into Himmler's
sphere of inuence. Several enquiries about the state of the reform over the course of
the coming years as well as visits to Berlin's main registration oce show, how Himmler
took personal interest in registration issues, in particular, the project of a unied card
index, dubbed Volkskartei in early 1937. As consequence, the Reichsmeldeordnung, a
precondition to the establishment of the Volkskartei, was nalised within a year, and
eected early 1938.
Despite the previous eorts and the recent disentanglement of the administrative re-
form's dierent aspects, several problems of the Reichsmeldeordnung remained unsolved.
After Frick's call in early 1934 to comment on the Prussian system of April 1933 numer-
ous replies had demanded the reintroduction of the landlords duties vis-a-vis the tenants
and harsher punishment for non-compliance. Yet, as it was clear that registration de-
pended on compliance of the public, new regulations had to be reasonable. Also, the
new regulations had to bring about standardisation while keeping advanced registration
like the `Hanseatic system' intact. The Prussian regulations from 1933  still in the
liberal spirit of the republic  did not discriminate between alien and citizen; under the
conditions of Nazi rule several instances demanded these provisions be changed again.
During 1937 new issues surfaced: secondary residence, possible entries in the eld for
religion and the issue of registering car holders. These issues were discussed by the head
ocials and ministers. During July 1937 several Chefbesprechungen took place in order
to settle these last issues. Since secondary residences and religion were mainly connected
to taxing, these issues were negotiated with the Ministry of Finance. The registration
of car holders and their cars was of concern to the Trac Ministry and the military,
who both favoured a solution in which the police register oces registered car holders
and forwarded the results to the vehicle registration oce  an extra duty for the re-
gistrars the Reich Ministry of the Interior tried to avoid. The question of religion was
treated by Globke's oce in charge of the law on civil status; the results were adapted
for the Reichsmeldeordnung. Numerous party members who had left the churches to
join the various religious cults that had ourished as a part of the völkisch life-reform
movement. Many of them  who refrained from being registered `Dissident ' as well as
from being subsumed among one of the ocial churches in order to avoid church taxes 
had begun to ll in `gottgläubig ' or `deutschgläubig ' or variations of the sort. Eventually
one was allowed to enter the specic name of a religious community (Religions- oder
Weltanschauungsgemeinschaft), `gottgläubig ' or `glaubenslos '. Provisionally registration
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of cars and their holders remained with the trac ministry; the question of a possible
inclusion on the Volkskartei 's index cards was postponed.68 In August 1937 Daluege
could eventually send a draft of the future Reichsmeldeordnung to Himmler for perusal,
remarking:
[. . . ] wie bei der Volkskartei, dass der Entwurf selbstverständlich noch
manche Änderung erfahren wird, weil er zunächst nur vorbesprochen und
jetzt erst zur Stellungnahme an die [. . . ] Reichs- und Staatsstellen geschickt
wird.69
On 10th September Frick was eventually able to send the nal draft to Hitler's Deputy
and all ministries.70 With only minor changes this draft was accepted and passed in
1938.
The Reichsmeldeordnung
Since the Prussian police decree on registration in April 1933, almost ve years passed
until nationwide registration system was eventually established. Had the original plan
been to extend the Prussian provisions over the Reich, the rst combined draft of 1935
had revealed several loopholes in these provisions so that a thorough revision was ini-
tiated. At about the same time, the requirements of the Wehrmacht and the Ministry
of the Interior's will to identify Germany's Jewish population highlighted the demand
for an index system that was capable of serving the various authorities' needs. While
most of the groundwork was done by Kerstiens, with his removal and replacement by
Liebermann, the aspects of registration and ling were separated. The eorts gained
momentum. What had started out as one aspect of a Reichsreform was eventually real-
ised as part of the National Socialist reorganisation of the police. The textual structures
of Prussia's 1933 provisions and the Reichsmeldeordnung are completely dierent. The
draft versions of 1937 are already characterised by the same outline of the law eventu-
ally passed. The 1938 Reichsmeldeordnung fused elements of various registration systems
with the experiences of the introduction of compulsory work and military service as well
as recommendations from various authorities and the public in a process that did not
signicantly dier from the Weimar era.
68. BArch R 19 431, Ministerialdirigent Bracht to Daluege 10th July, 1937.
69. BArch R 19 407, Chef der Ordnungspolizei an den Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei
im Reichsministerium des Innern, Herrn Heinrich Himmler, 12th August, 1937.
70. BArch R2 12199, Vorentwurf, Verordnung über das Meldewesen, Reichsmeldeordnung, 10th
September 1937.
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Before turning to the genesis of the Volkskartei in following chapters I will take a closer
look at the changes that came with the Reichsmeldeordnung as well as the remaining
dierences in registration, in order to have a clear understanding of the registration sys-
tem the Volkskartei was eventually meant to be included within. Since the incomplete
state of the Reichsreform had left the implementation of a unied registration system
without legal basis, in May 1937 the Gesetz über das Paÿ-, das Ausländerpolizei und
das Meldewesen sowie das Ausweiswesen authorised Frick to carry out a nationwide
reorganisation of the specied areas of law.71 It provided the legal basis for the Reichs-
meldeordnung that came to eect on 1st May 1938. It suspended all existing regulations.
The most basic regulations dened the subjects of registration and aected the en-
tirety of the German inhabitants with the exception of children under 15 and members of
foreign nations' diplomatic corps. Prussia's 1933 regulations required registration when
a `continuous residency' (dauernder Aufenthalt) was established, but the denition of
`continuous residency' had proven to be vague and depending on subjective factors.
With the Reichsmeldeordnung, presence on German territory required registration. Ad-
apting the Bavarian provision from the late 1920s, moving into a new home triggered
the obligation to register. More importantly, the Reichsmeldeordnung established the
individual's obligation to register instead of the head of family's from the age of fteen
upwards. Nevertheless, in accordance with the principle of easy compliance the head of
the family was still allowed to register his children on their behalf. Unlike in 1933, the
Reichsmeldeordnung reintroduced obligations for the lessor or landlord in the tenants
registration process. However, the respites for registration remained unchanged. Even
when registration was tightened with the onset of the war, a respite of 3 days was gran-
ted for Germans  aliens had to register within a day. Kääb and Liebermann explained
the rationale that had led to this comparatively lenient provision was based on the fact
that a respite of 24 hours was easy to miss. Once in default, most would refrain from
registering altogether in apprehension of penalty. Compliance, they argued, depended
on the public after all:
Polizeiliche Vorschriften, die sich an eine unbeschränkte Zahl von Personen
wenden, sind auch durch Strafandrohungen und Strafen nur durchzusetzen,
wenn die Bevölkerung sie als notwendig anerkennt und als tragbar empn-
det.72
71. RGBl I, 589-590.
72. Erich Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Reichsmeldeordnung (Verordnung über das Meldewesen),
5th ed., ed. Kurt Daluege and Artur Kääb (München: Jehle, 1942), 19.
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Hence, the Reichsmeldeordnung was still characterised by the eort to nd a balance of
simplicity and complaisance on the one and rigour on the other hand. Complementary
to upholding the respites agreed upon in 1928, the penalties for non-compliance were
raised to 150 RM or six-week imprisonment compared to a maximum charge of 150
RM or two weeks imprisonment before. Deliberately registering at a false address or
participation therein was generally penalised with detention. The reintroduction of the
landlords as an accountable supervisory body for their tenants responded to the multiple
demands in that regard and denitely made the paper work involved when moving more
dicult as both the landlord of the new residence (or a representative) as well as the
one of the former residence (or a representative) had to conrm the cancellation and
registration respectively. The provision of free forms, expected to increase compliance,
was not adopted for the Reichsmeldeordnung.
Aly and Roth considered the attempt to balance requirements and hurdles to regis-
tration prototypical for National Socialist administration.73 Admittedly, the concept ts
well into National Socialist ideology. However, the rationale of this provision predates
the Nazi era and was grounded in more than a hundred years of lacking compliance on
the side of the registrants. Compared to the standards of Eisenach the Reichsmeldeord-
nung 's registration provisions were rather harsh. Unlike the Prussian regulations from
April 1933 and similar provisions in other federal states, the Reichsmeldeordnung did
not merely provide the frame work for local police decrees but regulated the details of
registration and unied forms were established for all registration oces.
The vision of a truly seamless registration depended not least on the registrars observ-
ance of ling and notication regulations. Most crucial to the entire system therefore
was the notication system which clearly dened the occasions that triggered notica-
tions as well as the mandatory forms. The notication obligations and the provisions
for disclosure were regulated by the Zweiter Runderlass des R. u. Pr. M. des Innern
vom 10 April 1938 über die Reichsmeldeordnung.74 With the Reichsmeldeordnung, after
transferring the data from the form to the register oce's ling system, the registration
form was sent to the tax oce, which forwarded it to the statistical oce. From July
1939 on, in an additional step the form passed through the labour oce before being
sent to the statisticians. On a monthly basis, the NSDAP Ortsgruppenleiter had to be
informed about all moves in his district in separate lists for registration and cancellation
of registration. The unied registration form also asked about car ownership so that the
73. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 49.
74. RMBliV, 689.
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move of a car-owner would be reported to the vehicle registration oce. In addition to
the notication system, register oces had to conrm re-registration (Rückmeldung) to
the registration oce of the former place of residence, even though this aspect of the
Prussian regulations from 1933 had been heavily contested during the planning stages
for increasing the work-load of the registrars. But the draft of 1935 had highlighted the
essential role this conrmation of re-registration played achieving seamless registration.
Registration of aliens always triggered a notication of the local police department's
Ausländeramt. The report sheet to the Ausländeramt also asked descent descent (Jüdis-
che Rassezugehörigkeit), albeit without any direction as to how to retrieve or verify
the indication.75 The provisions for youth hostels, hotels, hospitals and the like were
tightened. The hosts had to register their visitors within a day, completing an individual
form for each person. Groups over ten individuals did not have to register each person;
instead the tour guide would give her or his credentials and the number of participants.
Like all other registrations, those of tourists had to be checked by the local registry oce
and compared with the police's wanted persons lists on arrival. Individual travellers or
tour guides had to disclose the following data:
 rst and family name; married women had to additionally add their maiden name
 maritial status
 vocation, specifying the exact occupation and employment relationship;
 date of birth
 place of birth
 citizenship (aliens had to provide their ID-number and date of issue)
The unied registration form  to be used in all other cases  asked the following sup-
plementary questions:
 new address
 proof of former address (by providing the cancellation of registration form)
 designation of religious confession
 military status, service number and selective service board
 participation in civil air raid protection
75. Sonnenberg, RMO, 130.
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The questions were more specic than before.76 Nevertheless, Hamburg's earlier re-
quest for Ausweiszwang was introduced only for aliens. Otherwise the Reichsmelde-
ordnung authorised the register oces to subpoena individuals and to require them to
furnish documents proving their credentials. Beyond that, the limitation of the need
to provide documents to certain `cases of doubt' made the Ausweiszwang once again
dependant on individual registrar's `intuition'. The question for confession was altered
to include the various cults of the völkisch circles. A question for race as dened in
September 1935 was not included.77
Notably, the question asking for an exact description of profession was not intended to
facilitate individual job placements but statistics on internal migration.78 This further
underlines the tendency to fuse registration and statistics in order to make grand-scale
surveys obsolete. The data maintained in the system was not only stored to administer
the individual, but to draw conclusions on the development of the population as a whole.
In cases where individuals were designated to specic tasks, as in the case of civil air raid
protection or military status, the respective authorities were informed via the notication
system and took over. The respective authorities quickly developed independent index
systems, better suited for their specic tasks and organised to specic internal criteria
a general registration system could not provide for.79
Despite the above, the Reichsmeldeordnung did not remove regional dierences in
registration altogether. The third decree regarding the Reichsmeldeordnung included
various permissive provisions and recommendations. The administrative structure of
registration remained inconsistent so that the Reichsmeldeordnung 's  28 dened ad-
ministrative responsibilities for the individual federal states. The concurrent existence
of municipal and police registration remained intact. While this certainly was a conces-
sion to the federal states, Kääb and Liebermann argued:
76. Compare chapter `Registration in the early 1930s', 58.
77. I will discuss this decision in `Identifying `the Jews'', 110.
78. Sonnenberg, RMO, 54.
79. As Henry Marx has recently shown for indices of the labour oces. Cf. Henry Marx, Die Ver-
waltung des Ausnahmezustands: Wissensgenerierung und Arbeitskräftelenkung im Nationalsozialismus,
Geschichte des Reichsarbeitsministeriums im Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2019).
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Dieser Regelung liegt die Absicht zugrunde, die unterste mit polizeilichen
Aufgaben betraute Behörde als Meldebhörde zu verwenden. Diese [. . . ] liegt
dem Meldepichtigen räumlich am nächsten.80
For municipalities that had not already established a registration system, the Reichs-
meldeordnung introduced a unied index card (Einheitsregisterkarte). Smaller municip-
alities were still allowed to maintain a list of inhabitants. Registry oces were asked to
organise their registration similarly to Prussia, where in addition to the Personenregister
organised in alphabetical order, a Hausregister granted access to individuals based on
a spatial search. But all existent ling systems remained unaltered. In case one of the
above questions was missing they were to be added in handwriting or by seal. Addi-
tional question could be added to meet local requirements.81 The Reichsmeldeordnung
refrained from altering the systems that had proven successful and otherwise introduced
minimum standards in registration. Apart from that, the unied organisation of the
index system was disentangled from the introduction of a nationwide ling system. By
and large the Reichsmeldeordnung realised the unied registration system that had been
laid out by the Eisenach conference. But the establishment of the unied card index in a
second step was not yet decided upon. And while Kääb and Liebermann had both been
involved in nalising the Reichsmeldeordnung, Liebermann's main task was to design a
card index that would full the additional demands voiced by the Wehrmacht and the
Ministry of the Interior.
4.4 Identifying `the Jews'
The Reichsmeldeordnung left racial issues and thus an important National Socialist con-
cern aside. Since late 1935, measures to identify and register Germany's Jews were under
consideration. At the time Kerstiens had made his proposal to use the tax survey to
aggregate the data, other projects  like the Reichssippenkartei  were still considered.
In early 1937 the ministry still had to identify those eligible for a Reichbürgerbrief. I will
argue that the Volkskartei was largely designed to identify and locate Germany's Jews
by providing a database to collate information on Jewish descent from various sources.
To this end I will rst cover the reasons for a survey compared to a cumulative approach
and the suitability of the dierent approaches. The annual tax survey and the census
scheduled for 1938 were discussed as alternatives. I will examine the respective cap-
80. Sonnenberg, RMO, 48.
81. 2. RdErl des RuPrM. des Innern vom 10 April 1938 über die Reichsmeldeordnung, IV 2-4.
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abilities and limitations of each of the surveys. Simultaneously, the party's Sicherheits
Dienst (SD) investigated ways to compile a nationwide Judenkartei. The respective
discussions will help to substantiate the argument that the 1939 census' measures to
identify German Jews were closely linked to the planning of the Volkskartei.
In February 1937 the Reich Ministry of the Interior's Ministerialrat Krause discussed
ways to determine Volkszugehörigkeit during the coming census with the statistical of-
ce. Considering both the point in time as well as the inherent logic of the Nuremberg
laws that essentially dened the Volksgemeinschaft by exclusion, it stands to reason that
the initiative for a einmalige Gesamtzählung des Juden, jüdischen Mischlinge und sonst
fremdblütigen was devised to discriminate Staatsangehörige from Reichsbürger.82 This
notion is validated by a document from late 1937 in which Hagelmann summarises the
existing sources for the SD subsidiary oces, explaining die endgültige Durchführung
des Reichsbürgergesetzes necessitated a Judenkartei.83 Other authorities had also con-
sidered using a survey to identify German Jews. Liebermann had adopted the idea for
the Volkskartei. In order to close the existing gaps in registration, Liebermann considered
a nationwide survey the most promising approach. By obliging everyone to complete
the questionnaires during a given respite, a survey would speed up the process of data
accumulation considerably and be more comprehensive. Compared to the cumulative
registers of the registration system that would add an entry only if the registree complied
to the regulations, a survey would guarantee the registration of everyone present on the
surveyed territory at the time of the screening  the statistical principle of simultaneity.
The survey-based approach furthermore allowed the circumvention of the problem of
competences regarding decisions on racial descent. Since the information was based on
personal disclosure this method did not infringe the Reichsstelle für Sippenforschung 's
monopoly. Yet, it did allow the collection of the information in a brief time span without
the need of individual evaluation.
Meanwhile, Liebermann's colleague at the Department for Administration and Law,
Kääb, was working on regulations to introduce ID-cards. On the same legal base the
Reichsmeldeordnung had been passed on, the Verordnung über Kennkarten dated 22nd
July 1938 had authorised the Reich Ministry of the Interior to introduce the obligation
82. GStA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 17, Sonderakte Bd. 2, Abteilung I B2 13505/5012, Mit einer
Anlage dem Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei, Bl. 272.
83. Sonderarchiv Moskau 500/3/322, Hagelmann, Die derzeitige Erfassung der Juden in Deutschland
durch die verschiedenen Behörden, Institute, Ämter und ihre Auswertungsmöglichkeit bei der endgülti-
gen Aufstellung der Judenkarteien., cited in: Michael Wildt, Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935 bis 1938
(München: Oldenbourg, 2010), 153.
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to carry ID cards for certain groups of citizens (Staatsangehörige).84 The respective
plans were devised by Kääb. In addition to the established credentials like name and
address etc. the new ID card featured elds for `biometrical data': ngerprints, a picture
and a signature. By producing duplicates that remained with the police departments,
this collection would over time form an cumulative data-base of those obliged to carry
ID cards. One day after the initial Verordnung über Kennkarten three additional decrees
specied the groups subject to Kennkartenzwang : conscripts, the population in border
regions involved in local border trac and Jews.85
Only with the onset of the war on 10th September 1939 did the Verordnung über den
Paÿ- und Sichtvermerkszwang sowie über den Ausweiszwang extend the obligation to
carry ID cards to the entire population above the age of 15.86 However, none of the
related decrees sanctioned non-compliance so that Himmler was still dissatised with
compliance rates in December 1942.87 Jews according to the Nuremberg denition had
to apply for an ID card at the local police department by the end of 1938. From then
on they were obliged to present their Kennkarten on every contact with authorities
disclosing ihre Eigenschaft als Jude.
Nevertheless, in October 1936 Heydrich's Sicherheitspolizei  obviously unaware of the
Reich Ministry of the Interior's and Order Police's plans  had noticed Jews converting
and moving in order to alter their entry in the eld of religion on the registration forms.
As the negotiations of the Reichsmeldeordnung where still ongoing at that time, Heydrich
demanded:
geeignete Maÿnahmen zu treen, nach denen der Anmeldepichtige neben
der Religion anzugeben verpichtet ist, ob er Jude im Sinne der Nürnberger
Gesetze ist. Eine solche Maÿnahme würde die staatspolizeilichen Ermittlun-
gen sowie die Überwachung des Judentums erheblich erleichtern.88
Back in February Daluege had told the Head of the Security Police to suspend these
eorts since the coming census would analyse the blutmäÿige Zusammensetzung der
deutschen Bevölkerung. Daluege and Lösner had considered this approach already in
summer 1935 eventually decided against it. They agreed that the registrars were not in a




87. Cf. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 64.
88. GStA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 17, Sonderakte Bd. 2,Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei an den
Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Betrit: Überwachung des Judentums, 12th of October 1936, 269.
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the introduction of `Ausweiszwang ' (the obligation to prove credentials by providing
respective documents). Moreover, the head of the Order Police tried to quickly end this
discussion arguing cumulative registration would remain auf lange Zeit hinaus doch nur
lückenhaft. But it took several meetings until in June 1937 both concluded that sich die
Zugehörigkeit zur jüdischen Rasse im polizeilichen Meldeverfahren nicht in erschöpfender
Weise feststellen läÿt. Instead, the data of either the questionnaires for the Volkskartei
or the census 1938 could be collated with the index cards of the registry oces.89
Independently, the SD examined ways to create a card index of Jews. Since April
1937 SD sta investigated ways to collect the necessary data and considered a survey
by the party's local groups a feasible approach.90 However, the issue of registration of
Jewish citizens was not only discussed in Berlin's ministries. In 1936 the city of Leipzig
introduced new registration forms that featured the question Arischer oder nichtar-
ischer Abstammung?. As this question clearly collided with the Nuremberg denition,
Leipzig-based lawyer Helmut Runge had informed Lösner about the occurrence. Lösner,
who approved of the initiative, forwarded the complaint to Liebermann and Kääb. The
related correspondence of Lösner and the Ministry of the Interior's Department Admin-
istration and Law clearly shows that a possible inclusion of a question for descent in
the Reichsmeldeordnung 's unied registration form was discussed until summer 1937.
The main reason for eventually deciding against this approach was neither the fear of
interfering with the Reichsstelle für Sippenforschung 's competences nor the unreliability
of the particulars furnished by the registrants but the erhebliche, ihnen wesensfremde
Mehrarbeit for the registrars, that would jeopardise the oces' smooth operation.91
The Leipzig police department was told to stop using the forms and wait for future
nationwide regulations to solve the problem.
Census and segregation
It is a well established fact in historiography that the 1939 census' supplementary cards
(Ergänzungskarten) asked whether the respondent's grandparents were Jewish. The data
aggregated could thus be used to compile lists of all Germans who were Jewish according
to the Nuremberg denition. Whether and how the aggregated data was used to create
card indices is on the other hand disputed. Though I will cover the detailed arguments
89. GStA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Nr. 17, Sonderakte Bd. 2, Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei an den
Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei, 3rdJuly 1937, 275.
90. BArch R 58 544, II 112 Wi./Hrt: Vermerk an II 1, Betrit: Judenkartei 12th June 1937, Bl. 90.
91. GStA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 343, Sonderakte Bd. 2, Der Reichsführer SS usw. ORR. Dr. Kääb,
Ref.: Reg Direktor Liebermann von Sonnenberg, MR. Dr. Lösner, 29th April 1937, Bl. 304.
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of each side at the appropriate places I want to juxtapose the main arguments briey,
for they inform this research. The entire issue was rst brought up by Aly and Roth's
1984 book on registration as a precondition of the murder of European Jewery.92 Aly
and Roth sum up their main thesis in the preface of this edition as follows:
In 1939, German Jews and Jewish half-breeds were registered by name
during the course of the census and with the cooperation of the Reich Main
Oce for Security (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). Information about the reli-
gion of all four grandparents, which was mandatory under penalty of law and
ostensibly protected as secret by the state, was immediately transferred to
police les under the category of descent if even one grandparent was listed
as Jewish. German archivists at the Secret Prussian State Archives created
a Reichskartei (Reich registry) for German Jews from the original census
data.93
Their ndings were initially widely accepted and relied upon to be confronted only in
2001 by Jutta Wietog's research on the Reich Statistical Oce in the Nazi era. Focusing
on the statisticians' involvement with the Nazis' racial policy, Wietog points out several
aws in Aly and Roth's interpretation of the sources  in particular the alleged immediate
transferal of the data on descent to the police  and ultimately doubts that the 1939
census supplementary cards were used to identify previously unregistered Jews. As other
surveys included a question for descent as well, Wietog reasons:
Unter der Voraussetzung, daÿ die Personenstandsaufnahme 1939 wirklich
durchgeführt wurde [. . . ] gab es mit der dort enthaltenen Frage nach der ras-
sischen Einordnung zusammen mit den statistischen Unterlagen der Reichs-
vereinigung der Juden und der [. . . ] Volkszählung allein 1939 drei Ver-
suche zur reichsweiten Erfasssung von Juden und z. T. `jüdischen Mischling-
en'. [. . . ] Die Möglichkeiten Juden zu erfassen  auch `jüdische Mischlinge'
und sogenannte `Geltungsjuden'  waren also auch ohne die Volkszählung
vielfältig.94
Notably, the three surveys Wietog refers to for 1939 are, with the exception of the
census itself, dierent to those of the SD and the Ministry of the Interior discussed in
92. As Edwin Black put it: In fact, the crucial minutiae of registration are barely mentioned in any
of thousands of books on the Third Reich. Aly and Roth were the rst.Götz Aly, The Nazi census:
identication and control in the Third Reich, ed. Karl Heinz Roth and Edwin Black (Philadelphia:
Temple Univ. Press, 2000), ix. Cf. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung.
93. Aly, Nazi census, xi.
94. Jutta Wietog, Volkszählungen unter dem Nationalsozialismus. Eine Dokumentation zur Bevölker-
ungsstatistik im Dritten Reich (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 79.
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the previous section above for 1937. Over the course of the following chapters I will
examine Wietog's objections, starting with a clarication of the scope and statistical
value of the tax surveys. The genesis of the questions on descent during the 1939 census
will be addressed next. Whether the survey conducted by the Reichsvereinigung in 1939
suced to identify previously unregistered `Rassejuden' will only be addressed in the
section `Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland '.95
This chapter will rst reconstruct the process that led to the inclusion of questions
on race and ethnicity in the 1938/39 census. Based on the chronology of the decisions,
I will eventually argue, all relevant authorities had agreed to use the census data to
identify those amongst the population not of `German or kindred blood' by the end of
September 1937. As we have just seen, in early 1937 the decision for a survey-based
approach to the issue had been taken. At that time, the initiative for a new census
was already on the way. While the various eorts to provide the informational basis for
segregation proceeded, on the Ministry of Economy's behalf the Statistisches Reichsamt
had begun scheduling a census for 1938. On the 22nd December 1936 the oce had sent
a memorandum arguing in favour of an extended census in 1938. The 1933 census 
in particular the industrial and vocational census  had been severely reduced to save
costs. In addition to the demand for a thorough census the oce, preemptively, argued
against a possible delay of the survey:
Da die Ergebnisse von 1933 infolge der Aufbauarbeit und Neuordnung in
der Wirtschaft bereits jetzt vielfach überholt sind, würde in den kommenden
Jahren ein auÿerordentlicher Mangel an zuverlässigen statistischen Unterla-
gen auf allen Gebieten eintreten.96
The statistical oce insisted that in order to draw meaningful conclusions from censuses
a quinquennial succession of survey had to be reestablished. Like in 1933 it was planned
to nance the entire survey from the Reich's coers. Resistance against a census thus
came from the Ministry of Finance that for nancial reasons favoured a register-based
census to a survey. The ministry did not outright contradict a new census but it did
contest the point in time and doubted the statistical oce would manage to nd the
required personnel. It therefore proposed a delay of the census until 1940. Mainly,
however, the ministry argued that the estimated costs of about 12 million RM were only
justied if the results were valid for a longer period of time, which would not be the case
95. `Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland ', 179.
96. BArch R2 57003, Statistisches Reichsamt, Notwendigkeit einer Volkszählung, 22nd December 1936,
Bl. 182.
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since the German economy was going to undergo drastic changes in 1938 in the course
of the implementation of the Vierjahresplan.97 Similarly, advocating for 1938 to conduct
the survey, the statisticians employed the Vierjahresplan's time frame in their argument.
But unlike the Ministry of Finance, their reference was the point in time the results
were available which they expected to match the end of the second four-year-plan.98
The statisticians' memorandum focused on the industrial and vocational aspects of the
census as these were considered most important and made up the biggest proportion of
the census. But in the section concerned with `population policy' two paragraphs dealt
with Minderheitenpolitik, Ausländerfragen and the Judenfrage. With regard to minority
policy the statisticians pointed out that the 1933 census' results were of little signicance
since the questions about language aliation (Sprachzugehörigkeit) had been axed. A
new survey would have to analyse parameters like age and religion in combination with
the language aliation in order to draw conclusions on demographics of aliens. The
paragraph entitled `Judenfrage' initially discusses the possibilities of monitoring the
eects antisemitic policy has had on Jews (Glaubensjuden). By comparing the results
with those of 1933 it could quantify the number of Jews that had left Germany.
Had the memorandum thus far been underpinned by stressing the necessity of a census
in almost every aspect of social life, with regard to a survey that would identify Jews as
dened in 1935, the statistical oce did not seem too enthusiastic:
Ob die Erfassung des gesamten Judentums und der Judenmischlinge, auch
soweit sie der mosaischen Religion nicht angehören, noch erforderlich ist und
im Rahmen einer allgemeinen Volkszählung oder besser im Anschluÿ an eine
Personenstandsaufnahme durchzuführen ist, bedarf noch besonderer Erwä-
gung.99
The tax survey
Obviously, in December 1936 it was still undecided whether the census or the Person-
enstandsaufnahme (tax survey) were better suited to collecting the data on descent and
ethnicity. The respective discussion is not reected in the relevant sources. Neverthe-
less, it cannot be denied that the tax survey had several decits compared to a census.
First and foremost, the tax survey was register-based. It relied on the register oces'
97. BArch R2 57003, Referat III/1 dem Referat Kühne, 9th January 1937, Bl. 180.
98. BArch R2 57003, Bl. Statistisches Reichsamt, Notwendigkeit einer Volkszählung, 22nd December
1936, 182.
99. BArch R2 57003, Statistisches Reichsamt, Notwendigkeit einer Volkszählung, 22nd December 1936,
Bl. 199. Cf. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 82.
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data and was thus unt to discover individuals previously unregistered or of unknown
racial status. As it was directly connected with costs for the surveyed, it was known
to produce unreliable data. Furthermore, as we have seen above numerous cities had
replaced the tax surveys by the Adrema system.100 Hagelmann's list of sources for
a Judenkartei does not mention the Personenstandsaufnahme.101 By May 1938 the
Reichsmeldeordnung introduced a unied notication system. On the occasion of re-
gistration the register oces had to forward the registration form to the tax authority.
This should have made the tax survey obsolete.102 Nevertheless, a circular decree dating
July 1939 ordered the nationwide Personenstandsaufnahme for October 1939.103 The
decree also introduced new question and municipalities could only be relieved of the
survey if their existing system already contained the respective data. These new ques-
tions asked for racial descent, religion, maritial status and the day of marriage. The
respective correspondence of the Deutsche Gemeindetag on the matter show that the
only question that caused a problem for the Adrema systems was the one asking for
the day of marriage.104 The Adrema system had already considered the question for
`race' and reserved the second row on the plates for the labels `DR' (Deutsches Reich),
`A' (Ausländer) or `N' (Nichtarier).105 Eventually those administrations that managed
to include the date of marriage in their machine systems were exempt from the survey.
Notably, the label `Nichtarier ' still employed the terminology prior to the Nuremberg
Laws, and was not as ne-graded as required by these laws. Berlin's tax oce believed
the informative value of the tax survey to be limited to the use as Beweismaterial für
die Willenskundgebungen der Betroenen hinsichtlich ihrer Religionszugehörigkeit in
cases of so-called Geltungsjuden who applied for racial re-classication.106
100. The scope and locally diering practise of the Personenstandsaufnahme is well documented in
BArch R36 645 and BArch R 36 646. Jutta Wietog based her argument on a newspaper article according
to which the 1939 Personenstandsaufnahme also asked a question for descent. Cf.Wietog, Volkszählung
NS, 76.
101. Sonderarchiv Moskau 500/3/322, Hagelmann, Die derzeitige Erfassung der Juden in Deutschland
durch die verschiedenen Behörden, Institute, Ämter und ihre Auswertungsmöglichkeit bei der endgülti-
gen Aufstellung der Judenkarteien, cited in: Wildt2010, 153.
102. However sources also refer to a Personenstandsaufnahme with respect to the distribution of the
tax declaration forms
103. RMBliV, 1353.
104. BArch R36 646, Der Obernanzpräsident Weser-Ems in Bremen an den Herrn Minister der Fin-
anzen in Oldenburg, 6th July 1939.
105. BArch R36 646, Adrema Maschinenbaugesellschaft an den Herrn Oberbürgermeister in Wil-
helmshafen, 6th July 1939.
106. BArch R 1509 1528, Hauptsteueramt Reichshauptstadt Berlin an den Herrn Reichsminsiter des In-
nern, Betrit: Auskunftserteilung aus den Haushaltslisten der Verwaltungsbezirke der Reichshauptstadt
in Verbindung mit der Rassischen Eingliederung von Juden bzw. jüdischen Mischlingen, 13rd of Novem-
ber 1939.
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When in 1942 the jüdische Kultusvereinigung zu Berlin compiled a paper listing all
available sources to determine Jewish descent it stressed the limited use of the tax sur-
vey's data. It only revealed information on those both tax-paying and identifying Jewish
(Glaubensjuden).107 The Personenstandsaufnahme in 1939 was conducted. But it was
unsuited to provide data on `Rassejuden'  `Mischlinge' in particular , notwithstanding
its utilisation in individual cases of racial re-classication.
The census
The further development suggests that after the decisions of February 1937 which in-
denitely postponed the project of a Sippenkartei and instead intended to acquire the
required data by means of a grand-scale survey; considerations to that point had res-
ulted in favour of the integration of the respective questions with the next census. On
19th July the Ministry of Economics in charge of the census' design and legal framework
announced that the schedule for the 1938 census was almost completed. In a letter to the
Ministry of Finance the dierences to the 1933 survey are listed. Most of the question
were economic in nature. With the exception of the second point in the list, which re-
corded that in order to implement the `Judenpolitik ' ist die Erfragung der Abstammung
und die Auszählung der Juden- und Judenmischlinge auf Verlangen des Herrn Reichs-
und Preuÿischen Ministers des Innern vorgesehen.108 As we have just seen, already in
December 1936 the Reich Statistical Oce had intended to conduct an extended survey
on minorities. With the limitation of the project of the kinship index to `Germans and
those of kindred blood' this analysis received a völkisch twist as the Reich Ministry of
the Interior now expected results on Volkszugehörigkeit. As before, the statistical oce
would rely on eine Auszählung der Muttersprache, die sachlich mit der Erfragung der
Volkszugehörigkeit zusammenhängt to identify those of foreign folkdom.109 Combined
with the data on Jews the census would thus provide the data necessary for the produc-
tion of the Volksgemeinschaft by exclusion and thereby implement the negative logic of
the Nuremberg laws.
107. BArch R 8150 32, Abschrift: Statistische Erfassung der Juden in Berlin, 1942.
108. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 151, Nr. 347, Der Reichs- und Preuÿische Wirtschaftsminister an den
Herrn Preuÿischen Finanzminister, Betrit: Programm der für 1938 in Aussicht genommenen Volks-
Berufs- und Betriebszählung, 19th July 1937, Bl. 9.
109. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 151, Nr. 347, Der Reichs- und Preuÿische Wirtschaftsminister an den
Herrn Preuÿischen Finanzminister, Betrit: Programm der für 1938 in Aussicht genommenen Volks-
Berufs- und Betriebszählung, 19th July 1937, Bl. 10.
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In August 1937 the rst draft for a census law was circulated.110 In  4 the survey's
scope was dened including the data to be disclosed: Volkszugehörigkeit, civil status,
mother tongue, descent (blutmäÿige Abstammung) and religion. Furthermore, the draft
explicitly allowed test runs in smaller districts to optimise the questionnaires. After
a brief period reserved for severe objections in October, it was passed unaltered.111
The Reich Statistical Oce was put in charge of the analysis, but allowed to delegate
specic tasks to the federal states' oces. False declarations were punishable by a years
detention. The census was to be conducted on 17th May 1938. In early 1938 in order to
prepare the interested public for the census Burgdörfer reported details on the coming
survey pointing out:
Auÿerdem ist mit der Volkszählung erstmalig eine A b s t a m m u n g s e r -
h e b u n g verbunden, durch die zuverlässige Unterlagen über die Zahl der
Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge gewonnen werden können.112
When Burgdörfer was writing this article the questionnaires had already been designed,
printed and sent to their destinations. But March 1938 brought a drastic change to the
map as Germany invaded Austria and incorporated it into the Reich. On 21st April 1938,
the Ministry for Economy informed all Reichsminister that the census was postponed for
one year exactly in order to extend the survey to the newly annexed territory.113 During
the summer of 1937 the decision to aggregate the data to implement racial segregation
with the census was taken. On behalf of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, the draft from
August 1937 explicitly extended the scope of the survey to include questions on descent
and ethnicity. The option to use the tax survey was not discussed in the accessible
sources beyond late 1936.
110. GSTA I HA Rep. 77, Tit. 151, Nr. 347, Der Reichs- und Preuÿische Wirtschaftsminister an den
Herrn Staatsekrtär der Reichskanzlei, Betrit: Gesetz über die Durchführung einer Volks- Berufs- und
Betriebszählung, 26th August 1937, Bl. 89.
111. RGBl. I, 1053.
112. Friedrich Burgdörfer, `Die Volks-, Berufs- und Betriebszählung am 17. Mai 1938', Allgemeines
statistisches Archiv (AStA) Journal of the German Statistical Society (Heidelberg) 27 (1938): 462464,
463.
113. GStA I HA Rep. 77. Tit. 151, Nr. 347, Der Reichs- und Preuÿische Wirtschaftsminister an
die Herren Reichsminister, Betrit: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung und Ergänzung des Gesetzes
über die Durchführung einer Volks-, Berufs-, und Betriebszählung vom 4. Oktober 1937, 21st April
1938, Bl. 97.
120
The SD index on Jews
Widely unimpeded by the Reich Ministry of the Interior's plans, the Sicherheitsdienst
(SD) considered the Überwachung des Judentums one of their most important elds.
According to Aly and Roth on behalf of the SD the results on descent were compiled to a
single Reichskartei der Juden und Judenmischlinge soon after the census. Before looking
into the details of the census processing in the chapter `Volkskartei and deportations'
this section rst assesses the SD's own eorts to ensure the registration of Jews.114
Founded in 1931, in the time span leading up to the war, the Sicherheitsdienst evolved
from the party's intelligence service tasked with observing political enemies to an elite of
the Security Police cultivating a self-image als Vollstreckerin einer völkischen Neuord-
nung Europas.115 Consequently, the SD did not limit its actions to `political enemies'
but included the observation of Jewish organisations amongst their core tasks as an
internal paper from 1937 pointed out: Das Judentum ist für den Nationalsozialismus
der Gegner schlechthin.116 Despite its initially marginal role in the National Socialist
power structure, the SD was eventually in a position to shape policy against Jews.117
Nevertheless, the SD's `systematic treatment' of the `Jewish enemy' only had started in
June 1935. The focus at this time was the registration of Jewish organisations.118 At-
tempts to register individuals were only prompted from outside the Judenreferat after
the plans for the Reichs Kinship Index were abandoned. On 30st April 1937 the SD's II
112 Winsliceny was contacted by the Zentralabteilung asking whether the department
occupied monitoring Jews were prepared for an oncoming war. In reply, Winsliceny
reports that no proceedings in that regard existed.119 Beginning in May, department
II 112 started to plan the establishment of a `Judenkartei ' a card index on Jews and
ordered material to organise and maintain the index such as card index cabinets.120
In early May Winsliceny drafted a questionnaire, the `Personalfragebogen für Juden in
Deutschland '. It illustrates that the SD's priorities were focused on what they called
`Jews of inuence' be it political or economical. Of its 24 questions, eleven enquired
the economic situation. Eight questions asked about racial and family status, and six
114. `Volkskartei and deportations', 162.
115. Cf. Wildt, Judenpolitik SD, 11.
116. BArch R 58 544, II 112 Wi./Hag., Vermerk an II 1,etr.: Richtlinien und Forderungen an die
Oberabschnitte, 21st April 1937, Bl. 31.
117. Cf.Wildt, Judenpolitik SD, 59-62.
118. BArch R 58 544, II 112 Wi./Hag., Vermerk an II 1,etr.: Richtlinien und Forderungen an die
Oberabschnitte, 21st April 1937, Bl. 34.
119. BArch 58 544, Zentralabteilung II 1 an II 112 SS-Untersturmführer Winsliceny, Betr.: Mobbefehl
Nr. 2, Bl. 44 and II 112 Wi./Hrt. an II 1, Betr.: Mobbefehl Nr. 2., Bl. 45.
120. BArch 58 544, Bl. 56.
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questions regarded political and social connections.121 It is not quite clear though who
was supposed to complete the form. Questions like the one inquiring the `former polit-
ical views' and `personal conduct' were unlikely to produce any valid information when
answered by the subject. The questionnaire thus seems unsuited for the acquisition of
new data. It is more plausible that the questionnaire was supposed to be lled with in-
formation excerpted from les present at SD and Gestapa (Geheimes Staatspolizei Amt)
by the SD's sta.122
During a meeting on 7th June it was agreed to start collecting and organising know-
ledge on `important Jews' living abroad in three separate indices. The indices should
then be used as a basis for further investigation into their links to other individuals or
organisations. One was to contain information on `important Jews abroad' in general
with special attention given to familial, scientic or commercial ties to Germany. A
second index should comprise information on emigrés. It was supposed to be copied
from a similar index already maintained by the Gestapa. The third index was to collect
the data of all Austrian Jews possibly including `Mischlinge' and `Geltungsjuden', yet
without indicating how to capture the data.123
About a week later on 12th, a meeting took place in the Secret Police Department
(Gestapa) gathering Gestapa's Regierungsrat Dr. Haselbacher and Assesor Flesch and
II 112's Wisliceny, who discussed the further proceedings with respect to a comprehensive
Judenkartei. The minutes of the meeting reveal the narrowness of the ongoing approach,
for gathering data from membership rosters of Jewish organisations limited the reach to
individuals identifying as Jewish in the rst place. The SD acknowledged this existing
gap in the available sources: Diese Verzeichnisse umfassen ca. 80% der in Deutschland
lebenden Volljuden. In addition to the estimated 20% of `Volljuden' unidentied came
an unknown number of the various degrees of `Mischlinge'. It was this unidentied group
that had to be registered in order to put the Reichsbürgergesetz into practise. The current
approach was therefore unsuited to accomplishing a comprehensive Judenkartei.
Here Haselbacher informed the others that a thorough screening of the entire popu-
lation was initiated by the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei and the Ministry of the Interior.
Meetings to discuss the matter were set for August. Hasselbacher summed up the project
121. BArch R 58 544, An II 1, Betrit: Personalfragebogen für Juden in Deutschland, 27th May 1937,
Bl. 59-61.
122. Cf. Klaus Dobrisch, `Die Judenreferate des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes und des Sicherheitsdi-
enstes der SS 1933 bis 1939', in Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung; 2, 1st ed., ed. Wolfgang Benz,
vol. 2 (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 1993), 230254, 242.
123. BArch 58 544, II 112 Hg/Pi an II 1 z.H. SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Six, Betr.: Erweiterung des
Abreitsgebietes von II 112, Bl. 66-67.
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auf Grund einer Volkszählung eine Kartei des Deutschen Volkes aufzustellen.
Bei dieser Volkszählung, die für 1938 festgesetzt ist, sollen eingehende Erhe-
bungen übder die rassische Zusammensetzung und konfessionelle Bekennt-
nisse angestellt werden. Nach Abschluss und Auswertung der Volkszählung
wird also bei jeder Ortspolizeibehörde eine Kartei der Juden, Halbjuden und
jüdisch versippten stehen.
Haselbacher obviously understood the forthcoming census and the establishment of the
Volkskartei as intrinsically linked projects. Despite the fact that the Volkskartei was
not yet ocially sanctioned, by end of June 1937, the planned collation of census results
and population registers was common knowledge among the departments involved. The
note continues:
In Anbetracht dieser Tatsache vertrat Dr. Haselbacher den Standpunkt, dass
es unzweckmäÿig sei, sofort durch Parteiorganisationen Erhebungen über die
Juden anstellen zu lassen. Es bestände absolut keine Gewähr, dass die Block-
und Zellenleiter der Partei einwandfreies Material heranbrächten. Auÿerdem
würde der SD durch die Aufstellung einer solchen Kartei zu einer Auskunft-
stelle für die Partei.
Haselbacher set out the implications of this project for the SD card indices, in particular
the utilisation of the coming census and the Volkskartei by the SD:
Die Auswertung der Volkszählung durch den SD. soll folgendermaÿen vor-
genommen werden: Die Polizeireviere geben ein Doppel ihrer Juden- und
Mischlingskarteiblätter an die SD-unterabschnitte. Der UA*-Referent er-
gänzt dann diese Angaben nach SD-mässigen Gesichtspunkten.124
This clearly shows that the SD did not intend to aggregate data if avoidable and rather
relied on sources maintained by other authorities. These data sets could be merged or
enriched according to the SD's needs.
The minutes of this meeting are widely referenced in historiography. Wildt's and
Dobrisch's conclusion that the minutes document the SD's decision to wait for the census'
results to nalise a comprehensive Judenkartei is certainly plausible.125 In particular as
the le concludes: Noch ehe die Judenkartei des SD. fertig sein könnte, käme die Volk-
szählung. The eorts to compile a comprehensive Judenkartei  including `Mischlinge
124. BArch 58 544, II 112 Wi./Hrt. an II 1 Vermerk, Betr.: Judenkartei, 12th July 1937, Bl. 90-91.
* Unterabschnitt
125. Cf. Dobrisch, `Die Judenreferate des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes und des Sicherheitsdienstes der
SS 1933 bis 1939', 242; Wildt, Judenpolitik SD, 37. Whereby Wildt quotes from Sonderarchiv Moskau
500/1/495 which seems to an identical le.
123
and `Geltungsjuden'  were postponed. Instead the SD's focus was shifted to evaluate
the sources on `Volljuden' accessible by copying the membership rosters of the Jewish
organisations currently maintained at the Gestapa.126
However, Wietog situated the document dierently. She maintained, the SD was
falsely relying on an obsolete plan:
Auch Ende 1937 ging der SD noch immer davon aus, daÿ die Volkszählung
entsprechendes Material für die Judenkartei liefern würde.127
Instead, Wietog argued, rather than the census, the crucial surveys for the identication
of Germany's Jews were eventually conducted by Jewish organisations, most import-
antly the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland among its members in October
1939.128 I will thoroughly scrutinise these assumptions in chapter `Reichsvereinigung der
Juden in Deutschland '.129 But when the SD's Hagelmann reported on the registration
of Jews to the SD's 1937 Novemberkonferenz, he maintained that the SD remained oc-
cupied  bis zur Abwicklung der Volkszählung, mit der Erörterung der der in jüdischen
Organisationen organisierten Juden.130
A Survey of medical personnel
Early on, the SD had begun to see the solution to the `Jewish Question' in driving Jews
into exile. As an integral part of this eort, since 1936 the SD's priority had shifted
to removing Jews from the German economy.131 And while the Ministry of Economy
was in charge of balancing the eects on the economy, the Reich Ministry of the Interior
was concerned with the population's well being. Discussing the draft for a further
implementation decree regarding the Reichsbürgergesetz in April 1938, the Ministry of
the Interior informed the ministries involved about the preconditions for a segregation of
Jews in the medical sector.132 Both scope and the point in time of the implementation
hinged on a crucial question:
126. BArch 58 544, II 112 Wi./Hrt. an II 1 Vermerk, Betr.: Judenkartei, 12th July 1937, Bl. 91.
127. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 71.
128. Wietog, 75.
129. `Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland ', 178.
130. As cited in: Wildt, Judenpolitik SD, 154. For details on the Novemberkonferenz see Wildt, 45-52.
131. Cf. George C. Browder, Hitler's enforcers : the Gestapo and the SS security service in the Nazi
revolution (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), 190-191.
132. Vierte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz vom 25 Juli 1938, RGBl. 969-970.
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Kann bei völliger Ausschaltung von rd. 4000 jüdischen Ärzten bei einer
Gesamtzahl von rd. 55 000 im alten Reichsgebiet und von rd. 3300 jüdischen
Ärzten von insgesamt 7200 in Österreich in Friedens- und in Kriegszeiten eine
ausreichende ärztliche Versorgung an allen Orten sichergestellt werden?133
In addition to the replacement of Jewish physicians that was deemed indispensable, it
was uncertain to what extent the removal would include the entire Jewish medical per-
sonnel and `Mischlinge'. However, conclusive statistical overview of the Reich's medical
personnel did not exist. In 1931 the Prussian Ministry of the Interior had mandated
the notication of the district medical ocer (Kreisarzt) on the occasion of a physi-
cian's or dentist's registration in Prussia in order to gain and execute oversight.134 Prior
considerations to include a wider circle of medical personnel like nurses, dental tech-
nicians and midwifes were only adapted in August 1933 when the RdErl. d. MdI Pol-
izeiverwaltung, Aufgaben der Polizei, Polizeiliche Meldung von Zahntechnikern, Heil-
und Pegepersonen usw. introduced notication obligations for the groups mentioned
above and various non-medical practitioners.135 Still, this measure once again suered
the disadvantage of cumulative registries since the polizeilichen Meldungen nur künftig
stattndende Veränderungen im Zu- und Abgang des oben genannten Personenkreises,
nicht aber dessen Bestand erfassen könnten. Thus, the data of October 1933's tax
survey (Personenstandsaufnahme) was analysed to gather the respective information.
Municipalities that had already replaced the tax surveys weil sie anderweitig über ein
vollzähliges Adressmaterial verfügen were explicitly advised to use these registers to ac-
quire the respective information.136 Yet, for reasons unknown, the Reichsmeldeordnung
did not extend these provisions to the entire Reich and the nationwide supply of medical
personnel remained uncertain. The removal of Jews from the medical sector in summer
1938 faced incalculable risks regarding the supply of health services to the population.
The 25th July implementation decree nullied Jewish physicians' licence to practise.137
Further-reaching measures depended on the capture of the required statistical data  a
precondition that was only to be fullled with the Volkskartei 's initial survey in summer
1939 and the subsequent analysis of the data.
133. BArch R 1501 5519, Bl. 117. Reichs- und Preussischer Minister des Innern an: Preuÿisches Staats-
ministerium, Reichswirtschaftministerium, Reichsnanzministerium, Reichsjustizministerium, Stellver-
treter des Führers und Reichskanzlei, 13. April 1938.
134. Cf. RdErl. v. 28.7.1931  II D 165, MBliV, 769.
135. MBLiV. I, 1007.
136. RdErl. d. MdI. V. 20.1.1934  III a I 2351/33, MBliV. Nr. 5. This once again underlines that a
Reichs-wide survey based on the tax survey was impracticable.
137. Vierte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz vom 25 Juli 1938, RGBl. 969-970.
5 The Volkskartei
The previous chapters have shown how the need for a unied index system evolved
from the priorities of the National Socialist government. The Reichsmeldeordnung had
left several demands towards registration unconsidered: cohort-based registration, a
standardised card index system, the accumulation of data necessary to bring about
racial segregation and an inventory of medical personnel. The Reich Ministry of the
Interior expected the Volkskartei to be the panacea solving all these problems at once.
Over the course of the remaining chapters I will rst reconstruct the basic design
of the Volkskartei before examining the conditions of the implementation. In order
to understand the priorities that governed the decisions on the index I will analyse the
ample  previously unconsidered  sources that resulted from a test-run of the Volkskartei
in the district of Potsdam in 1938 and compare the approaches tested to the nationwide
implementation a year later. With regard to the eventual utilisation of the index, I have
split the analysis in two parts. I will rst evaluate the signicance the index had for
measures that targeted the Volksgemeinschaft  that is conscription and enrolment in
the party's youth organisations. In a separate chapter I will discuss the Volkskartei 's
role in the identication of German Jews, arguing that the index was the device that
facilitated the segregation of Germany's Jews  which by the time of implementation
meant deportation and physical annihilation. The nal chapter analyses the political
power struggle that evolved around the issue of administering the German workforce
and eventually led to the Volkskartei 's decommission in 1943.
However, I will begin with a brief digression into some of the memoranda regarding
registration that have informed the index' design. In early 1937, when Liebermann
was studying Kerstiens' les and excerpted comments and proposals from the various
authorities involved, he had taken a particular interest in the numerous memoranda that
had reached the Interior Ministry's Department Administration and Law over the past





Es handelt sich hier um Gedanken, die mich seit bald 30 Jahren besschäf-
tigen. Ich habe das Gefühl, dass diese jetzt nicht mehr als Phantasterei
abgetan werden, sondern dass jetzt die Zeit für sie gekommen ist.1
From autumn 1933 onwards private individuals began sending memoranda concerned
with registration issues to the ocial bodies they believed to be in charge. Given the
willingness of the recipients, these memoranda were forwarded to the Abteilung Verwal-
tung und Recht where at least the cases that made it to the les were seriously considered
and usually answered. Unlike the piecework at the Reich Ministry of the Interior's De-
partment Administration and Law some of these proposals laid out a grand vision for a
future registration system. Others made rather detailed proposals for ling systems or
notication obligations etc. The authors shared the belief that with the new political
order a more stringent registration system was inevitable and displayed readiness to oer
their service to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, all of them expressed
the feeling their contribution would be welcome under the new political conditions as
the opening quotation of Erwin Cuntz, a lawyer from the town of Freiburg im Breisgau
vividly illustrates. In November 1934 in a letter that was addressed to den Reichskan-
zler und Führer Cuntz proposed the establishment of a Deutsche Kartei. A 25-storey
tower located in a central place in Germany was to contain the centralised card index
of the entire German population. Each story of the circular tower was to be divided
into 12 rooms, one for each month, in which index cards were to be organised in age
cohorts, place of birth, gender and then alphabetically.2 Besides the monumental archi-
tectural proposal the most signicant novelty of Cuntz' memorandum was this age-based
organisation of the index cards.
In February 1935 Kääb compiled a document listing all proposals worth further con-
sideration and did not omit Cuntz' proposal, despite pointing out its impracticability.3
The circular structure of the tower with its conical rooms has a structural resemblance
to Bentham's panoptical prison, the design of which allowed a single person positioned
in a central tower to monitor a huge number of prisoners in the surrounding cells.4
1. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Erwin Cuntz Rechtsanwalt an den
Führer und Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler, 27th November 1934, 52.
2. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Cuntz' Proposal `Deutsche Kartei',
53-54. The entire proposal is quoted in: Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 48.
3. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Kääb, Neuregelung des Meldewesens,
Anordnungen, Anträge und Anregungen, 13th February 1935, 77.
4. Cf. Michel Foucault, Überwachen und Strafen: die Geburt des Gefängnisses (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1994), 251-291.
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Unlike in the prison, however, with a card index there is no one to monitor. What is
similar though is the vantage point of those operating the index. Given that the modern
relationship between authority and subject depended on the mediation by documents,
the aggregation of index cards for each individual of the population in a single building
was the closest approximation to an unmediated relationship possible. Related to the
`altar room' in Kehrl's Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, in which the Reich's
entire industrial statistical data was displayed in 21 `altars' each comprising 145 tables,
Tooze suggested that [t]he concentration of knowledge in a single location was also an
expression of power. [. . . ] A man standing in this unique space could feel himself to
be in direct command of all of German industry.5 Similarly Cuntz' `Deutsche Kartei '
put the entire population at the registrars' disposal. The intriguing aspect of Cuntz'
concept consists in its claim of complete oversight from one single point. Despite its
obvious disfunctionality, the design best illustrates this claim of omnipotence over a
comprehensively registered population that had earlier fascinated Knost when planning
his Reichssippenkartei as a central index in which das ganze deutsche Volk [. . . ] wirklich
der ganze Volkskörper vertreten, zur Auskunft an einem Ort anwesend wäre. A truly
seamless registration, whether centralised or not, on the other hand would have a similar
eect on the population as the centralised tower had on the inmates in Bentham's prison
as it would accustom the public to a certain degree of constant, albeit remote, surveil-
lance. Contrary to Cuntz' aspirations central maintenance of millions of les was still
a `folly' (Phantasterei) and Kääb may have included Cuntz' memorandum in his report
precisely to make this point. Another aspect of Cuntz' proposal was more sustainable
but not included. Regarding the aggregation of the data, he suggested simply using
the general census results, thereby being the rst to propose a survey-based registration
system.
About a month later, the Berlin-based party member Ulrich Jeske sent his memor-
andum to Frick. His contribution also sheds light on the state of registration in Berlin
during the 1930s. Jeske had joined the Berlin Wilmersdorf electoral oce in 1933 in a
subordinate role and just witnessed the futile production of 14,000 tax cards in the course
of the transition to the Adrema system. The recipients had moved without cancelling
registration or reregistering at their new residence. Jeske's proposal is characterised to
a great extent by his frustration with the daily work.
5. Tooze, Statistics and the German State: 1900 - 1945: the making of modern economic knowledge,
267-268.
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Deine ganze Arbeit und die deiner tausend anderen Arbeitskameraden in
den Polizei-Revieren und Bezirksämtern erzielt nicht die Genauigkeit, die
nun eben mal in unserem dritten Reich als selbstverständlich erreicht werden
muss. Ausserdem muss das Meldewesen vergrössert werden und sich nicht
auf die Person beschränken, sondern auf die Ausbildung zur Abwehr und
Hilfeleistung bei Bedrohung der deutschen Volksgemeinschaft.
He proceeds to list examples from his daily experience highlighting the aws of the
Prussian registration system beginning with the fact that registrants usually were asked
to complete the forms in handwriting. Man bekommt einfach die Wut über ein solches
Geschmiere, aber, damit sinkt auch die Arbeitslust. His second complaint relates to
the compilation of the Wahllisten from the registration data. As shown above the
Wahllisten were considered the best source to make enquiries into citizenship. Since
Prussia had not adopted the policy of Ausweiszwang practised in the Hanseatic system,
Jeske complained:
Jeder verlauste Ausländer kann sich auf seiner polizeilichen Meldung als
deutscher Reichsangehöriger bezeichnen, ein kleines  D  genügt. Seine
Adrema-Platte erhält im Wahlamt die Signale und, er wählt.
In a similar tone he proceeds to complain about numerous forms of non-compliance. For
most of these problems Jeske oered no solution. But he proposed the establishment
of a more stringent registration system by increasing the landlords' accountability for
the registration of the tenants. Jeske proposed the main device of a future registration
system be the house book, kept in each house by the landlord or a delegate. The keeper
of the book (Hausbuchführer) would also be in charge of notifying authorities.6
In January 1936 party member Max Prodell suggested the introduction of a unied
index card for the entire Reich, naming two main benets from such a system.7 A uni-
ed system would ensure dass es noch nach hunderten von Jahren [. . . ] mit Leichtigkeit
möglich ist, über die Vorfahren jeden nur erdenklichen Aufschluss zu erhalten. Further-
more, he stresses the possibilities of the statistical evaluation of a unied card-based
system. Several other proposals dealt with the issue of identity theft or fraud and thus
suggested including a personal description, ngerprints or a photo in the les.8 Cuntz's
6. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Entwurf (Jeske) zur Umorganisation
des polizeilichen Meldewesens, 58-61.
7. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Max Prodell an das Reichsministerium
des Innern, 4th January 1936, 221-222.
8. E. g.: GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 343 Polizeisachen Bd. 12-13, Der Polizeipräsident Berlin dem
Herrn Preuÿischen Minister des Innern, 2nd January 1934, 352-353.
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central index was inspiring yet unfeasible, apart from that aspects of these proposals, in
particular Prodell's proposal for a unied card index, inspired the Volkskartei.
5.2 Comprehensive registration
The experience of the First World War had inuenced the German society as a whole
and the discourse around the Volksgemeinschaft in particular. Mobilisation had broadly
relied upon the recruits' adherence to the public appeals. The only available data that
could be consulted to identify missing recruits was maintained at their respective place
of birth by the Standesämter. A coherent registration system did not exist. Hence,
objectors easily escaped the administration's attention. When Kääb and Liebermann
introduced the Volkskartei in an extensive manual for the registrars, the Great War and
its `total mobilisation' were the main point of reference.9 The registration system of
the labour service and even more the rst combined draft in summer 1935 had revealed
the loopholes in the German registration and notication system, in particular when
employing recruits beyond the federal states' boundaries. The Reichsmeldeordnung was
introduced to mend these shortcomings.
The Volkskartei was to introduce this unied system as well as an entirely new organ-
isation of the index cards. The cohort-based organisation of the index rst and foremost
served basic military needs. It was designed to provide comprehensive lists of entire
cohorts at their respective place of residence. As the military principle of recruiting
entire cohorts was adapted in the Labour Service and the party's youth organisations it
aected a growing number of people, including women.
Historiography has understood Göring's announcement of the Volkskartei 's establish-
ment on 18th November 1938 in front of the Reich Defence Council (Reichsverteidigung-
srat) as the index's point of origin.10 Considering that the initial survey to capture the
necessary data was conducted in August 1939, this dating leaves little time for forward
planning. Mühlbauer dates the initiative in late 1936 as he understands it to be connec-
ted to the rst Vierjahreslan announced in September of that year, albeit stressing that
the exact date cannot be established.11 The denite decision in favour of the nationwide
establishment of the index was certainly taken only briey before the meeting of the
9. Cf. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 47.
10. Cf. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 54; Robert M.W. Kempner, `The German National
Registration System As Means of Police Control of Population', The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 36 (1946): 362387, 367. Though Aly and Roth do mention the test-run in 1938.
11. Cf. Mühlbauer, Einwohnermeldewesen, 77.
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Reich Defence Council in November. Neither can a connection to the Vierjahresplan be
denied as both projects were linked to the mobilisation eort and were intended to put
material as well as human resources at its disposal.
However, the specic dierence of the Volkskartei is the organisation in age cohorts.
It is this feature that fullled the demands voiced by the Wehrmacht during the rst
draft in 1935 and which allows the dating of the Volkskartei 's origins to as early as
July 1935.12 While the project was initially referred to as nach Geburtsjahrgängen
aufgestellte Einwohnerkartei, from spring 1937  that is after Liebermann's transferral to
the Order Police  the term Volkskartei is frequently found in the les. On 20th July 1937
Himmler informed the Regierungspräsidenten of the Potsdam district a test run of the
index was planned for 1938. Liebermann had been appointed to design the Volkskartei,
but discussions to align population indices had already begun when Kerstiens was in
charge. In February 1938 Liebermann had been working on the proposal for an index
system for over a year and had sent rst drafts to Daluege and Himmler as well as the
government in Potsdam and the district commissioners.13
The Reichsmeldeordnung itself had dened the conditions of registration for the pub-
lic. Only April 1938's second implementation decree regarding the Reichsmeldeordnung
governed the substantial side of registration regulations and refrained from prescribing
a card index system. Nevertheless, for those municipalities that had not previously in-
troduced such devices, the Reichsmeldeordnung and the related implementation decrees
provided the regulations and form layouts for a complete registration system. While the
use of some of these forms was obligatory, like the postcard-sized standardised notic-
ations forms, others were meant to be used in case no equivalent solution was in place.
The Einheitskarteikarte  or Personenregisterkarte  existed in two forms: in blue for
women, in white for men each on a 5 paper. Both cards contained questions beyond
those asked in the registration form (Anmeldeschein). Unlike the registration form, the
index card featured an additional eld next to the question on citizenship in which doc-
uments provided as proof could be specied. This allowed a potential introduction of
Ausweispicht later on. A further row provided space to note prior convictions. The
third row of the index card was reserved for the parents' personal details, including
religion. The following one for the credentials of possible spouses. The last row asked
for the children's credentials leaving space for a reference to their individual les. A
box was left to list special licences or other remarks. A new feature of the form was the
12. See chapter `Second planning stage', 100.
13. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343 Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Reichsführer SS usw. O-VuR. III
3013/38 an das Oldenb. Staatsministerium, 26th January 1938, 383.
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header. As the index cards were stored in index boxes in an upright position, the header
would be visible at a glance when browsing the index boxes. On the right side of the
card it featured 16 numbered elds that could be coloured or tabbed in order to high-
light specic cards. Left of the header's 16 elds was an extra box that contained one
word only  `Abstammung:'  succeded by an empty space.14 Yet, neither the extensive
instructions for the use of the index cards by Kääb and Liebermann explain the purpose
of this eld nor is it referred to elsewhere.15 As the introduction of the Volkskartei was
not uncontested, the unied register card provided a fall-back version for the census data
in case it was decided to abandon the project of the Volkskartei. However, both projects
were neither alternatives nor mutually interchangeable.
5.3 The concept
The Reichsmeldeordnung had refrained from introducing a unied index system and
thus left disparate registration in place. The Volkskartei was meant to make up for
that. The most important feature of the Volkskartei was its organisation in age cohorts.
The `traditional' population registers of the police or civil registration oces had always
been organised alphabetically since they usually had to locate and identify individuals
by name. In the Volkskartei alphabetical order remained relevant only within the age
cohorts. But both indices would also dier in scope as the correspondence of Heydrich
and Daluege in February 1937 reveals. After the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei had enquired
as to what extent comprehensive lists of residents existed, the Ministry of the Interior's
Department Administration and Law replied:
`Übersichten der ortsansässigen Einwohner' fehlen auch in den Städten und
bei den staatlichen Polizeiverwaltungen. Sie sind auch nicht zu beschaen.16
The only lists available, the letter sets out, comprise the registered residents. A follow-
up from February informed Heydrich that a coming Kartei aller Einwohner vom 14.
Lebensjahre ab was intended to ll the existing gaps in registration.17 More than a
14. Cf. Ralf Zeitler and Hans Schlempp, eds., Die Reichsmeldeordnung vom 6. Januar 1938 mit der
VO. vom 6. September 1939, dem Volkskarteierlaÿ, den Vorschriften über Paÿ- und Ausweiswesen,
den Ausländerpolizeirecht sowie den einschlägigen gesetzlichen Bestimmungen und Erlassen, 7. (Berlin:
Deutscher Gemeindeverl., 1940), 142-143.
15. Cf. Zeitler and Schlempp, 114-117.
16. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343, Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, O-VuR.R III 394 Hrrn Oberregierungsrat
von Wigandt 23rd December 1936, 267.
17. GSTA I HA Rep. 77 Tit. 343, Nr. 107a Sonderakte Bd 1, Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei O-
VuR.Org.R 208/37 an den Chef der Sicherheitspolizei, 11th February 1937, 268.
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mere device of registration on the occasion of establishing a new home, the new card
index was intended to comprise the entire population. To achieve that, the new index
could not just be another cumulative data base, instead, the data was to be captured by
an independent survey. What made the approach to capturing the data by a survey so
intriguing were the benets of the `principle of simultaneity' statistician Dr Engel had
established in the previous century.18 By requiring every person in every household to
answer the questionnaires simultaneously a `static picture' of the entire population could
be produced. The traditional registration oces were by their very nature maintaining
cumulative data-bases and even the nationwide standardisation and the notication
system introduced with the Reichsmeldeordnung could not compensate for the inherent
ineptitude to comprise the unregistered population. A survey-based register would help
closing the existing gaps without suering the disadvantage of the data quickly becoming
obsolete usually connected with surveys. Through the integration of the index with the
existing registration and notication system, the decits of the `static picture' a survey
provided could be compensated, and turn the Volkskartei into a dynamic data base,
frequently updated by the registrars. On the occasion of change of residency, cards
were to follow their holders to be integrated into the local indices. As the number
of surveys were growing not least as a result of the increasingly managed economy
and the concomitant management of human resources, the establishment of a data-
base that provided the basic information of the entire population was only an obvious
next step. The concept of the new card index was associated with the attempt to
identify `Rassejuden' by means of a grand-scale survey at an early stage since the idea
was brought up by Kerstiens at about the same time the Wehrmacht had made their
requirements for registration known to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Once this
index was established, new queries could easily be included. By tabbing the index
cards of a given group of individuals, the index could quickly provide an overview of a
given segment of the population. Despite the earlier Prussian eort to identify medical
practitioners via the tax survey, nationwide their number remained uncertain. The
Volkskartei was supposed to mend this gap in registration of medical personnel left by
the Reichsmeldeordnung. In order to limit the number of statistical requests to the
municipalities, local registries were combined on the district level. Hence, for every
registrant, two copies of the Volkskarteikarte would be produced. The original was to
be kept at the local registration oce forming the `Urkartei ' while the copy be sent
to the district's police department where a Kreiskartei was to allow evaluation of the
18. See chapter `Nationality and statistics', 22.
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index to produce oversight over the district's population. Surveys could thus be easily
conducted on the local level for direct implementation or on a national scale evaluating
the Kreiskarteien. The registration system's notication obligations were to guarantee
both copies featured identical information, thereby introducing grand-scale double-entry
accounting for the entire population. A somewhat similar design had been proposed by
Gercke for the Reichsippenkartei back in 1934, albeit with the local register on the
district level and a single central kinship index.19 Conversely, Kääb and Liebermann
were well aware a central index was unfeasible as it would alsbald an seiner eigenen
Papierfülle ersticken and measures like the draft were implemented on the district level
anyhow. They considered the decentralisation in Kreiskarteien a workable compromise
of oversight and swift operation.20
Yet, despite attempting to close all gaps in registration, the Volkskartei could not
simply replace the traditional registration devices for several reasons. As individuals
were usually identied by name and frequently the date of birth was unknown, the in-
dex could not be operated without a separate alphabetical name-index. In municipalities
where card-based registration was already in place, these cards could provide a reference
system; otherwise a separate name index had to be established. Furthermore, index
cards were only produced for the section of the population aged from 5 to 70 years that
constituted the staatspolitisch und polizeilich in erster Linie interessierende Groÿteil
der Bevölkerung.21 For those ageing above 70 a separate system had to be maintained.
As the Volkskartei was to register Reichsangehörige exclusively, the presence of aliens
also required a separate registration system. Hence, as the index was unsuited for the
replacement of the existing registers, it required the operation of several population re-
gisters by the local department's in addition to the double-entry accounting established
on the district level with the Kreiskartei which also depended on a separate name index.
While this might not overstrain trained civil servants of the larger Einwohnermeldeämter
in the cities, the requirements that were introduced with the Reichsmeldeordnung had
already led to several complaints by the honorary mayors in charge of registration in
the smaller municipalities. With the introduction of an additional index, their duties
increased once again. As the Volkskartei was integrated with the system the Reichs-
meldeordnung had established, the decree did not introduce new institutions or oces,
hence it left the split in adiministrative responsibilities between municipal and police
registration intact.
19. See chapter `Path dependencies', 69.
20. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 16.
21. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939), 47.
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The Volkskarteikarte With the format a 5 (145 x 210 mm) size the index cards were
comparatively small. This was owed to the fact that cellulose was one of the restricted
raw materials Germany had to import. On the other hand durable 200 gs paper was
chosen to guarantee the card's longevity. Cards for women were green and the cards for
men were orange (chamoise). Either version featured eleven questions and two additional
elds for regulatory remarks (behördliche Vermerke) and change of residency. Due to
the card's size each of the elds was relatively small and required careful completion.
Like the Einheitsregisterkarte the Volkskarteikarte was headed by a row of 14 tabs.
Included in the header was a eld for the date of completion preceded by the notice
Nur von Reichsangehörigen, nicht von Ausländern auszufüllen. Other than Daluege
and Heydrich's correspondence suggested, the Volkskartei was limited to the population
of German citizenship  including any cases of doubt  but clearly not aliens and hence
not the entire resident population.
The rst eld, identical for women and men, asked for year, day, place and district of
birth. The second asked questions on the registrants vocation both trained and practised.
While men had to specify their employment relationship, women were asked for their
husband's profession. The next row asked whether the person was in possession of a
Arbeitsbuch. Field number four asked for physical handicaps. The fth eld at the top
of the centre column asked for names and maritial status and if married the spouse's
credentials. Women also had to list all children below the age of fteen. The subsequent
box contained questions on any form of education beyond primary school (Volksschule)
and was succeeded by questions on stays abroad and knowledge of foreign languages.
While eld number eight on the cards for men asked for special qualications in industry,
agriculture, technology or the sciences in general, the respective eld on the women's
card asked quite specically for qualications in typewriting, accounting, shorthand,
sewing, cooking, gardening, factory work or the sciences. Question number nine was
identical for women and men and the rst on the reverse side of the card. It asked for
medical qualications and potential driving or pilot licences. The following eld asked
questions related to military and labour service. As women were excluded from the
military, the eld on the green cards was accordingly smaller. Only the last eld to be
completed by the registrant enquired about the current place of residency.
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5.4 A test run
Before nationwide establishment of the Volkskartei was decided upon, the creation of
the index was put to a test. The administrative district of Potsdam enclosed the Reich-
shauptstadt and was presumably chosen as a testing ground for its proximity to the
central administration. Spanning from Wittenberg at the Elbe river in the west to
Schwedt at the Oder and from Jüterbog in the south to Pasewalk up north, and char-
acterised by growing industrial cities like Oranienburg with an enormous increase in
population on the one hand and sparsely populated regions like the Uckermark on the
other, it provided an appropriate testing ground for the index.22 By secret decree dated
20th July 1937 the Regierungspräsident of Potsdam announced the establishment of a
Volkskartei on a trial basis for the administrative district of Potsdam for 1938.23 The
announcement was supplemented by the draft version of the regulations for the Volks-
kartei, that had also been subject of Daluege's correspondence with Himmler in August
1937.24
I will examine the exchange between the Regierungspräsidenten of the Potsdam district
and its district commissioners (Landräte) and mayors that resulted from a test run of the
index in the Potsdam district. These previously unconsidered sources allow an insight
into the obstacles encountered at the dierent stages of implementation that do not exist
for the national level.
In the month leading up to the test run, the Regierungspräsident ordered the district
commissioners to report on the current state of registration. Only few of the reports
were as concise as the one from the Jüterbog-Luckenwalde district, whose district com-
missioner replied in a single sentence: In sämtlichen Gemeinden des Kreises werden
Meldekarteien in Karteiform geführt.25 Although some communities had introduced
the Adrema system in the late 1920s, by far the majority of municipalities still relied
on lists or books to register their population. Yet, one month after the Reichsmeldeord-
22. Cf. Frédéric Bonnesoeur, Im guten Einvernehmen: die Stadt Oranienburg und die Konzentra-
tionslager Oranienburg und Sachsenhausen 1933-1945, ed. Metropol-Verlag, Forschungsbeiträge und
Materialien der Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten Band 22 (Berlin: Metropol, 2018), 19-22.
23. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat von Angermünde an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in Pots-
dam, 24th of July 1937, Eingangsbestätigung. Betrit: Verfügung vom 20. Juli 1937 - I Pol.R.V.1.322
24. BArch R 19 407, Bl. 1. Daluege to Himmler on the 12th of August. Like similar holdings this le is
characterised by a gap stretching from summer 1937 to 1943. The entire correspondence on the index's
test-run is marked Geheime Reichssache suggesting the respective documents were handled with a high
degree of secrecy.
25. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Jüterbog-Luckenwalde an den Herrn Regier-
ungspräsidenten in Potsdam, 20th June 1938.
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nung came into force about 60 municipalities still did not keep registers at all.26 Given
that the Reichsmeldeordnung was not the rst attempt to standardise registration within
Prussia these reports prove the rural areas were still a major problem for registration.
Similar conditions may well have prevailed in other places, in particular the rural and
less densely settled areas in the southern federal states.
On 25th July 1938 Himmler instructed Potsdam's Regierungspräsidenten in his capa-
city as head of the Oberste Verwaltungsbehörde and thus the district's police forces and
registration oces to establish the Volkskartei in order to test the stages of implement-
ation. The document was  as was the entire correspondence on the test-run  marked
classied. It included detailed instructions and proposals for collecting the data, the
establishment and the maintenance of the index and sample index cards. The trial was
set for August. The municipalities' reports about the screening were expected at the
police departments by 30th September 1938 who would compile summary reports for the
Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam by 15th October.27 That left the brief time-span of
about three months for the entire project and its evaluation.
The Regierungspräsident started receiving comments from the district's commission-
ers and mayors soon after the plan had been announced in 1937. While all recipients
of the decree acknowledged possible benets of the new index, the fact that it intro-
duced double-entry accounting of the population caused disquiet amongst them. Three
days after the plan had been announced Oberbarnim's district commissioner proposed:
Meines Dafürhaltens brauchen nur die Kreispolizeibehörden die Volkskartei zu führen.28
Over the course of the year commissioners realised that the two identical indices would
depend on further, separate indices for the elderly, foreigners and an alphabetical index
so that the commissioner in Teltow argued for the Wegfall aller anderen Karteien, die
Volkskartei muÿ eine Universalkartei sein.29
Their objections were motivated by the apprehended increase in workload during the
index' compilation and the later operation. The Reich Ministry of the Interior had
26. 22 Municipalities in the district of Teltow BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat des Kreises Teltow
an den Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, 27th June 1938, and 42 in the Rathenow district, BLHA
Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702 Der Landrat Rathenow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten, 24th June 1938.
27. BArch R 1501 1300008, Bl. 2-7, Bracht on behalf of: Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen
Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern O-VuR. / a g Nr 13 III/38 an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 25th July 1938.
28. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Oberbarnim an den Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, Betre: Errichtung einer Volkskartei  Verfügung vom 20. Juli 1937; eine Anlage. 27th
July, 1937.
29. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Teltow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, Betrit Volkskartei 11th August 1938.
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promised an additional position per 50,000 inhabitants nanced by the states. But due
to the high employment rates, it was hard to ll the vacancies as the commissioner of
Oberhavel laid out:
Da der Kreis Oberhavel z. Zt. rund 120 000 Einwohner hat und von diesen in
der Volkskartei etwa 90 000 erfaÿt werden sollen, würde die Ausstellung der
Karten in Maschinenschrift etwa 600 Werktage in Anspruch nehemen. Da die
Herstellung der Kartei bei der Kreispolizeibehörde in 3 Monaten erfolgen soll,
müÿten 8 gute Arbeitskräfte während dieser Zeit ausschlieÿlich mit dieser
Arbeit beschäftigt werden. Eine derartige Anzahl von Arbeitskräften steht
mir nicht zur Verfügung. Bei der Lage des Arbeitsmarktes würden sie auch
auf keinen Fall hier zu zu bekommen sein.30
Similar concerns were voiced all over the district.31
While the situation in the district towns was dire, it was even more problematic in
municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants where the entire administration was in
the hands of honorary mayors. The district commissioner of Ostprignitz had already
noticed growing unease amongst the mayors in his district. He pointed out, daÿ die
Bürgermeister meines Kreises durch die ständig zunehmende Arbeit unlustig werden
und mich wiederholt gebeten haben, sie nunmehr von ihrer ehrenamtlichen Tätigkeit zu
entbinden.32 He was seconded by the commissioner of Beskow-Storkow, who pointed out
the dependence on the mayors' goodwill and added: Bei Zwangsmaÿnahmen wird es zu
Amtsniederlegungen kommen.33 Teltow's commissioner, in whose district 22 mayors had
failed to implement the Reichsmeldeordnung anticipated daÿ das Proberverfahren unter
Mitwirkung der Bürgermeister zu einem völligen Fehlschlag führen muÿ.34 Inaccuracy
on the local level, he argued, would not only aect the local registries:
30. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Oberhavelland an den Herrn Regierungspräsid-
enten, z. Hd. von Herrn Honig oder Vertreter im Amt in Potsdam, Betrit: Volkskartei, 6th August
1938.
31. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Regierungsbezirks Potsdam an die Herren Landräte
des Bezirks, 10th August 1938, Betrit: Volkskartei.
32. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Ostprignitz an den Herrn Regierungspräsid-
enten in Potsdam, 10th August 1938, Betrit: Volkskartei.
33. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Beskow-Storkow Herrn Regierungspräsiden-
ten, Herrn Regierungsvizepräsidenten Dr. Honig oder Vertreter in Potsdam, Betre: Volkskartei, 6th
of August 1938
34. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Teltow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 11th August 1938.
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Da nach diesen Erfahrungen die ordnungsgemäÿe Führung der Karteien bei
den Bürgermeistern scheitern dürfte, scheitert auch die auf einer ordnungs-
gemäÿen Führung der Gemeindekarteien beruhende Kreiskartei.35
Thus he proposed a workable solution for the lack of police registration in the smaller
municipalities where registration had remained a communal competence: Die Schaung
von Amtsbürgermeistereien ist meiner Auassung nach eine dringende Vorrausetzung für
das Gelingen des groÿen Planes.36A professionalisation of administration in the smaller
municipalities was briey discussed again in 1940 but they faced the same opposition as
the discontinued Reichsreform.37
The problem of stang was subsequently addressed by involving more volunteers.
Daluege enquired to the SS Head Oce's Heiÿmeyer whether the formation was willing
to supply volunteers.38 Himmler agreed to have the district's schreibgewandte SS-
Männer volunteer to the task of producing the Kreiskarteien.39 To win the support of
the local SS, the respective notication sent to the `SS-Oberabschnitte' (districts) the
same day highlighted that in addition to military and policing the new index would
directly serve the party's interests as it would gure as Erfassungsgrundlage für das
Jungvolk, die HJ und den BDM.40 Similarly, the Reich Ministry of Science, Education
and Culture had promised the teachers' help compiling the index. To that regard the
district commissioner in Zauch-Belzig commented: die Parteiorgane und auch die Lehrer
sind bereits mit anderen Arbeiten sehr in Anspruch genommen.41
The survey itself faced several diculties in logistics as well as external obstacles.
The trial was overshadowed by the Sudetenkrise in course of which signicant parts of
the male population were absent.42 The district of Angermünde and the Ostprignitz
suered an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that rendered their mayors immobile
as their farms were put into quarantine. Angermünde had to deal with oodings so
35. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat des Kreises Teltow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 27th June 1938
36. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Teltow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 11th August 1938.
37. BArch R 19 395, Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei an Herrn Ministerialdirektor Bracht, 7th December
1940.
38. BArch NS 31 132, Chef der Ordnungspolizei an den Chef des NS-Hauptamtes, SS-
Obergrupenführer Heiÿmeyer, 12th January 1939.
39. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Der Regierungspräsident des Kreises Ostprignitz an den Herrn
Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, 19th of January 1939.
40. BArch NS 31 132, Der Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an den SS-Oberabschnitt Ost, 19th of January
1939.
41. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Zauch-Belzig an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, Betr. Volkskartei, 8th August 1938.
42. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Polizeipräsident von Potsdam an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 21st October 1938.
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that the district's available workforce was employed securing the levees and rescuing the
harvest from the polders inland. In the areas aected, the survey was postponed until
November.43
Logistical problems surfaced when not all municipalities were supplied with a sucient
number of index cards. Diculties arose in the communes where the ocials had to
report the amount of required cards, and sometimes underestimated the increase in
population since the last census. More often, the lack of raw bre to produce the cards
on the side of the Reichsdruckerei, the only printing house authorised to print the cards,
created a bottleneck.44
While the general schedule of the trial and the respites were ordered centrally from
the Reich Ministry of the Interior, the method for distributing and collecting the cards,
as well as the actual production of the index was left to the local authorities, in or-
der to adapt to the local conditions. Depending on the mayors' and commissioners'
priorities, three dierent approaches developed. Where the establishment of the index
was left to volunteers and honorary mayors, often both cards were handed out to the
population, who had to complete them within ten days. This approach was chosen not
necessarily because it was considered the best method. Weighing his doubts regard-
ing the rural population's ability to correctly complete the questionnaires, against the
honorary mayor's existing duties, Teltow's district commissioner concluded, daÿ die
Ausfüllung der Karten im Groÿen und Ganzen der Bevölkerung wird überlassen werden
müssen.45
In contrast, Templin's commissioner considered due to high rates of illiteracy in some
regions that the survey takers would have to complete the questionnaires.46 Sometimes
the survey overburdened even these volunteers. Beeskow reported:
Die Karten enthalten [. . . ] überhaupt Fragen bei denen die Zähler, selbst
Lehrer, kaum wissen, was und wie sie zu antworten haben.47
43. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Angermünde an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, Betrit: Volkskartei, 13th September 1938.
44. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichmin-
isterium des Innern an den Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, Nachrichtlich an: Die Herren Landräte
des Bezirks, Den Herrn Pol.-Präsidenten in Potsdam und den übrigen kreisfreien Städten des Bezirks,
Die Staatspolizeistelle in Potsdam, 23rd September 1939.
45. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Teltow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 11th August 1938.
46. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Templin an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 6th August 1938.
47. BLHA Rep. 8 Beskow 3546, Der Bürgermeister in Beskow an den Herrn Landrat, 3rd October
1938.
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In order to produce an accurate index some districts produced paper questionnaires
and intended to complete the index cards by typewriter.48 Yet, the unreliable supply
of cards forestalled this approach and municipalities that had planned to produce both
copies of the cards by typewriter and carbon copy in a single step found their work
almost doubled. Furthermore, the card lay-out made completion with a typewriter all
the more dicult. The choice of high-quality paper required powerful typewriters to
produce a legible carbon copy. Smaller machines were reportedly broken while produ-
cing the Volkskartei. Furthermore, the spacing of the cards' rows was not adjusted to
conventional typewriter's spacing so that the scribes had to target the individual rows
manually.The poor use of available space made it impossible to complete the lower rows
with a typewriter as the cards would simply fall o the platen roller.
Erkner, Glienike and Oranienburg  all located in the Niederbarnim district  were
allowed to test the integration of the Volkskartei with their Adrema systems. Erkner 
bypassing the Ministry of the Interior  had specically designed cards compatible with
the machines and as a result could enormously speed up the index production. The
other cities had resorted to printing labels that were eventually attached to the cards.
This proved impracticable since it took more time and resulted in thicker and bent index
cards.49 The integration of the Volkskartei and Adrema-system was dismissed for the
nationwide implementation.
The third approach, that was eventually adapted for the nationwide implementation,
was to hand out the card intended for the local index to the public for completion and
to produce the one for the police department's Kreiskartei by typewriter.
Forms of non compliance, like loss of the form or return of incomplete or only partly
legible forms were practised everywhere  often exceeding the 10% margin already taken
into account by the Reichsdruckerei. As had been expected by many civil servants,
cards distributed to the population were rarely returned intact. The report from Ruppin
district highlighted: [. . . ] durch die Belassung der Karteikarten bei den Volksgenossen
geht eine Menge Karteikarten verloren oder wird derart verschmutzt, dass sie in jedem
Fall erneuert werden müssen.50
As the entire planning of the index' test-run had been classied, local authorities were
not allowed to ocially announce the survey prior to its actual conduct whereas tradi-
tionally censuses and other surveys had been accompanied by press coverage and public
48. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Oberbarnim an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 6th August 1938.
49. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Niederbarnim an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 5th November 1938.
50. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Ruppin an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 2nd November 1938.
141
announcements. Prior to the distribution of the cards, the mayor of Brandenburg an der
Havel had suggested linking the project with the tax survey, weil die Bevölkerung [. . . ]
bei einer auÿerterminlichen Ausfüllung der Bogen für die Volkskartei sicherlich stutzig
werden würde.51 During the survey, several reports mention dierent degrees of resist-
ance or unwillingness to complete the questionnaire. The commissioner of Zauch - Belzig
noted in this regard, daÿ teilweise bei den Volksgenossen eine recht groÿe Abneigung
dagegen besteht, ihre Fähigkeiten usw. mitzuteilen [. . . ].52 The same reasoning that
had made some reluctant to disclose their vocational qualications led others to provide
misleading information as they understood the index to be a potential stepping stone
for their (or their children's) careers. A survey taker from Beskow reported:
In einigen Fällen ist bewuÿt die Unwahrheit gesagt worden! Bei Frauen
sind oft `höhere Schulen' angegeben worden [. . . ] In einem anderen Fall
hat der Vater den Sohn aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit aus einer höheren
Schulklasse entlassen.53
Due to the lack of legal basis, neither of the above was punishable. To identify and rectify
false information, an additional process of verication was required, but its implement-
ation depended on the local authorities. The head of the Potsdam police department,
who had involved volunteers from the local party branch to conduct the survey, seems
to downplay the incidents in his district, sharing an interesting observation:
Unvermeidlich waren natürlich auch einzelne wenige Zusammenstöÿe zwi-
schen den politischen Leitern und Volksgenossen, da sich letztere teilweise
grundsätzlich weigerten, die Karten auszufüllen, hauptsächlich in der Mein-
ung, die Karten seien für Parteizwecke, nicht aber für den Staat selbst
bestimmt.54
This suggests that readiness to disclose personal data also depended on the institution
asking for disclosure and the intended use. To that regard trust in the state institutions
diered from that in the party. The commissioner of the Ruppin district, where party
51. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Oberbürgermeister als Kreispolizeibehörde in Brandenburg
(Havel) an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, 10th August 1938.
52. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Zauch-Belzig an den Herrn Regierungs-
präsidenten in Potsdam, 25th February 1939.
53. BLHA Rep. 8 Beskow 3546, Kurt Müller (Zähler) an den Herrn Bürgermeister in Beskow, 3rd
November 1938.
54. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Polizeipräsident in Potsdam an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 21st November 1938.
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members distributed and collected the cards in Neuruppin, reported Dieses Verfahren
ist aber nicht zu empfehlen.55
The mayor of Birkenwerder had to deal with high levels of non compliance. To dif-
fuse respective fears in the population the mayor had Niederbarnim's district commis-
sioner issue an announcement claiming the use of the new index was limited to the
zahlreichen Aufgaben, die der Polizei in der Betreuung der Bevölkerung obliegen.56
A similar announcement was made in Rüdersdorf. Upon sending the announcement,
the commissioner informed Birkenwerder's mayor to maintain condentiality and refrain
from publishing the announcement via the local press in order to avoid wider attention.57
In his report Niederbarnim's commissioner summarised:
Diese Riesenarbeit [. . . ] hätte sich bedeutend leichter durchführen lassen,
wenn für rechtzeitige und ausreichende Aufklärung vorbereitend hätte ge-
sorgt werden können. [. . . ] Man wollte wissen, weshalb diese und jene An-
gaben verlangt wurden, und nur dem einsichtsvollen Verhalten der Helfer
ist es zuzuschreiben, daÿ ernsthaftere Angstpsychosen nicht zum Ausbruch
kamen.
Without going into further detail, the commissioner reported several cases in which
mayors involved police to enforce compliance.58 Judging from the drastic language
employed in the report, distrust was relatively widespread and obviously the intrusion
into privacy presented by the index recognised by parts of the population. As a result
the data was often incomplete so the head of Potsdam's police department had to admit
in his nal report:
Auch heute noch benden sich in der Kartei Karten, die nicht alle erforder-
lichen Angaben enthalten, die also späterhin noch einmal gesichtet und durch
die Polizeireviere vervollständigt werden müssen.59
After the survey both copies had to be organised in cohorts then alphabetically and
kept safe. As the commissioner of the district Ruppin illustrated the situation of the
honorary mayors to his superior in Potsdam:
55. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Ruppin an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 2nd November 1938.
56. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Niederbarnim, Bekanntmachung, 10th
October 1938.
57. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Der Landrat des Kreises Niederbarnim an den Herrn Bürgermeister
als Meldebhörde in Brikenwerder, 10th October 1938.
58. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Niederbarnim an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 5th November 1938.
59. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Polizeipräsident in Potsdam an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 21st November 1938.
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Das Amtszimmer ist zugleich Wohnzimmer und mit allem möglichen Mobil-
iar angefüllt. Für den Karteikasten ist tatsächlich kein sicherer Platz vor-
handen.60
Police departments often had to rent additional rooms to accommodate the index con-
soles. The furnishing of all register oces in the Potsdam district remained incomplete
even in November 1938.61 Without the proper equipment, operation of the index was
tedious and oversight was not guaranteed. The Kreiskarteien easily comprised some
10,000 cards or more. Once again, the commissioner of Niederbarnim was addressing
this aspect most tangible in his report:
Namentlich in den grossen Gemeinden türmen sich die losen Karten überall
auf den Tischen und Ablageplätzen und erschweren die Übersicht. Infolge
der täglich eintretenden Veränderungen müssen die Karten schon bei der
Erstellung nachgesehen und ergänzt werden, wobei sie arg in Mitleidenschaft
gezogen werden.62
The most meaningful step in the Volkskartei 's creation was its evaluation. By adding
tabs to the card header, the index was turned into a tagged and hence searchable data
base. Evaluation of the index was ordered for the district of Potsdam on 7th August 1939
by Himmler and accompanied by extensive instructions.63 Cards of medical personnel
were marked with a white tab and the Volkskarteibehörde was tasked with informing
the local health department about every registration or cancellation thereof involving
medical personnel, hereby closing the gap in registration the Reichsmeldeordnung had
left. Cards of those who held any sort of driving licence were marked with a red tab and
a blue tab was to mark those who owned an Arbeitsbuch.
However, this revealed just another technical problem. Since the majority of the
working population turned out to own an Arbeitsbuch, almost all cards, in particular
in the consoles for men were tabbed. Instead of producing oversight over the working
population, the measure increased the volume of the index  the commissioner of Teltow
noticed his index of some 100,000 cards had grown three more metres  so that once
60. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Ruppin an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam 24th June 1938.
61. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Polizeipräsident in Potsdam an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in
Potsdam, 21st November 1938.
62. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Niederbarnim an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 5th November 1938.
63. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsmin-
isterium des Innern an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, 7th August 1939.
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again the registration oces had to order new consoles to house the larger index.64 Due
to orders from all over Germany that had meanwhile been placed and the onset of the
war, the delivery period for new consoles and cabinets had been extended to up to an
entire year.65 Some registration oces tried tabbing only those cards whose owners did
not own a Arbeitsbuch. While this cleared the view in the male part of the index, the
female consoles were now crowded with tabs.
A further step was the attachment of the duplicate ID cards (Kennkarten) that had
previously hitherto been collected separately. In the summer of 1939, when the district of
Potsdam was ordered to combine both data sets, only conscripts and Jews were required
to carry ID cards. By combining the ID card duplicates with the Volkskartei their
biometrical data was added to the index. The existence of the ID card was to be noted
on the Volkskarteikarte. Furthermore, the order from August 1939 instructed:
Bei dieser Gelegenheit sind die Kennkarten von Juden [. . . ] dadurch zu
kennzeichnen, dass ein viereckiger schwarzer Reiter über der Zahl 14 auf der
Volkskarteikarte befestigt wird.66
During the completion of the Volkskarteikarte the survey takers had been told to pencil
the cards of those they knew or suspected to be Jewish with a `J ' in the card's upper left
corner. The attachment of the Kennkarten to the index cards provided an additional
way of collating data on race with the population registers. Cards that labelled a person
Jewish but without an ID card or vice-versa were supposed to trigger further enquiries.
The earliest district to nish compilation of the local copy (Urkartei) was Jüterbog-
Luckenwalde, whose commissioner reported nine days after the original respite expired.
Nevertheless, he did not expect the Kreiskartei to be completed within the year. Re-
garding the operation of the index he remarked: Weiter kann auch die Gewähr für eine
ordnungsgemäÿe Führung der Kreiskartei mit dem vorhandenen Personal nicht übernom-
men werden.67 With the exception of Angermünde most districts reported the nalisa-
tion of the Urkartei during November 1938. Due to the delays in the Potsdam district,
the decision for the nationwide implementation of the Volkskartei was taken before the
64. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Der Landrat des Kreises Teltow an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 10th October 1939.
65. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Hinz Organisation für Büro, Betrieb und Verwaltung G.M.B.H. an
den Herrn Landrat in Prenzlau, 14th November 1939.
66. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsmin-
isterium des Innern an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, 7th August 1939.
67. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2702, Landrat der Kreises Jüterbog-Luckenwalde an den Herrn Regierung-
spräsidenten in Potsdam, 24th October 1938.
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trial in Potsdam had come to an end and despite the enormous diculties the establish-
ment had to face. The fact that the Ministry of the Interior still insisted on the index
shows the importance it attached to the Volkskartei.
During the trial's initial phase only the cohorts between 1869 and 1925 were registered.
But the Volkskartei was intended to shape the future, i. e. the youth. Hence, in a second
phase that was to begin after the compilation of the Kreiskarteien was supposedly n-
ished, the Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Culture had ordered the registration
of the remaining children ageing from ve to fourteen years on 18th of January 1939.68
However, this time the decree was not limited to the Potsdam district.
The survey of school children was conducted simultaneously in the Potsdam district
and the entire Reich  being the last step in data acquisition in Potsdam and the initial
stage for the Reich. The Ministry for Education had both ordered the creation of the
index for school children as well as guaranteed the cost-neutral creation of the Urkartei
by oering the teachers to volunteer in its initial compilation and the long-term main-
tenance. In turn, the ministry included its questions on vocational training and higher
education in the survey.69
Registration was carried out in school mainly by the teachers, though the instructions
pointed out:
Gröÿere Kinder können unter Aufsicht der Lehrer die Karten sauber, ordent-
lich und in leserlicher Schrift mit Tinte selbst ausfüllen.70
The Reichsdruckerei had printed a signicant number of the index cards to prepare for
the nationwide establishment, but resulting from the trial, the design was altered so
that the existing stock was distributed during the rst screening of school-children 
the inappropriate questions were simply left out. Although the registration oces in
the Potsdam district were almost a year ahead of their counterparts in other regions,
the onset of the war had a direct impact on them. On 18th September 1939 the district
commissioner of Templin sent an inquiry to the district government in Potsdam:
Ich bitte um Verfügung, ob bei dem erschütternden Personalmangel, der in-
zwischen eingetreten ist, die Weiterführung der Volkskartei bei den Landräten
und Gemeinden ausgesetzt werden kann.71
68. RMBliV, 115.
69. Cf. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 11.
70. BLHA Rep. 8 Beeskow 3546, Der Landrat des Kreises Beeskow an die Herren Bürgermeister des
Kreises, 7th February 1939.
71. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Der Landrat des Kreises Templin an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten
in Potsdam, 18th September 1939.
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Himmler's reply which was forwarded to all district commissioners and the heads of
the police departments suggests that similar considerations had been made elsewhere,
too. Thus the reply began conceding that the mobilisation had been challenging the
registration oces, so daÿ der Aufbau der Volkskartei hier und dort zurückgestellt
worden sein mag. Nevertheless, Himmler's reply once again stressed the importance
of the index für die Landesverteidigung und die wirtschaftliche Mobilmachung and
ordered the rigid implementation of the necessary steps. On a local basis authorities were
asked to publish announcements obliging those who were unregistered to complete the
forms. On the occasion of the Personenstandsaufnahme, data that had been forwarded
from the registration oces to the tax oce beforehand was to be tallied with the local
Volkskarteien.72
Trial and implementation
Before turning to the survey of 1939 I will address the changes resulting from the trial as
they allow the reconstruction of the priorities governing the decisions during the Volk-
skartei 's nationwide establishment. In contrast to the ample correspondence related to
the index' test-run, detailed reports stemming from the nationwide implementation do
not exist. The analysis of the implementation thus primarily has to rely on the respect-
ive laws and regulations. A meaningful source previously not consulted by researchers
are the discussions regarding the decommissioning of the index in 1943  in particular
when compared to the reports coming from Potsdam's civil servants in the late thirties.
Regarding the initial survey, the best source is provided by the Volkskartei manual rst
published in 1939 prior to the nationwide implementation, which was almost entirely
written by Liebermann.73 The manual is divided into two parts. The rst of which,
after laying out the Volkskartei's purpose, provides detailed instructions for the dier-
ent steps required for its creation. The instructions address individual stages of the
indices production  the aggregation of data, the organisation of the indices (Ur- and
Kreiskartei), the evaluation and tabbing of the index cards, as well as the operation of
the indices. The second part gathers all relevant laws and decrees. The entire rst part
is characterised by a colloquial tone and numerous remarks on practical issues and objec-
tions show how Liebermann was well acquainted with the diculties that had surfaced
during the trial.
72. BLHA Rep. 2A I Pol 2703, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsminis-
terium des Innern an den Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam. 23rd September 1939.
73. BArch R 19 5376, Ministerialrat Kääb an Ministerialdirektor Bracht, 27th August 1942. Erich
Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei, 1.-3., ed. Artur Kääb (München, Berlin: Jehle, 1939).
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The most obvious change concerned the lay out of the index cards, which now allowed
the processing of the entire card by typewriter as the spacing was adjusted accordingly.
The card for women that had previously asked for the husband's profession twice was
altered and allowed more space for the maiden name that had before been considered
too small.
Most notably, all methods that had led to a higher quality of the index cards, like the
distribution of paper questionnaires and the production of the Urkartei by typewriter,
were explicitly forbidden. Exceptions were only admitted in small rural communities
where illiteracy was common; elsewhere the completion of the cards by the population
in handwriting was mandatory. Liebermann addressed the problem in the index' manual
employing the anti-statist sentiment nurtured by National Socialists:
Der echte Bürokrat (und solche soll es noch immer geben) wird allerdings die
Hände über dem Kopf zusammenschlagen. [. . . ] Die schriftliche Beantwor-
tung von Fragen ohne behördliche Überwachung übersteigt die Wahrheitsliebe
und das Begrisvermögen des deutschen Publikums keineswegs. Auf alle
Fälle wäre es ein Widerspruch wenn Behörden [. . . ] sich auf der einen Seite
wegen Personalmangels auÿerstande erklären wollen, [. . . ] dann aber auf der
anderen Seite sich die im Erlaÿ zum Grundsatz gemachte Vereinfachung der
Arbeitsgänge nicht zu nutze machen wollten.74
Of course, this was a reaction to the lack of personnel that had become obvious during
the trial. Producing the index with the existing sta would have delayed the completion
of the index and increased the costs. And indeed, the entire decree is characterised
by the willingness to surrender neatness and accuracy to ensure the quick creation of
the index. Several regulations for the nationwide creation of the index underline this
approach. The survey takers were instructed to check the cards for completeness but
explicitly not to ask for proof of the answers, once again referring to the principle
of simplicity.75 But most importantly, a process of verication would have severely
impeded the swift creation of the Volkskartei as it would occupy the registrars auf
Jahre hinaus.76 For the case that incomplete cards were returned despite the survey
takers insistence, the creation of the index was once again prioritised over the cards
completeness. Only when the Kreiskartei had been established, registrars were told to
approach the card-holders to complete individual cards. As we have already seen, it
took the authorities in the Potsdam district more than a year to bring the indices to
74. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939), 4-5.
75. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, 5.
76. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, 15.
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usability. Aware of the imminent war the Ministry of the Interior simply had no time
left to create an accurate index. But on the other hand, the index was intended to create
the most comprehensive register possible and the ministry was unwilling to trade speed
for comprehensiveness. The establishment of a nationwide index system refrained from
introducing mechanised registration and thus still fell behind the standards set by the
`Hanseatic' system. The case of Erkner had shown how cards designed to be processed
by the Adrema machines helped to reduce the time needed for the creation of the index
enormously. Yet, to prevent local administrations from simply copying the existing data
sets instead of conducting the survey, the new design of the index cards deliberately left
the Adrema system's requirements unconsidered.77
Once again this underlines that the Volkskartei was intended to close the gaps in
registration by adapting the procedure developed for the censuses  a simultaneously
conducted survey targeting the entire population. In the later discussions to decom-
mission the index in 1943 Himmler claimed the index had increased registration of the
population by up to 25%.78 Given the state of registration in rural areas prior to the
establishment of the index this is entirely possible, in particular when the children were
taken into account. But none of the holdings consulted during this research contain
material to substantiate this claim.
But as individuals might have escaped the Volkskartei survey, register oces were
held to tally the Volkskartei with the existing registers to identify and close remaining
gaps. However, it was impossible to prescribe a unied procedure as these registers still
diered throughout Germany. Possible data could be provided by the Hauslisten,79 the
data of Adrema systems or the tax survey.
During the trial the comprehensiveness of the index had been jeopardised by chaotic
conditions in the registry oces that had to check the cards, produce the duplicates
and keep track of the occurring changes at the same time. In order to avoid the loss of
cards, the manual gave clear instructions on how to proceed in case the consoles were
not delivered in time or in the event of any other interference with the integrity of the
index. Eventually Liebermann reminded the registrars:
77. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939), 6.
78. BArch R 58 254, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des
Innern an den Leiter der Parteikanzlei z.Hd. Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. Klopfer, 27th February 1943.
79. See chapter chapter `Registration and emancipation', 11.
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Jede Karteikarte bedeutet einen Menschen. Ihr Abhandenkommen kann bei
einem notwendigen Einsatz das Fehlen dieses Menschen bedeuten.80
Hence, more important than accuracy or neatness was the comprehensiveness of the
index and rasche Erstellung.81 Most importantly, however, the changes resulting from
the test-run did not address what has explicitly been considered the system's funda-
mental weakness: its dependence on volunteers. As the trial in Potsdam had shown,
when compiled by paid workers, the establishment entailed costs and occupied workers.
Addressing the SS Head oce's Heiÿmeyer asking for the contribution of volunteers from
the SS for both the establishment and the long-term operation of the indices in March
1939, Daluege indicated:
Der Führer legt im Hinblick auf den bestehenden Mangel an Arbeitskräften
Wert darauf, daÿ der Personalbedarf für die Volkskartei auf ein möglichst
geringes Maÿ beschränkt wird.82
While the Wehrmacht and both branches of the police pushed for the index, they were
facing Hitler's headwind that manifested in a lack of funding for the project so that the
head of the Order Police concluded in the same letter:
Die Errichtung der Kartei im ganzen Reich wird einen groÿangelegten Ver-
such darstellen, eine bedeutsame und sehr umfangreiche staatliche Maÿ-
nahme zu einem groÿen Teil mit Hilfe ehrenamtlich tätiger Kräfte durch-
zuführen.
Obviously Daluege was aware of the obstacles the index was facing and expected the
help of Himmler's SS, once again stressing the demand for schreibgewandte SS-Männer.
In reply, Heiÿmeyer once again ascertained the help of his organisation.83 Baldur von
Schirach had also oered the help of the Hitler Youth with the distribution and collection
of cards.84 Apart from the `volunteer' teachers and SS men who were supposed to help
80. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939) 20.
81. Liebermann von Sonnenberg 20.
82. BArch NS 31 132, Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei an den Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, SS-
Obergruppenführer Heiÿmeyer, 26th March 1939.
83. BArch NS 31 132, Der Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an den Chef der Ordnungspolizei SS-
Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei Daluege, Betr.: Mitwirkung der Allgemeinen SS bei Errich-
tung und Führung der Volkskartei, 5th April 1939.
84. RdErl. des RFSSuChdDtPol. im RMdI vom 17. July 1939, betr. die Regelung der den Kre-
ispolizeibehörden durch Beschaung des Karteigeräts entstandenen Kosten, Errichtung der Volkskartei.
RMBliV 1531.
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establish and operate the local Urkarteien, for the maintenance of the Kreiskarteien, the
federal states had to nance a civil servant for every 50,000 cards. The Reich had to
bear the costs of the index consoles and the rst set of index cards.85
Yet, as the establishment of the index was only decided at the end of 1938, the
necessary resources were not included in 1939's budgets so that over the year several
states reported being overrun and requested help based on the federal scal equalisation.
Liebermann forwarded requests to the Ministry of the Interior.86 Since registration had
remained a federal competence, costs that resulted from the operation of the index such
as the sta and the occasional renewal of the index card stock were to be covered by
the states, so that the Ministry of the Interior simply brushed these requests o.87 But
despite the solution which reduced sta on the lowest local level, employing volunteers
and the limitation of additional sta to each 50,000 cards, lack of available personnel
was commiserated even before the initial survey or the war had started. In that re-
spect, in March 1939 the district commissioner of Saarlautern complained to Saarland's
Reichskommissar about the dire situation. Forwarding the complaint to Liebermann,
the Reichskommissar amended, die übrigen Landratsämter des Saarlandes leiden unter
ähnlichem Personalmangel.88 In the case of Saarlautern, additional sta previously
admitted for other tasks had not been supplied or instead been employed by superior
oces so that according to the commissioner eine Entlastung im Interesse des Dienstes
und der Gesundheit der Gefolgschaftsmitglieder was paramount.89 Nevertheless, of the
three positions requested, only two were granted by the ministry.90 Though the reports
regarding the nationwide establishment of the index are sparse, these cases from dier-
ent regions show that the Volkskartei encountered the same stang problems that had
already occurred during the trial. Yet, unlike the trial, the nationwide implementation
was poorly funded. Both problems were addressed by local administrations prior to the
survey. However, the central ministries remained adamant in their denial of nancial
responsibility for the index beyond the initial supply of the `hardware' reecting Hitler's
objections to the index.
85. Only for federal states under home rule (reichsunmittelbar) like Hesse and the Saarland, and
Alsace, Lorraine and Luxemburg, the central government covered the entire expenses.
86. BArch R 1501 1300008, von Liebermann an Abteilung IIa des Reichsministerium des Innern, 11th
January 1940.
87. BArch R 1501 130008, Der Reichsminister des Innern, Referent ORR Dr.Kernert an die Badische
Staatskanzlei, 19 th anuary 1940.
88. BArch R 1501 1300008, Der Reichskommissar für das Saarland an den Herrn Reichsminister des
Innern, 28th March 1939.
89. BArch R 1501, Der Landrat des Kreises Saarlautern an den Herrn Reichskommissar für das Saar-
land, 18th March 1939.
90. BArch R 1501 1300008, Der Reichminister des Innern an den Herrn Reichsminister der Finanzen,
9th May 1939.
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Hence, the Reich Ministry of the Interior's eorts to make the costs disappear by
sourcing out the bulk of the workload to `volunteers' had even been increased after
the trial despite all warnings to the contrary. This fundamental reliance on thousands
of volunteers whose availability was yet uncertain had made Daluege characterise the
project as a groÿangelegter Versuch, indicating his awareness of the precarious state
of the index prior to its establishment. Considering that the trial only resulted in
minor changes that provided for the swift conduct of the survey, and Göring's early
announcement of the index on 18th November 1938 prior to the nal reports it seems
plausible that the trial did not serve to assess the evaluation of the index but rather the
feasibility of the previous survey.
5.5 The nationwide implementation in 1939
The nationwide establishment of the index only started with the survey on 13th August
1939 that was ordered by the Ministry of the Interior. The establishment of the Urkartei
was expected to be reported to the Reich Ministry of the Interior by 15th of October
1939. As numerous administrations failed to report, a separate circular decree pressed
those in default for sofortige Erledigung employing alle zu Gebote stehenden Mittel.
The reports were expected by the end of January 1940.91
Before the cards were handed out to the population for completion on 13th August
1939, in May the census that will be subject of the subsequent chapter had been conduc-
ted.92 In several places the distribution and collection of the index cards for the Urkartei
was carried out by the former census takers, who were thus more acquainted with the
matter than the survey takers in Potsdam had been. As in the previous year during the
test run, the Reichsdruckerei encountered shortages in supply and the ocial respites
for the establishment of the index had to be postponed.93 Once again the distribution
of the cards was facing the absence of parts of the male population as it overlapped with
the covert mobilisation for the attack on Poland. The Wehrmacht was exempt from
registering recruits as the completion of their cards was expected to be part of the re-
registration process once their service had ended. Still, the military's registration oces
were required to register active personnel but failed to do so. Martin Bormann, Head of
91. RdErl. d. RMdI. v. 28.12.1939  Pol VuR 14g (7a) Nr. 309/39.
92. See chapter `Volkskartei and deportations', 162.
93. RdErl. des RFSSuChdDtPol. im RMdI vom 17. July 1939, betr. die Regelung der den Kreis-
polizeibehörden durch Beschaung des Karteigeräts entstandenen Kosten, Errichtung der Volkskartei.
RMBliV 1531.
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the Parteikanzlei, arguing in favour of the index decommissioning in 1943, maintained
Diese Männer sind zum grossen Teil bis heute nicht nacherfasst.94
The nationwide screening was accompanied by a row of implementation decrees. The
Verordnung über die Errichtung der Volkskartei vom 21. April 1939 penalised untruth-
fulness and refusal to complete the cards with 150 RM or six weeks' detention.95 Despite
the existence of numerous incomplete cards, there are no known cases of proceedings in
that regard. Compared to the test run, the nationwide establishment of the index
attached high priority to its cheap, fast, yet comprehensive compilation, therefore sacri-
cing accuracy and neatness.
As in Potsdam, the Volkskartei 's survey takers were expected to mark individuals they
knew or suspected to be Jewish with a `J' in pencil in the upper left corner. And they
were encouraged to do so liberally.
Der Helfer wird meistens die in seinem Abschnitt wohnenden Juden kennen.
Die Kennzeichnung wird ihm also keine Schwierigkeiten machen. Sollte je-
doch in einem Falle ein Zweifel bestehen, so wird der Helfer am besten auf
den Zweifel aufmerksam machen, indem er  ebenfalls mit Bleistift  ein
Fragezeichen hinter das `J' setzt (J?).96
The manual for the Volkskartei would downplay possible consequences of wrongly la-
belling a person as Jewish: Die Kennzeichnung der Karte durch den Helfer mit einem `J'
enthält kein endgültiges Urteil. While taking responsibility o the aides by postponing
a nite decision to a later verication, aides should provide as much of their `knowledge'
as possible  even if the quality of data was questionable. I will thoroughly discuss the
utilisation of the Volkskartei in the identication of Jews in the chapter `Volkskartei and
deportations'.97
The initial survey had coincided with the attack on Poland and the subsequent un-
folding of the Second World War. During the establishment of the index in the so-called
`Altreich', Germany occupied and incorporated new territories. But 1938's annexations
had posed a problem and neither in Austria nor in the `Sudetenland ' had the index
been established in 1939.98 Austria's Einwohnerverzeichnis was a card index. Albeit
organised alphabetically it provided the same functionality as the Volkskartei since it
94. BArch R 19 407, Bormann an den Herrn Reichsminister Dr. Frick, 28th May 1943.
95. RGBl I, 823,  5.
96. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939), 10.
97. `Volkskartei and deportations', 162.
98. The RdErl. d. RFSSuChdDtPol im RMdI vom 17. Juni 1939, RMBliV 1531, lists all districts in
which the index was established and only lists territories of the `Altreich'.
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was complemented by an age-based index. Its index cards (Stammblätter) were of about
the same size and registered similar data as the Volkskartei 's cards. This suced to or-
ganise the draft. Due to the dierent administrative structure in Austria, the Ministry
of the Interior had abstained from introducing the index in Austria. In the Volkskartei 's
manual Liebermann promised the later alignment.99 Only in March and April 1943 did
the unpublished decrees Pol O-VuR III 3424/43 ordered the immediate establishment
of the Volkskartei for Austria (Alpen- und Donau-Reichsgaue), the administrative dis-
tricts of Oppeln, Zichenau, Kattowitz, Danzig-Westpreuÿen and the Wartheland.100 By
tacitly introducing the index in these territories Himmler hoped to dismiss the grow-
ing criticism the index received.101 Furthermore, the decree repeated the order for
Gumbinnen, Aachen and Allenstein, although these districts were part of the `Altreich'
and had been allocated funding for the index in 1939.102 While in the adminstrative
districts of Danzig-Westpreuÿen and the Wartheland the index' creation was ordered
only in 1943, the city of Danzig had started preparing for its establishment 1th January
1940.103 There, compilation of the Urkartei began in July but encountered enormous
diculties in stang.104 Similar to Danzig, in Königsberg the introduction of the index
had been delayed by the hostilities during Poland's occupation so that it was begun
with a comparatively minor delay of about a fortnight. Due to the lack of personnel,
in Danzig the Urkartei was maintained by a central registry oce without maintaining
duplicates elsewhere.105 A similar solution had been allowed for Bremen and the other
cities that practised the `Hanseatic system'. This once again shows that the coverage of
the Volkskartei diered depending on time and place.
99. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939), 55.
100. BArch R70 POLEN 155, Bl. 9, Ausschnitt aus dem Ministerial-Blatt des Reichs- und Preussis-
chen Ministerium des Innern, and RdErl.D.RMdI.v.15.4.1943PolO-VuRRIII3433/43, Einführung der
Volkskartei in weiteren Reichsgauen und Reg.-Bezirken.
101. This matter will be treated more detailed in the chapter `Decommissioning of the Volkskartei in
1943', 184.
102. RdErl. d. RFSSuChdDtPol im RMdI vom 17. Juni 1939, RMBliV 1531.
103. BArch R70 Polen 155, Der Polzei-Präsident, Danzig, an die Reichsdruckerei  Auftragsannahme,
December 1939.
104. BArch R70 POLEN 155, Abteilung II an P[olizeipräsident in Danzig], 4th July 1940.
105. BArch R 70 POLEN 155, Der Polizeipräsident in Königsberg an den Polizeipräsidenten in Danzig,
20th October 1939.
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5.6 Utilisation of the Volkskartei
Zu welchen Zwecken die Volkskartei nutzbar gemacht werden kann, läÿt
sich heute noch nicht in vollem Umfang voraussehen; sicher aber kann die
Volkskartei zu zahlreichen und ganz verschiedenartigen Zwecken genutzt wer-
den.106
Liebermann thought of the Volkskartei as a future Universalkartei that presented a
solution to problems not yet existent. The Volkskarteierlass, on the other hand, was
very clear in dening its purpose: Der Einsatz der Gesamtbevölkerung im Kriege, that
is rst and foremost the organisation of the military draft as the organisation by age
cohorts shows.
Diese Verwendung der Kartei als Erfassungsmittel stellt ihren eigentlichen
Zweck dar. Dieser Zweck ist sofort mit ihrer Erstellung und der sich an-
schlieÿenden laufenden Berichtigung der Personenstands und Wohnungsver-
änderungen erfüllt. Alle weiteren Verwendungsmöglichkeiten stellen nur Neben-
zwecke dar, welche die Bedeutung der Kartei zusätzlich erhöhen.107
But the index was not limited to the male population. As we have seen, the Volkskartei
was designed to register the entire population and the military draft was only one side
of the mobilisation for the war. Once again the historical reference for the Volkskartei
was the previous war:
Im Kriege 1914/18 zeigte sich schon bald die Notwendigkeit, die im Felde
[. . . ] stehenden Millionen Soldaten im wirtschatichen Arbeitsprozess, dem
sie entzogen waren, [. . . ] insbesondere durch Frauen, zu ersetzen. [. . . ]
Groÿe Schwierigkeiten entstanden dadurch, daÿ kein Namensverzeichnis der
für einen Arbeitseinsatz verfügbaren Frauen bestand [. . . ]. Für den nicht
arbeitsbuchmäÿig erfaÿten Teil der Bevölkerung, bildet aber die Volkskartei
dieses Register, also gerade für den Teil, aus dem eines Tages der Zusatzbe-
darf an neuen Arbeitskräften geschöpft werden muss.108
To ensure the full employment of the available workforce, the index was intended to
provide oversight over the remaining human resources, women in particular. Apart
from the military draft, the index should be consulted in the same manner to register
106. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 56.
107. RdErl. des RMdI vom 15. Februar 1939, RMBliV, 321.
108. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 53-54.
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cohorts for non-military purposes. Liebermann lists compulsory vaccination and educa-
tion, the party organisations and the labour service among these secondary purposes.
Announcing the coming Volkskartei to the federal governments, Frick explained the Kre-
iskarteien would allow the district's register oces, ohne zeitraubende Umfragen bei
den Gemeinden [. . . ] Anfragen und Anforderungen militärischer und anderer Behörden
schnellsten nachzukommen.109 The index should be used to compile register-based sur-
veys. This included both comprehensive surveys as well as surveys targeted at a specic
demographic. In the manual for the index this principle is exemplied by a hypothet-
ical survey amongst graduates who could be identied in the Kreiskarteien and directly
contacted at their home address. This principle could be applied to any other feature
registered in the index, Liebermann set out,
gleich ob man nun an die akademisch Vorgebildeten oder z. B. an die Inhaber
von Kraftfahrzeug- oder Flugzeugführerscheinen, an Fremdsprachenkundige,
an ehemalige Auslandsdeutsche oder an besondere Gruppen von Spezialisten
herantreten will.110
In addition to the potential the index had for queries from central authorities, the manual
encouraged the local authorities to add locally relevant information to the system ac-
cording to their needs. Being linked with the registration system to keep the index
updated and have the cards follow their holders on the occasion of a change of address,
the Volkskartei nally introduced a unied system of record-keeping. Furthermore, the
index would give the police unprecedented access to personal data of the population that
simplied cases of uncertain identities. In that regard the manual remarked: Die Volks-
karteikarte wird vor allen Dingen dann ein ideales Erfassungsmittel sein, wenn ersteinmal
d i e K e n n k a r t e in Deutschland allgemein verbreitet ist.111 The obligation for all
citizens to carry ID cards had been introduced on 10th September 1939, yet without
penal provisions, so that the diusion was expected to increase only slowly. By adding
the ID cards to the index cards, the data set was enriched with a photograph, signature
and ngerprints. Beyond the comparatively rich data set, the Kreiskarteien facilitated
the localisation of individuals whose precise address was uncertain.
109. BArch R 1300008, Der Reichminister des Innern an die Herren Reichsstatthalter und Landesreg-
ierungen (auÿer Preuÿen), 17th February 1939.
110. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 52.
111. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, 58.
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Evaluation of the data
The `reichseinheitliche' evaluation of the index was ordered on 14th March 1940. Before
going into the details of the instructions, the decree once again sets out the purpose and
function of the index starting with the issue of distribution of the available workforce.
Turning to the draft, the decree recommended:
Soweit Wehrbezirkskommandos und Arbeitsämter sich mit der Einrichtung
der Volkskartei noch nicht vertraut gemacht haben sollten, empfehle ich
den Volkskarteibehörden, sie ihrerseits auf dieses Hilfsmittel aufmerksam zu
machen und ihnen Gelegenheit zu geben, die Einrichtung und Führung der
Volkskartei zu besichtigen.112
It is certainly noteworthy that the draft commissions had to be reminded of the existence
of the index even though it had been the Wehrmacht 's request for an age-based index
that had inspired the Volkskartei in the rst place. Finally, the decree emphasises:
Das Interesse der Reichsverteidigung erfordert es aber, daÿ alle Hilfsmittel,
die dem Ziele der siegreichen Beendigung des Krieges mittel- oder unmittel-
bar dienen können, voll eingesetzt werden.
Modest in tone, the decree tried to attach urgency to a consistent use of the index. To
that end, the register oces were told to enforce the use of the index. A central decree
that obliged the labour oces or the draft commissions to utilise the index was never
issued.
The initial analysis of the index consisted of tabbing the index cards of specic groups
as it had been tested during the trial. Of the index card's 14 tabs the rst four were
reserved for local purposes, for instance tabbing the members of voluntary re brigades in
the rural areas. The remaining tabs were reserved for the `reichseinheitliche Auswertung '
that was ordered in March 1940 by circular decree. For the nationwide tabbing it was
decided to mark the cards of those without Arbeitsbuch with a light-blue tab in the fth
eld. But the decree had to admit that this might prove dicult.
Der RAM [Reichsarbeitsminister] hat die Arbeitsämter infolge ihrer Über-
lastung für auÿerstande erklärt, den Volkskarteibehörden die Ausstellung
eines Arbeitsbuches jedesmal mitzuteilen. Die Arbeitsämter können auch
112. RdErl. des RFSSuChdDtPol. im RMdI. über Auswertung der Volkskartei vom 14. März 1940,
MBliV, 497.
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die Volkskarteibehörden nicht darüber unterrichten, wer seit der Errichtung
der Volkskartei ein Arbeitsbuch erhalten hat. Diese Kenntnis müssen sich
deshalb [. . . ] die Volkskarteibehörden selbst beschaen.
From the Labour Ministry's perspective the denial of cooperation was more than reason-
able as the management of the national workforce was at the heart of their institution.
During the discussions concerning the decommission of the index in 1943, Frick recalled:
Die Reichsarbeitsverwaltung hat vor allem der Aufstellung der Volkskartei
widersprochen, weil sie befürchtete, daÿ die Polizei damit ihr die Erfassung
und den Einsatz der Arbeitskräfte aus der Hand nehmen wollte.113
It is remarkable that the March 1940 decree openly addressed the Labour Ministry's
refusal to cooperate and did not oer a solution. And once again this shows that the
introduction of the index met with serious resistance from within the administration.
To close the resulting gap, the registry oces had to rely on the cumulative approach
of occasional rectication of the respective data. Cards of medical personnel had to
be marked with a white tab and the card owners listed and reported to the Health
Department or the District Veterinary Doctor (`beamteter Kreistierartzt ') respectively.
Cards of those with driving licences were tabbed in red.
The last step in the initial evaluation of the index was the attachment of the ID card
duplicates to the Volkskarteikarten. The most important eect of this measure was the
tabbing of the index cards of Jews.
Anläÿlich der Einordnung der K e n n k a r t e n v o n J u d e n (Jüdinnen)
[. . . ] sind gleichzeitig ihre Volkskarteikarten dadurch zu kennzeichnen, daÿ
auf ihnen über der Zahl 14 ein s c h w a r z e r Karteireiter befestigt wird.114
On 22nd August 1942 the requirement to combine the ID card duplicates was lifted.115
Duplicates of cards of Jews were successively transferred to the Reich Kinship Oce's
department in the Oranienburgerstraÿe. The federal governments were to report the
successful tabbing by 15th June 1940 to Himmler's oce. But numerous registry oces
failed to meet the respites, which were adjusted to 1st November that same year.116
113. BArch R 19 407, Der Reichsminister des Innern an den Leiter der Parteikanzlei Reichsleiter Martin
Bormann, 17th June 1943.
114. RdErl. des RFSSuChdDtPol. im RMdI. über Auswertung der Volkskartei vom 14. März 1940,
MBliV, 497.
115. RdErl. `Entlastung der Volkskarteibehörden', MBliV. 1731.
116. BArch R 70 155, Ausschnitt aus dem Ministerialblatt des Reichs- und Preussischen Ministerium
des Innern, RdErl. d. RFSSuChdDtPol im RMdI v. 14.3.1940. Auswertung der Volkskartei, and RdErl.
d. RFSSuChdDtPol im RMdI v. 25.7.1940, Auswertung der Volkskartei.
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The reports on `Gypsies'
In October 1941 a circular decree by Himmler titled `Eintragung der Zigeunereigen-
schaft in der Volkskartei und den Melderegistern' ordered that the results of the reports
(rassebiologische Gutachten) produced by Rudolf Ritter and his team at the Rassebiolo-
gische und bevölkerungspolitsche Forschungsstelle in Berlin Dahlem and associated with
the Reichsgesundheitsamt, were transferred to the registry oces (Melde- und Volks-
karteibehörden).117 Since the 1890s, the concept of `the Gypsy' had oscillated between
sociological and ethnic  respectively racial  denitions. The Nuremberg Laws were
intended to target Gypsies as well as Jews. But unlike Jews, where the documented reli-
gion of the ancestors allowed a comparatively simple discrimination of Jew and non-Jew,
there was no single criterion that had allowed a similar procedure to identify `Gypsies'.
Only in December 1938 did Rudolf Ritter establish a system comparable to the one
that categorised Jews to categorise Gypsies as `Zigeuner ', `Zigeunermischling ' or `Nicht-
Zigeuner '.
However, the method still required that the evaluated individuals had been identied
as possible `Gypsies' before, since Ritter relied on the data of the Criminal Police.
Karola Fings has highlighted that Ritter could not provide a clear-cut denition. Rather
than developing a method to identify `Gypsies', Ritter had monopolised the subjective
judgement traditionally practised by the police. And although the procedure deed
standardisation, Fings considered it the nal step in the racialisation of `Gypsies'.118
By August 1941 Ritter and his racial scientists had formalised their reports in a way
that they were ready to enter mass screenings and forward the reports to the Gestapo
and from there to the Volkskarteibehörden. By labelling individuals `Gypsy' in the
registers of the police registration system and the Volkskartei, it made the information
available to all branches of administration, thereby enabling an unprecedented unity in
administrative measures against those classied as such.119
117. RdErl. D. RFSSuChdDtPol. im RMdI v. 3-10.1941, RMBliV. 1767.
118. Karola Fings, `Rasse Zigeuner. Sinti und Roma im Fadenkreuz von Kriminologie und Rassen-
hygiene 19331945', in "Zigeuner" und Nation : Repräsentation - Inklusion - Exklusion, ed. Herbert
Uerlings and Iulia-Karin Patrut, Inklusion, Exklusion 8 (Frankurt am Main: Lang, 2008), 273310,
301-302.
119. Karola Fings, `Die Gutachtlichen Äuÿerungen der Rassehygienischen Forschungsstelle und ihr
Einuss auf die nationalsozialistische Zigeunerpolitk', in Zwischen Erziehung und Vernichtung. Zigeu-
nerpolitik und Zigeunerforschung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Michael Zimmermann (Stuttgart:
Steiner, 2007), 425459, 437-439.
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Draft and enrolment
The Volkskartei 's fundamental quality was its organisation in age-cohorts. The Wehr-
macht had demanded the connection of the register- and registry oces' data in 1935
in order to facilitate the process of identifying the draftees. Göring had announced the
eventual establishment of the index to the Reichsverteidigungsrat in November 1938. So
the new index was expected to primarily help full tasks connected to the distribution
of human resources for the war eort. However, during the rst covert mobilisation in
summer 1939, the joint draft commissions relied on the procedure developed in 1935.
The Verordnung über das Erfassungswesen dated 15th February 1937 remained in place
unaltered. This required the registry and register oces' cooperation, in order to check
the drafts' comprehensiveness that should have been replaced by the Volkskartei. As
the decree predates the announcement of the index, it is not mentioned in the text. A
1939 manual for the draft compiling all relevant laws and decrees does not mention the
Volkskartei at all, but speaks of polizeiliche Meldescheine, Einwohnerlisten u. dgl..120
This of course could include the Volkskartei once the Kreiskartei was successfully estab-
lished, but its utilisation was not mandatory. Only the 2nd edition from 1943 mentions
the index on two pages. The introduction briey lists the index among other registers
and a footnote to the sentence quoted above added:
Eine besonders wertvolle Unterlage ist, soweit erstellt, die Volkskartei.121
In case of an incomplete or non-existent Volkskartei a further footnote on the same page
advised the registrars to add the information about the recruits' assignments that was
to be registered with the index to the registration system in use. Despite the lack of
sources regarding the nationwide establishment of the index, the constraint regarding
the nationwide completion and the provision of make shift solutions in this semi-ocial
manual show that the establishment of the index was not accomplished in all regions
by 1943, more than three years after the initial survey. I will discuss these diculties
when we come to the Volkskartei 's decommissioning in 1943.122 For now it suces to
see that the Volkskartei did not achieve its main objective, the nationwide facilitation of
120. Karl Otto and Wolfgang Güldenpfennig, eds., Ersatzwesen: 1. Erfassungsverordnung. 2. Muster-
ungsverordnung. Textausg. zu den Erfassungs-, Musterungs- u. Aushebungsvorschriften mit Anm. u.
Sachreg. (Berlin: Vahlen, 1939), 15.
121. Karl Otto and Wolfgang Güldenpfennig, eds., Ersatzwesen: 1. Erfassungsverordnung. 2. Muster-
ungsverordnung. Textausg. zu d. Erfassungs-, Musterungs- u. Aushebungsvorschriften einschl. VO über
d. Wehrersatzwesen bei bes. Einsatz mit Anm. u. Sachreg., 2. (Berlin: Vahlen, 1943), 16. The index also
is not listed in the compilations headword register.
122. In chapter `Decommissioning of the Volkskartei in 1943', 184.
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the draft. This is not to say the index was not used to that end anywhere. In particular
the cities that had previously introduced the `Hanseatic system' quickly adapted to the
new index and integrated it in the daily routine including the organisation of the draft,
yet it did not release them from the obligation to check with the births places' registry
oces for missing draftees.
Enrolment in youth organisations
The Volkskartei 's capacity as an index of the youth diered from that for the adult
population. Its creation had been ordered by a separate decree. Since the children were
registered by their teachers, who had comparatively intimate knowledge of their pupils,
the children's index was both more accurate and comprehensive. Moreover, the children's
index was irreplaceable as no other index comprised this demographic on individual
index cards. With the exception of the administrative district of Potsdam, the creation
of the children's index had preceded the survey of the adult population. This was due
to practical reasons in order to register those who were to nish school that summer.
By contrast, in school they were still easy to locate and register. Afterwards they were
likely to change their place of residency. Neither the military nor the labour service were
obliged to register short term recruits during the summer's Volkskartei survey. For the
time until they registered again on the occasion of establishing a new place of residency,
they would be absent from the index. Since this cohort was of paramount importance
for the war eort, it was decided to conduct the school survey early in the year.123
Unlike the military draft, the draft for the Hitler Youth had been tested in Potsdam
prior to the nationwide implementation of the index and both methods, the compilation
of lists by the register oces as well as the use of the index by the local HJ leaders un-
der the registrar's supervision had proven successful. As the children's index had been
compiled prior to the adult index it was also completed earlier and, in October 1941, a
decree ordered the rst nationwide enrolment process relying on the Volkskartei for both
female and male cohorts of 1924 to 1928 and those born before the middle of the years of
1929. In January 1942 the NSDAP in Mark Brandenburg, whose Gauleiter, Stürtz, ap-
preciated the index in general, reported that they had to involve the local register oces
during the draft since they found daÿ die Unterlagen bei den Volkskarteibehörden nicht
mehr zutreend bzw. unstimming sind.124 Nevertheless, the decree had to admit excep-
123. Cf. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939), 63.
124. BLHA Rep. 2 A Pol. 2703, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, Hitler-Jugend, Gebiet
Mark-Brandenburg, Stabsleiter des Gebietes an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten der Regierung in
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tions for the territories where the index had not yet been established, namely, Austria
 now dubbed the Ostmark  and the Sudetenland. Registration with the Staatsjugend
was to be marked on the index cards in order to avoid duplicate registration.125
Potsdam, 1st January 1942.
125. RdErl. d. RFSSuChdDtPol. im RMdI v. 10.10.1941  OVuR III 4245 II/41.
6 Volkskartei and deportations
Even after the establishment of the Reichsmeldeordnung, the problem of identifying those
eligible for Reichsbürgerschaft remained. The logic of the Nuremberg Laws anticipated
the production of the Volksgemeinschaft by exclusion. Regarding statistics on Jews
Friedrich Bürgerdörfer had observed a particular nuisance in 1938:
Brauchbare zahlenmäÿige Unterlagen stehen bis jetzt nur für den Teil des
Judentums zur Verfügung, der sich zur mosaischen Religion bekennt oder ihr
rechtlich zugehört, nicht aber für Juden und Judenmischlinge, die auÿerhalb
der mosaischen Religionsgemeinschaft stehen und die durch den Austritt aus
ihrer angestammten Religion ihre blutsmäÿige Abstammung verdecken.1
Over this chapter I will assess the function the Volkskartei had in the negative forma-
tion of the Volksgemeinschaft by facilitating the identication and localisation of Jews
in Germany prior to deportation. I will initially trace the decision to include a ques-
tion on descent in the census on separate questionnaires before discussing the existing
historiography on the issue. In order to probe objections made to the relevance of the
census results in the identication of individual Jews brought forward by Jutta Wietog,
I will then reconstruct the processing of the census data and evaluate the informative
value of other sources on Germany's Jews.
When Liebermann introduced the concept of the Volkskartei 's secondary purposes in
1939, he listed a number of demographics whose members could be easily identied and
located since the required feature was registered with the index. Despite giving ample
examples of possible use, he omitted its potential to identify Germany's Jews. Yet, in
1937 the Sicherheitsdienst 's Hasselbacher had understood the Volkskartei as intrinsically
linked to the census' survey on descent.
The Volkskartei provided the infrastructure to organise knowledge on the population.
The data it contained initially was based on personal disclosure, with the exception
that cards of suspected Jews were labelled by the survey takers. Of the numerous
1. Burgdörfer, `Die Juden in Deutschland und der Welt', 152.
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complaints that had reached the Regierungspräsidenten in Potsdam, a single one had
addressed the issue of labelling the cards of Jews. Oberregierungsrat Stegemann from
Potsdam addressed Liebermann in January 1939 to discuss some recommendations for
the nationwide establishment of the Volkskartei. Just before closing his letter he notes:
Für ganz besonders bedenklich halte ich aber die Kenntlichmachung der Kar-
teiinhaber als Juden durch die Helfer, [. . . ] Die Möglichkeit, dass Personen
ohne es zu wissen in den Karteien als Juden geführt werden ist durchaus
vorhanden. Dies könnte zu ausserordentlichen Schädigungen und unter Um-
ständen Regressklagen der Betroenen gegen die Behörde führen.2
But the designers of the Volkskartei were well aware the pencil markings would not
necessarily provide reliable data, in particular, as the label did not reect the categories
introduced by the Nuremberg laws. Liebermann addressed the labelling of Jews and
possible unease about the categorisation by the survey takers. A collation of data from
various sources should nally lead to the identication of `the Jews':
Deshalb wird die Nachprüfung der Fälle nicht zu 100 Prozent ein richtiges
Ergebnis liefern. Daran braucht man sich aber nicht zu stoÿen; denn die Er-
fassung der Juden ist bereits auch von anderer Seite in die Wege geleitet. [. . . ]
der für die Volkszählung verwendete Fragebogen enthält auf einem Anlage-
bogen Fragen nach der Zugehörigkeit zur jüdischen Rasse. Die Überprüfung
wird aber noch auf einem anderen Weg getroen. Juden müssen für sich
Kennkarten als ihren ständigen Inlandsausweis beantragen, und ein Doppel
jeder ausgestellten Kennkarte wurde auch an die Volkskartei gegeben. Auf
diese Weise wurde die Kennzeichnung der Juden in den Volkskarteikarten
beinahe automatisch herbeigeführt.3
The Volkskartei combined three sources to identify Jews: the pencil markings of the
survey takers, the ID cards that Jews had to carry and the disclosure of the religious
status of the grandparents in the census 1939.
2. BLHA Rep. 2 A I Pol 2703, Oberregierungsrat Stegemann an Herrn Regierungsdirektor Freiherr
Liebermann von Sonnenberg, 6th January 1939.
3. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Volkskartei (1942), 37.
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6.1 1939 census: supplementary cards and the
identication of jews
The attachments (Anlagebogen) Liebermann was referring to are also known as the 1939
census supplementary cards (Ergänzungskarten). The census in 1939 was taken on 17th
May, before the Volkskartei survey. While the main questionnaire of the census was
almost identical to the one in 1933 a separate Ergänzungskarte would ask new questions
on descent and higher education. The Reich Statistical Oce, while not objecting to the
questions about `Volkstum', was not too enthusiastic about the inclusion of the ques-
tions on descent, that targeted Jews in the census.4 As Jutta Wietog elaborated, these
objections were not motivated by concerns about Jews in particular  the statisticians
had taken a similar stand in 1936 on the issue of disclosing farmer's livestock to the tax-
oces. But the interest of the nancial authorities in statistical data had existed already
during the times of the republic. So had the statisticians refusal. That individuals should
not suer any detriment as result of disclosing information was a longstanding principle
statisticians had defended before. It was grounded on the conviction that the public's
trust was the precondition for the survey's acceptance and the aggregation of meaningful
data.5 However, for the coming census the respective paragraph of the census law was
altered. The 1933 census had limited the census' questions on maritial status, place of
birth, religion, citizenship, mother-tongue, real estate, vocation and employment. More
importantly the law guaranteed:
Über die bei der Zählung über die Persönlichkeit des Einzelenen [. . . ] ge-
wonnenen Nachrichten ist Amtsgeheimnis zu wahren; sie dürfen nur zu stat-
istischen Arbeiten, nicht zu anderen Zwecken benutzt werden.6
For the 1939 census the same paragraph had amended Volkszugehörigkeit and blutmäÿige
Abstammung to the possible questions, and removed the limitation of the data's use.7
Instead, the implementation orders obliged the survey takers to maintain condential-
ity.8 This concern for privacy stands in stark contrast with the fact that in October
that very same year often the same personnel was incited to label alleged Jews during
the Volkskartei 's survey. So while the statistical oce had successfully stopped earlier
4. See chapter `Census and segregation', 113.
5. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 106-117.
6. RGBl. 199-200.
7. RGBl. I, 1053-1054.
8. Cf. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 113-114.
165
attempts on their data they failed to do so for the 1939 census. However, the objection
in itself conrms the statisticians' awareness of the plan to identify individuals using the
information collected. In contrast to Wietog's assumption that the Volkskartei 's survey
and the census collided, they appear closely connected and well attuned.9
Yet, the questions on descent were not included on the questionnaire for the census,
but were part of the so-called Ergänzungskarte that was to be returned to the survey
takers in a separate and closed envelope that even suggested a heightened level of privacy.
But the questionnaire also contained an excerpt from the census law to remind those
questioned that false declarations would be penalised. The supplement provided 14 lines
to list the members of a household including those temporarily absent and asked for the
name, date of birth and place of birth of each. The way the cards were designed promised
to register entire (nuclear) families at once. The question on descent (War oder ist einer
der vier Groÿeltern der Rasse nach Volljude? ) provided four boxes to complete asking
specically for each grandparent on the mother's and the father's side. Beyond that,
the questionnaire contained only two more questions. The rst enquired as to whether
or not the individual had nished a university degree the second inquired the university.
Judging from the limited use that could be made of the sparse declarations that went
beyond the individuals' descent, in particular compared to the respective question in the
Volkskartei 's survey later that year, it is safe to conclude that these additional questions
were not added on behalf of the Ministry of Education. Regarding the origins of the
supplementary cards' little is known.
I see two plausible explanations for the fact that the questions on descent were not
included with the census questionnaire. For once, as the statistical oce had insisted
on some standards of privacy, the additional questionnaire may have resulted as a com-
promise from the negotiations with the Ministry of the Interior so that the questionable
questionnaire was not directly part of the census. On the other hand, a more tech-
nical problem may have led to the separate questionnaire. As had been the case with
the previous census material, the questionnaires were archived at the statistical oces
for several years. Separate analysis of the data or collation with other registers would
have required duplication. Separating the questions of descent from the general census'
questionnaires thus facilitated separate processing.
This prompts the question of why a declaration of descent had not been included with
the Volkskartei 's survey later in the year. As the sources remain silent in that regard,
this once again is a matter of plausibility. The Reich Ministry of the Interior may have
9. Cf. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 159.
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`borrowed' from the statistical oces' credibility. During the test run the index had
raised suspicion as to its utilisation. The inclusion of the question on descent in the
Volkskartei 's survey that was clearly designed to register individuals might have incited
the provision of misleading declarations. Censuses, on the other hand, traditionally pro-
duced summarising results that did not imply individual targeting. The inclusion of the
questions on descent with the census certainly has a deceptive side. But moreover, there
were technical reason for this decision. The annual tax survey had proven inadequate
due to its limited scope. The census and the Volkskartei 's survey were meant to screen
the entire population. But factually, the index was limited to German citizens while the
census comprised the entire resident population (ortsansässige Bevölkerung) and thus
included resident aliens. The census hence promised more comprising results than any
of the other measures.
Supplementary cards in historiography
Before retracing the process of tabulation and its implications for the interpretation of
the events, I need to clarify some of the controversy that evolved on the subject of the
Ergänzungskarten. I have already juxtaposed the main positions in the section `Census
and segregation'. In 1984 Götz Aly and Karl-Heinz Roth considered the census supple-
mentary cards crucial in the identication of Jews in Germany as they were immediately
compiled into a Judenkartei  a hypothesis disproven by Jutta Wietog in 2001. Instead
she argued that the Statistical Oce withheld respective data and that several other
sources, in particular the tax surveys and a survey by the Reichsvereinigung der Juden
in Deutschland, provided similar information.10
That same year two other books relevant to the processing of the supplementary cards
were published; Diana Schulle touched on the issue of the supplementary cards in her
work on the Reich Kinship Oce.11 Edwin Black's IBM and the Holocaust focused
solely on IBM's (or more precisely Dehomag's) involvement with the census. Both
rely on Aly and Roth in those parts of their research regarding the Ergänzungskarten.12
10. See chapter `Census and segregation, 113. Cf. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung ; Wietog,
Volkszählung NS.
11. Diana Schulle, Das Reichssippenamt. Eine Institution nationalsozialistischer Rassenpolitik (Berlin:
Logos, 2001).
12. Edwin Black, IBM und der Holocaust. Die Verstrickung des Weltkonzerns in die Verbrechen der
Nazis (München: Propyläen, 2001). Black has not contributed to a better understanding. In crucial
points his line of argument depends either on Aly and Roth or more puzzling on Kistermann, whose
article replies to Milton and Luebke's Locating the Victims and is explicitly called Locating the
victims. The nonrole of punched card technology and census work. Kistermann argues convincingly,
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Black's interest in the topic evolved from an article by Milton and Luebke from 1994
in which they focus on IBM's involvement with the identication of Jews and Roma.13
Their article was heavily contested by former IBM employee Kistermann holding the
view that at the occasion of the 1939 German Census, every step had already been
taken to identify and locate the German Jews, thereby coming to a similar conclusion
Wietog arrived at four years later.14 Jutta Wietog has rst identied and claried Aly
and Roth's misinterpretation of a circular from the Reich Ministry of the Interior in
which the Volkstumskartei (Folkdom Card Index) was introduced to the authorities.15
Auf meine und des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD gemeinsame An-
regung hat das Statistische Reichsamt aus dem Urmaterial der Volkszählung
vom 17. Mai 1939 eine Kartei der Reichsangehörigen nichtdeutscher Volks-
zugehörigkeit (Volkstumskartei) erstellt. [. . . ] Die mir unterstehende Pub-
likationsstelle, die diese Kartei verwahrt, ist angewiesen, auf Anfrage einzelne
Auskünfte daraus zu erteilen.16
Obviously unaware of the decision to produce indices on ethnic groups other than Jews,
Aly and Roth confused the Volkstumskartei and the Ergänzungskarten. This led them to
believe that the Ergänzungskarten, after being analysed in the Reich Statistical Oce,
were sent to the `Publikationsstelle Dahlem' where the cards were purportedly used to
produce the `Volkstumskartei' comprising data on the entire German Jewery including
Jews dened as being mixed-blood by the Nuremberg laws.17 While it is correct that
the Volkstumskartei was compiled from census data and maintained by archivists at
the Publikationsstelle Dahlem, this index did not comprise data on German Jews but
of citizens of the German Reich of `foreign folkdom' (that is Czechs, Ukranians, Croats
or Poles).18 This data, however, did not stem from the Ergänzungskarten but from the
question on mother tongue asked in the census questionnaire.
that the supplementary cards were not processed with punch cards but manually. Cf. Friedrich W.
Kistermann, `Locating the victims. The nonrole of punched card technology and census work', Annals
of the History of Computing, IEEE (Los Alamitos) 19, no. 2 (1997): 3145, 39.
13. David Martin Luebke and Sybil Milton, `Locating the victim: An overview of census-taking, tab-
ulation technology and persecution in Nazi Germany', Annals of the History of Computing, IEEE (Los
Alamitos) 16, no. 3 (1994): 2539.
14. Kistermann, `Nonrole', 41.
15. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 167.
16. As cited in: Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 95.
17. Aly and Roth, 95.
18. Cf. Ingo Haar, `Bevölkerungspolitische Szenarien und bevölkerungswissenschaftliche Expert-
ise im Nationalsozialismus. Die rassistische Konstruktion des Fremden und das `Grenz- und Aus-
landsdeutschtum'', in Das Konstrukt `Bevölkerung' vor, im und nach dem `Dritten Reich', ed. Rainer
Mackensen (Wiesbaden: Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 340370, 358; Wietog, Volkszählung NS,
167.
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Gerlinde Grahn, who based her summary on the Federal Archive's holdings of the
Reich Kinship Oce on Aly and Roth's ndings, happened to make a further important
slip, turning the Folkdom Regisitry (`Volkstumskartei' ) into the People's Card Index
(`Volkskartei ').19 In succession Diana Schulle considered the Volkskartei to be identical
with the Ergänzungskarten and believed that the data on Jews derived from the census
was duplicated.20 She is correct in stating that the Ergänzungskarten  with the excep-
tion of the cards from Austria  eventually went to the Reichskinship Oces' archive
at Oranienburger Straÿe 28-29, in the cellar rooms of the `Gesamtarchiv der deutschen
Juden' in Berlin where the Kinship oce also maintained their `Fremdstämmigenkartei '
 but the sources do not mention duplicates of any sort.
Beyond that, Wietog made some interesting objections to Aly and Roth's ndings
which need to be considered. Wietog points out that the collation of the Ergänzungskarte
and the Volkskartei and the Police Registration System only started 31st March 1941 
22 months after the census.21
This led Wietog to suggest the compilation was deliberately delayed by the Statistical
Oce in order to render the results useless once they were nally transferred to the
Reich Kinship Oce.22 However, besides alluding to the oce's long standing-tradition
of respect for privacy she refrained from laying out a possible motivation to do so.
Instead, Wietog argued, the necessary data was provided by Jewish compulsory rep-
resentatives.23 Haar has doubted these ndings, arguing the summarised data published
in early 1940 already suced to facilitate deportations.24 Despite Haar's early objec-
tions Wietog's work presents the current state of research so that the Federal Archive
in Lichterfelde holding the supplementary cards today concludes:
Ob das Material wirklich für die Vorbereitung der Deportationen benutzt
wurde, wie oft vermutet wird, lieÿ sich bislang trotz einzelner Verletzungen
des Statistikgeheimnisses nicht nachweisen und ist aufgrund der Tatsache,
dass das Material erst im April/Mai 1941 in den Meldestellen und ab Januar
1942 im Reichssippenamt vorlag, eher unwahrscheinlich.25
19. Gerlinde Grahn, `Der Teilbestand des Reichssippenamtes im Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Potsdam',
ed. Deutschland Archivverwaltung, Archivmitteilungen (AM); Zeitschrift für Archivwesen, archivalische
Quellenkunde und historische Hilfswissenschaften (Potsdam-Bornim) 41 (1991): 269274, 272.
20. Schulle, Reichssippenamt, 230.
21. BArch R 19317; Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 161.
22. Wietog, 191.
23. Wietog, 192.
24. Haar, `Szenarien', 357.
25. Nicolai M. Zimmermann, `Die Ergänzungskarten für Angaben über Abstammung und Vorbildung
der Volkszählung vom 17. Mai 1939', https://www.bundesarchiv .de/DE/Content/Publikationen/
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Moreover, Wietog's research informs public perception of the 1939 census. An article
on thethirtieth anniversary of the 1987 census reported that Aly and Roth's inuential
interpretation of the census inzwischen von der Historikerin Jutta Wietog widerlegt
wurde.26
The main questions Wietog leaves us with are whether a) the statistical oces released
the Ergänzungskarten in March 1941 and b) this can be rightfully considered a delib-
erate delay and c) whether this date can be considered too late to have facilitated the
deportations. Furthermore, the question is raised as to whether the cards really arrived
at the Reichssippenamt 's archive in January 1942. I will discuss Wietog's objections
over the course of the following sections.
I will argue that the collation with the Volkskartei was the essential step in the iden-
tication and localisation of Jewish deportees. The creation of a single index  a central
Judenkartei  was neither necessary nor planned. To understand how the statistical
oces could have delayed the processing of the Ergänzungskarten I will rst take a
closer look at the mechanics of tabulation before placing the release date in its historical
context.
Mechanics of tabulation
The analysis of the census was overshadowed by the attack on Poland that immediately
impacted the administration. To adapt to the altered conditions on the 6th September
1939 a meeting in Berlin's Statistical Oce gathered all parties involved with the census.
In the face of the war authorities had to prioritise those aspects of the census most im-
portant to them given the labour-intensive processing. The Reichsnährstand and the
Reichsernährungsministerium (Reich Food Agency and Reich Ministry of Food) deman-
ded to rst process the general census data on the population's order by gender and age.
This data was deemed important to provide the statistical base to ensure food supplies
for the population. The second priority was set by the Ministry of the Interior and
Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS who demanded the swift processing of data
on citizens of alien countries for the`Ausländerkartei, German citizens of foreign des-
cent for the Volkstumskartei and of Jews and `Jews of mixed-blood'. The Wehrmacht 's
Supreme Command and the Labour Ministry had to accept a delayed processing of the
Aufsaetze/aufsatz-zimmermann-ergaenzungskarten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, 1.
26. Detlef Borchers, `Vor 30 Jahren. Die letzte groÿe Volkszählung', 2017, https://www.heise.de/
newsticker/meldung/Vor- 30- Jahren-Die- letzte- grosse-Volkszaehlung- 3725371.html. The German
Wikipedia page on the 1939 census also references Wietog's ndings: `Volkszählung im Deutschen
Reich 1939', https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volksz%C3%A4hlung_im_Deutschen_Reich_1939.
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vocational census. The agricultural workplace data's analysis was reduced and that of
other industries was postponed for a later decision. This so-called `Sofortprogramm' (Im-
mediate Program) was agreed upon and put into practice while other parts of the census
such as the processing of data regarding higher education from the Ergänzungskarten
were postponed indenitely.27
Regarding the data on Jews, research seemingly has overlooked an important detail.
Not only did the Ergänzungskarten for the rst time allow quantication and identica-
tion of `Jews of mixed-blood' as dened by the Nuremberg Laws, but the general census
questionnaire allowed the identication of intermarriages of Jews and non-Jews too.
Auf der Zählkarte für die Eheschlieÿungen ist eindeutig für Mann und Frau
danach gefragt, ob die Eheschlieÿenden deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes
sind, oder ob sie Mischling 1. bzw. 2. Grades oder ob sie Volljuden (Gel-
tungsjuden) seien. Die Auswertung dieser Angaben ist in einer Sondertabelle
über die Eheschlieÿungen, bei denen nichtarische Personen bzw. Mischlinge
beteiligt sind, gegeben.28
As questions on descent were only asked on the Ergänzungskarten, the data had obviously
been correlated with the general census data in order to produce the tables on inter-
marriage.
While the Ergänzungskarten were processed manually, it was dierent with the data
on intermarriages derived from the main census questionnaire. Since these questions
were part of the general census, the data was processed by machines.29
I will now examine the processing of the census in the Statistical Oces in more
detail. Josef Griesmeyer, involved with the census for the Württemberg Statistical Oce,
described the processing of statistical data in great detail for a publication honouring
Friedrich Zahn in 1940:
Bei der Aufbereitung ist zunächst zu unterscheiden: 1. die Prüfung auf Voll-
ständigkeit des Erhebungsmaterials und die Prüfung und Berichtigung der
Antworten im Zählpapier, 2. die Gruppierung und Auszählung des Inhalts
27. BArch R 43 II 591a, Sofort-Programm, Statistisches Reichsamt, 6th September 1939.
28. Josef Götz, `Rasseforschung und Statistik', in Die Statistik in Deutschland nach ihrem heutigen
Stand: Ehrengabe für Friedrich Zahn (Berlin: Verl. für Sozialpolitik, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1940),
185191, 191. Cf. Roderich Plate, `Die erste groÿdeutsche Volks- Berufs- und Betriebszählung', Allge-
meines statistisches Archiv (AStA) Journal of the German Statistical Society (Heidelberg) 28 (1939):
421436, 429.
29. Cf. `Hollerith-Tabelliermaschinen Type D11 und Type D9', Hollerith-Nachrichten (Berlin) 74
(June 1937): 10221024.
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der Zählpapiere. Der Auszählung schlieÿt sich die Summenbildung mit der
Aufstellung von Tabellen an. [ . . . ] Bei Individualfragebogen besteht die
weitere Arbeit nach der Auszeichnung in der `Sortierung' oder `Auslegung',
d. h. die Fragebogen werden nach Gebieten (Gemeinde, Kreis usw.) wie auch
nach bestimmten Merkmalen, nach Gruppen, Klassen, Arten, Gröÿen usw.
zu besonderen Packen sortiert (gruppiert). [. . . ] Nach jedem Sortiergang
werden die dabei angefallenen Packen von Zählkarten `abgezählt' und die
Ergebnisse in eine Hilfsliste eingetragen[. . . ].30
Most of the processing consists of physically grouping census cards according to territ-
ory or trades. These stacks of cards comprising individual cards sharing one or more
trades are then counted to summarise the ndings. The process remains the same
whether done manually or using punch-card technology, hier tritt dann an die Stelle
des handgeschriebenen Zählblättchens ein mechanisch gelochtes Zählblättchen, die sog.
Lochkarte.31 In an article on the use of punch cards during 1939's census, Franz Hieÿ
summarises:
Nach dem letzten Sortiergang liegen schlieÿlich die Lochkarten in jenen Teil-
gesamtheiten vor, welche den auszuzählenden Merkmalsgruppen oder Ver-
bindungen von solchen entsprechen. Die Auszählung dieser Teilgesamtheiten
hat einen logischen Sinn und erfolgt gleichzeitig mit der Sortierung.32
The above is true for all statistical investigations, regardless of its objects  be it com-
modities or people. Its results are stacks of cards and lists summarising the items.
Usually cards are primarily organised in stacks for certain territories and only then ac-
cording to certain criteria. Each sorting process hence results in smaller stacks sharing
the trades from the above while adding new ones.
The questionnaires of the census were sorted and `signiert ' (classied) in the local
statistical oces and then sent to the Reichs Statistical Oce to be processed with
punch card machines.33 However, this was dierent to the Ergänzungskarten which were
processed by the Reich Oce for Prussia, Oldenburg, Lippe, Schaumburg Lippe and the
Saarland while elsewhere the local statistical oces were in charge. After comparison
with the census schedules they were sorted in three categories: non-Aryans, people
30. Josef Griesmayer, `Erhebungs- Aufbereitungs- und Tabellierungstechnik', in Die Statistik in
Deutschland nach ihrem heutigen Stand: Ehrengabe für Friedrich Zahn (Verl. für Sozialpolitik,
Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1940), 12636, 131.
31. Griesmayer, 134.
32. Franz Hieÿ, `Mechanik der statistischen Aufbereitung', Allgemeines statistisches Archiv (AStA)
Journal of the German Statistical Society (Heidelberg) 31 (1943): 311329, 319.
33. Cf. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 135.
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with higher education, and others.34 The cards of the last two categories remained
unprocessed and were soon deleted while the further processing of the Ergänzungskarten
of Jews was documented by yet another statistician:
Zunächst erfolgt eine weitgehende regionale Aufgliederung der Zahl der Juden
und Mischlinge 1. bzw. 2. Grades unter Berücksichtigung ihres Religions-
bekenntnisses, ebenso eine Aufgliederung nach Geschlecht, Alter und Fami-
lienstand.35
The rst step in the sorting process was formed by an `extensive regional sorting' which
then was gradually rened. To summarise the nationwide number of Jews and Jews
of mixed-blood, all the Ergänzungskarten were organised in stacks of cards comprising
the data of Jews of dierent racial degrees in separate stacks for each region. The
summarised data was reported to the Berlin Oce by 11th November 1939.36 Due to
the small number of the cards and the fact that the local statistical oces had no access
to punch card or sorting machines, the Ergänzungskarten were processed manually. So
when the results of the census regarding Jews were circulated on 15th January 194037 and
published in the journal of the Reich Statistical Oce in March 194038 these separate
stacks were available at the respective statistical oces. Yet, Wietog argued:
Im Februar 1940 lagen die vorläugen Endergebnisse der Judenzählung vor.
Die Statistiker brauchten noch ein volles Jahr, um die Ergänzungskarten
zum Melderegisterabgleich freizugeben. In der Zwischenzeit hatte es die er-
sten Deportationen gegeben. Als die Karten schlieÿlich im April/Mai an die
Meldestellen gingen, waren die Daten zwei Jahre alt.39
From a technical point of view, Wietog's assumption that nal results were deliberately
withheld by the Reich Statistical Oce until March 1941 is not convincing as the compil-
ation of the summary gures for the districts was nished in November 1939. Thereafter,
the stacks of cards remained idle until they were nally sent to the registry oces.
34. Kistermann, `Nonrole', 39.
35. Götz, `Rasseforschung und Statistik', 190.
36. Kistermann, `Nonrole', 39.
37. BArch 1501 5519, Circular of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, 15th January 1940, 407.
38. Statistisches Reichsamt, ed., Wirtschaft und Statistik; Sonderhefte, vol. 20 (Stuttgart: Kohlham-
mer, March 1940), 8487.
39. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 191.
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Volkskartei and Ergänzungskarten
By the end of July 1939 the Reich Statistical Oce had gathered the statisticians in-
volved in the census in Berlin to discuss the state of the survey. All of them  including
Burgdörfer and Griesmeier  complained about attempts by the administration and
party to access the Ergänzungskarten prior to or during processing. Griesmeier also
reports in October 1939 that his Württemberg Statistical Oce was approached by the
mayor of Stetten, who demanded the supplementary cards of his district in order to com-
plete his Volkskartei.40 At the time, these advances were stopped so as not to delay the
compilation of the summary gures. Nevertheless, the advances illustrate how various
actors considered the respective data to be valuable information. After the summarised
data was reported to Berlin and published, stacks of Ergänzungskarten were kept at the
statistical oces.
Only on 31st March 1941 was a letter sent to all administrative authorities (with the
exception of Danzig and Marienwerder) and to all existing Volkskarteibehörden. On
behalf of Himmler, it informed the recipients that the statistical oces would start
sending Ergänzungskarten of Personen mit zwei oder mehr jüdischen Groÿeltern to
the district commissioners or head mayor (in charge of the Kreiskarteien) who would
forward them to the mayor's Urkarteien to be collated with Volkskartei and Police
Registration System (Karteien des polizeilichen Meldewesens). Hereby, the information
on descent was added to the Volkskartei. The notication system that was designed to
allow seamless tracing of individuals would ensure that persons who had moved in the
period between the census and collation were identied and their cards labelled at their
current address. The cards would follow the card-holders on the occasion of change of
residency and thus allow swift identication and localisation. The return of the cards
was expected after four weeks from smaller municipalities and eight weeks from cities
with over 10,000 inhabitants.
Contrary to Wietog's understanding it was not the Statistical Oce but Himmler in
his capacity as Head of the German Police who had ordered the release of the Ergän-
zungskarten. The circular stressed the informative value of the cards and informed the
registry oce that, after being returned, the cards were to be transferred to the Reich
Kinship Oce.41 But on the issue of the collation of the two data sets  the Ergän-
zungskarten and the Volkskartei  Wietog's argument remains vague at best. Wietog
40. Cf. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 131.
41. BArch 19 317, Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern,
An die Höheren Verwaltungsbehörden (ausser eingegliederte Ostgebiete, jedoch Reg. Präsidenten in
Danzig und Marienwerder, 31st March 1941, 319-320.
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even points out that the process had led to several corrections in both data sets, and
concludes on the issue of data collation:42
Für die Deportationen des Jahres 1940 standen die Angaben aus den Ergän-
zungskarten nicht zur Verfügung, doch für die im Oktober 1941 einsetzenden
systematischen Judentransporte, [. . . ] zwischen dem 1. Oktober 1941 und
dem 1. Januar 1943 [. . . ], können über die Volkskartei und die Meldere-
gister Informationen an die Gestapo gelangt sein, um Deportationslisten zu
erstellen. Die Melderegister werden auch immer wieder als eine Basis für die
Deportationslisten genannt. Und auch die Volkskartei soll für die Zusam-
menstellung der Transporte genutzt worden sein.43
Nevertheless, when summarising her ndings Wietog maintains, albeit vague:
Über die Volkskartei und die Melderegister haben aus der Zählung ab Mitte
bis Ende 1941 Daten für die Judenverfolgung zur Verfügung gestanden, ohne
daÿ gesagt werden kann, wie weit sie tatsächlich benutzt wurden. Die Über-
gabe der Unterlagen an das Reichssippenamt hat wahrscheinlich für die De-
portationen ebenfalls keine groÿe Rolle gespielt [. . . ].44
This reasoning conveys the notion that the Ergänzungskarten were not relevant for identi-
fying Jews for deportations. The argument is eventually based on the chronology of
events and tainted by Wietog's inaccurate treatment of dates.45 Before contextualising
the processing of the Ergänzungskarten in the chronology of the deportations, I will
thus examine the further processing of the cards in the Reichssippenamt (Reich Kinship
Oce).
Reichssippenamt
Himmler's decree of 31st March 1941 announcing the transferral of the Ergänzungskarten
to the registry oces also ordered that after collation the cards were to be sent to the
Reich Statistical Oce, which would eventually forward the cards to the Reichssip-
penamt.46 The Reichssippenamt was not informed and enquired about the details in
42. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 163.
43. Wietog, 168.
44. Wietog, 194.
45. Himmler's announcement that the supplementary cards was issued 31th March, in Wietog's sum-
mary this moved to `mid 1941'.
46. BArch 19 317, Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern,
An die Höheren Verwaltungsbehörden (ausser eingegliederte Ostgebiete, jedoch Reg. Präsidenten in
Danzig und Marienwerder), 31st March 1941, 319-320.
175
June 1941, prompted by a letter from Düsseldorf's Landessippenamt.47 Back in May
the regional oce had informed its superior oce in Berlin that the collation of the
Ergänzungskarten and the Volkskartei was proceeding swiftly and expected to nish
before schedule. Thus it enquired to the Reichssippenamt whether these cards could
pass through their oce in order to complete a local Fremdstämmigenkartei that com-
prised information on `Juden und Judenmischlinge' before transferral to Berlin. Ger-
hard Kayser, head of the department in charge of hereditary documents, sent a dilatory
reply in June in which he oered to temporarily transfer the cards back to Düsseldorf
after receiving them from the statistical oce.48 But his superior Knost approved of
the procedure and instructed the Head of the Düsseldorf Police to comply with the
request, as the local Fremdstämmigenkartei von wesentlicher Bedeutung für die Durch-
führung bestimmter bevölkerungspolitischer Maÿnahmen ist.49 Meanwhile, Kayser had
discussed the issue with Regierungsassesor Baethge overseeing the collation process in
Berlin's Police Department and Regierungsinspektor Pöhlmann of the Reich Statistical
Oce who did not approve. Kayser thus informed the Landessippenamt :
Es [the Reich Statistical Oce] will bei Ihnen auch keine Ausnahme machen,
wobei darauf hingewiesen wird, daÿ ja ein Teil der örtlichen Polizeibehörden
im Rheinland die Ergänzungskarten sowieso schon zurückgesandt hat, sodaÿ
Sie das Material also mit Ihren derzeitigen Maÿnahmen doch nicht voll-
ständig erhalten würden. Unter diesen Umständen bleibt nur übrig, daÿ Sie
sich noch 2-3 Monate gedulden, bis mir die Karten vom Statistischen Reichs-
amt übergeben worden sind. Ich werde Ihnen danach diejenigen Karten, die
von Ihnen noch nicht ausgewertet worden sind zustellen. Soweit die örtlichen
Polizeibehörden ohne Kenntnis der Absicht des Statistischen Reichsamtes
bereits überlassen haben oder noch überlassen wollen, wird nichts im Wege
stehen.50
Obviously the process of copying the data was already underway in Düsseldorf's Landes-
sippenamt and the Berlin oce did not object. As promised the central oce provided
the missing cards, but only in December 1943.51 In May 1944 the Landessippenamt
47. BArch 1509 1729, Kayser (Reichssippenamt) an den Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen
Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern, 26th June 1941.
48. BArch R 1509 1729, Kayser an den Herrn Oberpräsidenten der Rheinprovinz (Verwaltung des
Provinzialverbandes) Landessippenamt, 9th June 1941.
49. BArch R 1509 1729, Der Direktor des Reichssippenamtes dem Herrn Polizeipräsidenten in Düssel-
dorf, 26th June 1941.
50. BArch R 1509 1729, Kayser an den Herrn Oberpräsidenten der Rheinprovinz (Verwaltung des
Provinzialverbandes) Landessippenamt, 26th June 1941.
51. BArch R 1509 1729, Kayser an das Landessipenamt Düsseldorf, Betr.: Ergänzungbogen zur Volk-
szählung 1939, 15th December 1943.
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informed Kayser  who had previously asked when to expect the return of the cards
 that the process of copying the documents was proceeding only slowly due to the
augenblicklichen anormalen Verhältnisse.52 Despite the unusual circumstances, the
Ergänzungskarten were still considered a valuable source.
Similarly, in September 1941 the Gausippenamt in Vienna expressed the intent to copy
the data before forwarding the Ergänzungskarten to Berlin. This time Kayser objected
to the plan
Schlieÿlich befürchte ich, daÿ bei einer auch nur vorübergehenden Abgabe der
Karten an andere Stellen der jetzige Bestand nicht unversehrt bleibt. Das
hat sich, wenn auch nur in vereinzelten Fällen, schon bei der kurzfristigen
Überlassung der Karten an die Bürgermeister und Staatlichen Polizeiver-
waltungen zur Vervollständigung der Karteien des polizeilichen Meldewesens
und der Volkskartei gezeigt.53
The document suggest that Kayser had already received some regional cards or was
otherwise well informed about their current state. But in spite of Kayser's objections,
the Austrian Ergänzungskarten were never transferred to the Reichssippenamt in Berlin.
In August 1942 the Reichssippenamt 's Jahnke noted:
Die Ergänzungskarten aus dem Altreichs-Gebiet und dem Sudetengau liegen
bereits bei Herrn Arndt in der Oranienburgerstraÿe vor. Die Ergänzungs-
karten der Reichsgaue der Ostmark stehen noch aus.54
According to Exner and Schimany, who by and large follow Wietog's line of argument,
the Austrian Ergänzungskarten remained in Austria and were destroyed in 1945.55 Their
ndings that in Austria the Ergänzungskarten were not used to identify Jews56 deserve
renewed scrutiny in the light of the Vienna Gausippenamt 's request for the cards, in
particular as they conrm the existence of an Austrian Judenkartei.
The mode and point in time of the cards' transferral from the Reich Statistical Oce
to the Reichssippenamt is still uncertain. Some cards were sent to the statistical oce
52. BArch R 1509 1729, Landessippenamt Düsseldorf an den Herrn Direktor des Reichssippenamtes
Abt. III, 6th May 1944.
53. BA R1509 1040, Kayser an den Herrn Reichsminister des Innern, Betrit Ergänzungskarten über
die Abstammung aus der Volkszählung 1939, 14th October 1941.
54. BArch R 39 803, Note to the les, Jahnke, 5th August 1942.
55. Cf. Gudrun Exner and Peter Schimany, `Die Volkszählung von 1939 in Österreich und die Erfas-
sung der österreichischen Juden', in Bevölkerungsforschung und Politik in Deutschland im 20. Jahrhun-
dert, ed. Rainer Mackensen (Wiesbaden: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 137160, 104.
56. Cf. Exner and Schimany, 116.
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in June 1941, as we have seen above. Whether the statistical oce collected all cards to
send them over to the Reichssippenamt at once or transferred complete regional stacks
in several instances is unclear. In September 1941 the statistical oce reminded the
districts in default to comply by 25th of the same month. The cards from Württemberg
were transferred only in January 1942.57 The cards' presence in their entirety  with the
exception of the Austrian set  in the Reichssippenamt is documented in August 1942
at the latest  but possibly earlier since the document seems unrelated to the receipt of
the cards by the Reichssippenamt. Whether the time in between was used by other Gau-
or Landessippenämter than Düsseldorf (and possibly Austria) also remains unresolved.
Wietog believes the cards in their entirety were transferred to the Reichssippenamt in
early 1942 and argues with regard to their possible further utilisation:
Geht man davon aus, daÿ das Reichssippenamt die Informationen auf den
Ergänzungskarten zunächst mit den eigenen Daten verglichen hat, so dürfte
dies bei über 330 000 Angaben nicht von heute auf morgen möglich gewesen
sein. Ehe auch hier  falls man das überhaupt wollte  nochmals die Adressen
auf den neusten Stand gebracht waren muÿten Monate vergehen. Aber war
das für die Gestapo und ihrem Ziel, die Juden nach dem Osten in die Ver-
nichtungslager zu deportieren, noch von Interesse? Die Deportationen waren
um diese Zeit schon voll im Gange. [. . . ] fast alle Informationen, die die
Gestapo brauchte, hatte sie um diese Zeit schon zusammen. Und sie hatte
sich dabei auch des Wohl perdesten Mittels bedient, das man sich vorstel-
len kann: der Mitarbeit der Opfer, die zum Teil die Deportationslisten selbst
zusammenstellen muÿten.58
This conclusion is based on the assumption that the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in
Deutschland had the required data available in their indices. It furthermore implies that
the local representatives of the Reichsvereinigung were willing to expose individuals
who had previously escaped registration by the pursuers. To evaluate this conclusion,
the next section analyses the sources the Reichsvereinigung could access to identify
previously unidentied `Rassejuden'.
57. Cf. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 163-164.
58. Wietog, 192.
178
Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland
In September 1933 the most important Jewish organisations in Germany joined forces in
order to eciently respond to the threats presented by the new rulers and founded the
Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden. But in July 1939 the organisation lost its volun-
tary and independent status. Now dubbed Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland
the Berlin oce was to take orders from the Reichs Ministry of the Interior  and
thus from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and the Gestapo  and coordinate the jüdis-
che Kultusvereinigungen that were designated to its local branches. Aside of exception
for couples in childless mixed marriages, all Geltungsjuden were by act of the decree
members of the new organisation. And while schooling and welfare remained part of
its responsibilities, the main purpose was die Auswanderung der Juden zu fördern.59
In the course of the 1938 pogroms, the Reichssippenamt had moved its archive into the
building of the Jewish community in Berlin, so that by 1939 both archives resided in
the building on Oranienburgerstraÿe.60 Here, the Reichsvereinigung in succession of the
previous organisations maintained the Berlin membership roaster. Likewise, the local
Kultusgemeinden did this for their respective jurisdictions. In Berlin the register called
`Katatster ', was alphabetically organised and limited to the members of the Kultusver-
einigung. Due to the organisation of the register Diana Schulle concluded:
Mögen in einem frühen Stadium der Berliner Transporte jüdische Stellen
noch einen gewissen Einuÿ auf die Zusammensetzung der Transportlisten
gehabt haben, ist dies später, als nach Straÿenzügen und Häusern deportiert
wurde, mehr als unwahrscheinlich.61
Despite the regional dierences in the organisation of the deportations, in many places
the Gestapo tasked the local Kultusgemeinden with compiling the lists.62 From the
Gestapo's perspective the focus of the planning for the deportations was a logistical
problem. The local Kultusgemeinde were usually given a quota that they had to meet
59. RGBl. 1097.
60. The Kultusvereinigung also maintained indices on Jews that had exiled and those deported. But
these were maintained in the organisations oce in the Kantstraÿe and only transferred to the Or-
anienburgerstraÿe in 1943, after the Kultusvereinigung was liquidated. Cf. Schulle, Reichssippenamt,
359.
61. Schulle, 357.
62. Beate Meyer, `Handlungsräume regionaler jüdischer Repräsentanten 1941-1945', in Die Deporta-
tion der Juden aus Deutschland: Pläne - Praxis - Reaktionen; 1938 - 1945, ed. Birthe Kundrus and
Beate Meyer, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 20 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 6385,
66.
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by choosing individuals. As Ingo Haar has pointed out, in order to address these logist-
ical issues, the summary results from the Ergänzungskarten published in 1940 suced to
estimate the scope of deportations and assign quotas to individual communities.63 Beate
Meyer has analysed the room for manoeuvre the local representatives of the Kultusge-
meinden had when it came to the compilation of deportation lists. Her study lists several
cases in which deportations were organised without the involvement of the Kultusge-
meinden and explicitly names the registration system in general as the data source for
the deportation lists.64 For the city of Mainz, Meyer states that the local Gestapo had
acquired the data of the Ergänzungskarten in 1940. This once again suggests that prior
to the collation with the registration system, the Ergänzungskarten had been accessed
and collated with other indices. The Reichsvereinigung 's representative in Mainz, Michel
Oppenheim, is quoted saying:
Die Reichsvereinigung wurde nur aus Bequemlichkeit mit der Anfertigung
[. . . ] beauftragt. Sämtliche Listen dieser Art hätten gerade so gut bei der
Gestapo angefertigt werden können.65
For Berlin the sources used by the Kultusvereinigung are well documented. In December
1942, Dr Ernst Rosenthal, head of the legal department of Berlin's Kultusvereinigung,
presumably on the Reichssippenamt 's order, summarised the sources at hand to identify
Jews in Germany. His report listed all measures to identify Jews that had been initiated
since 1933.66 In October 1939  after the census  the Kultusvereinigung conducted a
similar survey in order to identify `Geltungs- ' and `Rassejuden' previously unregistered.
It is the survey Wietog suggested had eventually led to the identication of Germany's
Jews.67 But as Kultusvereinigung lacked the means to enforce compliance, there was
a poor response to the survey. Thus, in order to complete their index, in late 1939
the Kultusvereinigung turned to the Statistical Oce, requesting access to the census
results. Yet, the Ergänzungskarten were still being processed so that eventually the
Gestapo agreed to forward the registration sheets of Jews moving within or to Berlin
to the Kultusvereinigung. Furthermore, the Kultusvereinigung had inquired with the
Gestapo
63. Cf. Haar, `Szenarien', 364.
64. Cf. Meyer, `Handlungsräume regionaler jüdischer Repräsentanten 1941-1945', 71 and 76.
65. As cited in: Meyer, 80.
66. BArch R 8150 32, Die Katastermäÿige Erfassung der Juden in Berlin, Dr. iur. Ernst Rosenthal,
23th December 1942.
67. Wietog, Volkszählung NS, 79.
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zur vollständigen Erfassung amtliche Quellen zugänglich zu machen, was sich
bisher jedoch nicht ermöglichen lieÿ.68
So, in December 1942, the `Katatster ' comprised the data of the self-identifying Jews
including those `Geltungs- ' and `Rassejuden' who had answered the calls for registra-
tion. A second document appended to Rosenthal's report, most probably from the same
author, addressed a particular problem in Berlin at the end of 1942. In November the
Jüdische Nachrichtenblatt had published an announcement obliging all Berlin Jews to
register with the Kultusgemeinde. But the number of registrations did not tally with the
number of Jews estimated to be present in the city. Thus, the legal advisor investigated
the sources available to identify the unregistered persons. As a rst measure he suggest
tallying the existing `Kataster ' with the new registration sheets. In a second step, he
suggested checking with the register oces. For complicated cases like Jews in mixed
marriages who were exempt from many measures that had led to the registration with
Kultusgemeinde there was only one way to access the missing data: Vergleich der Kartei
mit dem Verzeichnis der in Berlin abgegeben Kennkarten bezw. der Volkskartei.69 Since
the report stresses that the other sources at hand were limited to the members of the
Kultusgemeinde, the Volkskartei presented the most complete index on Germany's Jews.
Beyond these empirical points, there is a logical argument. If, as Wietog implies, the
Reichsvereinigung and its representatives alone were in possession of comprehensive in-
dices on Germany's `Rassejuden', the Gestapo would have had to completely rely on
their cooperation whilst lacking the means of control.
Volkskartei and Deportations
To close the argument I will now summarise the existing research on the development
of the decision in favour of grand-scale deportations from the `Altreich' and sketch the
course of the deportations in order to contextualise Himmler's announcement of the
beginning collation process on 31th March 1941.
The regime's early antisemitic policy intended to force Jews out of Germany by lim-
iting access to work and depriving civil rights. But this ended in deadlock when the
number of those who could aord exile stagnated, leaving behind an increasingly pau-
perised Jewish population.70 With the entry into war and the subsequent occupation of
68. BArch R 8150 32, Die Katastermäÿige Erfassung der Juden in Berlin, Dr. iur. Ernst Rosenthal,
23th December 1942.
69. BArch R 8150 32, Abschrift: Statistische Erfassung der Juden in Berlin, 1942.
70. Cf. Wildt, Judenpolitik SD, 57 and 63.
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new territories, the number of Jews under German control increased whilst chances to
escape drastically reduced.71 However, the new territories also oered the opportunity
to deport Jews from the `Altreich'. In October 1939 about 4,000 Austrian Jews were de-
ported to Nisko in the Subcarpathian Province. According to Gruner, the lists for these
deportations were compiled by the Jewish community under order of the Gestapo.72
The deportations were soon stopped, but not because the point of destination was com-
pletely unprepared and lacked the most basic facilities to accommodate the deportees.
Rather shifting priorities among the NS-leadership had led to the postponement of the
deportations in order to allow the deportation and accommodation of Volks- and Aus-
landsdeutsche agreed upon with the Soviet Union.73 In February and March 1940, under
the harsh conditions of winter, about one thousand people from Pommerania were de-
ported to Lublin. These deportations were organised by the Gestapo and assisted by
the local party oces. Reportedly non-Jews and Jews in mixed marriages were mis-
takenly included.74 But, once again, the subsequent transports were stopped soon after,
mainly due to the objections of Generalgouverneur Frank.75 Over the summer 1940 the
so-called `Madagaskar-Plan' was devised that considered grand-scale deportations for
the rst time. The idea of the deportation of the entire European Jewery to a remote
island, given France's defeat and a possible peace treaty with Britain, proved unrealistic
by the end of 1940. Nevertheless, the plan informed the further decisions regarding the
deportations on a European scale.76 In October 1940 the Reich Main Security Oce
(RSHA) organised the deportation of some 6,000 Jews from Baaden and Saarpfalz to
France.77 An intervention of the Vichy regime ended deportations to France. These
early deportations illustrate how the regime's antisemitic policy was subject to shifting
priorities. Each deportation raised objections at the respective destinations. Neverthe-
less, the Gestapo had used the experience of each transport to adjust the organisation of
71. Saul Friedländer, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden; Bd 1-2: Die Jahre der Verfolgung 1933 - 1939
(München: Beck, 1998), 109-118.
72. Wolf Gruner, `Von der Kollektivausweisung zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland 1938-
1945', in Die Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland : Pläne - Praxis - Reaktionen ; 1938 - 1945,
ed. Birthe Kundrus and Beate Meyer, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 20 (Göttingen:
Wallstein, 2004), 2162, 33.
73. Cf. Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen
Judenverfolgung (München: Piper, 1998), 259; Götz Aly, Endlösung: Völkerverschiebung und der Mord
an den europäischen Juden (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1995), 95.
74. Cf. Gruner, `Von der Kollektivausweisung zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland 1938-1945',
38.
75. Cf. Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Juden-
verfolgung, 267-269.
76. Aly, Endlösung: Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden, 167.
77. Cf. Friedländer, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden, 119-120.
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transport and the concomitant expropriation of the deportees.78 Wietog had correctly
stated that for these early deportations the Ergänzungskarten were not available and
therefore the identication and localisation depended on other sources. In October 1939
Eichmann wrote a note, based on which Gruner concluded that the early deportations
were planned centrally in the Berlin oce: Listen sämtlicher erfaÿter Juden ordnen u.
zw. nach Altreich, Protektorat und Ostmark.79 Notably, Eichmann refers to `lists of
registered Jews', suggesting he knew of the decits in the registration of `Rassejuden'
in 1939. The lists were to be related to individual Jewish communities in order to tally
with the membership rosters. Eichmann was obviously aware that the Gestapo could
not solely rely on information provided by the Jewish communities. This suggests the
early deportation lists were compiled from the data available in the Gestapo registers.
Over the turn of the years 1940 to 1941, the decision to attack the Soviet Union
over the coming summer was taken and inuenced the further development. Over the
next month Heydrich, tasked with the implementation of the `Lösung der Judenfrage',
proposed and revised several plans in that regard.80 Since the dominant naval power
of Britain remained hostile, a dislocation of Europe's Jews to Madagascar was imprac-
ticable. Instead, the future deportations were redirected to unspecied areas of the
Soviet Union where harsh conditions and forced labour were expected to kill most de-
portees.81 A meeting of Göring and Heydrich on 26th March 1941 in which Göring
approved of Heydrich's proposal is widely considered to have resulted in the decision to
deport Jews from the `Altreich' to these unspecied territories in the Soviet Union.82
Likewise, in March, Eichmann's department in the Reich Main Security Oce (RSHA),
now dubbed IV B 4, was reorganised and henceforth ocially in charge of `Deporta-
tions and Jewish Aairs'. On 17th of that month, the RSHA informed representatives of
the Reichsvereinigung about the imminent Gesamtauswanderung der siedlungsfähigen
jüdischen Bevölkerung and the related nancial burden for the organisation that was
expected to cover the costs.83 What is considered the rst `regular' transport of Jews
78. Gruner, `Von der Kollektivausweisung zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland 1938-1945',
41-42.
79. As cited in: Gruner, 31-32.
80. Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenver-
folgung, 285-292.
81. Cf. Aly, Endlösung: Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden, 273.
82. Cf. Friedländer, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden, 161; Aly, Endlösung: Völkerverschiebung und
der Mord an den europäischen Juden, 271; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung
der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung, 290; Gruner, `Von der Kollektivausweisung zur Deportation
der Juden aus Deutschland 1938-1945', 44.
83. Gruner, 45.
183
left Vienna on 15th October 1941, destined to the overcrowded and undernurished odz
Ghetto, succeeded by transports from Prag, Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt. During this
rst stage, the deportations that ended on 5th November had dislocated about 20,000
Jews and about 5,000 `Gypsies'. From then on `Gypsies' were frequently deported with
numbers peaking in 1943. According to Karola Fings, the racial-biological reports of
Ritter's oce and their inclusion in the Volkskartei were practically irrelevant for the
deportations of `Gypsies' from Germany as they were in many cases only produced dur-
ing the deportation process, for which identication relied on the long existing police
registers.84
The second stage started on 8th November and ended in February 1942. During this
time span, about 30,000 people were deported to the Baltic cities Minsk and Riga.85
From March into the summer of 1942 frequent deportations from the Altreich dislocated
another 17,000 Jews, mostly to Lublin. In March 1942 the annihilation camps of the
`Aktion Reinhardt ' in Beª»ec, Sobibór and Treblinka became operational, where about
1.35 million people were murdered. From May on transports from Germany directly
headed to Auschwitz.
In early 1943 about 51,000 Jews had remained in Germany, about 20,000 of them
employed in forced labour. On 27th February 1943 more than 10,000 of these forced la-
bourers were arrested during the notorious `Fabrik-Aktion' and deported. Subsequently,
remaining work-camps for Jews were closed and the work-force was deported. From June
1943 representatives of the Reichsvereinigung were deported. From early 1944 Jews in
mixed marriages were targeted and deported in case of divorce or death of the Non-
Jewish partner. During the last year another 2,600 Jews were deported from Germany.
When Germany was defeated in 1945 of the approximately 500,000 German Jews the
census in 1933 had registered, about 15,000 Jews had managed to survive in Germany.86
The development of the regime's measures against Germany's Jews between 1939 and
1941 was characterised by trials and changing plans. But the attack on the Soviet Union
promised the prospect to act unsupervised in what was understood as the `vast space
to the East', furthering the decision to deport Germany's Jews after a victory, which
was expected by autumn 1941. Considering that the decision to deport Jews from the
`Altreich' was taken around 26th March 1941, the argument, that the statistical oces
84. Cf. Fings, `Erziehung und Vernichtung', 450-51.
85. Cf. Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Juden-
verfolgung, 448-450.
86. Cf. Gruner, `Von der Kollektivausweisung zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland 1938-1945',
56-59.
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(deliberately) delayed the processing of the Ergänzungskarten until 31st of March lacks
plausibility. Quite to the contrary, I would argue, the transferral of the Ergänzungskarten
from March 1941 onward  in particular the collation with the registry system and
the Volkskartei  is evidence of their signicance in the process of identication and
localisation of Jews that was precondition to deportation. Thus, the cards were not
requested before that point in time since the respective data was only required once
the faith of the registered people had been decided upon. When in June 1941 Knost
remarked to the head of Düsseldorf's Police Department that the Ergänzungskarten were
von wesentlicher Bedeutung für die Durchführung bestimmter bevölkerungspolitischer
Maÿnahmen he was referring to the forthcoming deportations.87
6.2 Decommissioning of the Volkskartei in 1943
The Wehrmacht had demanded the connection of register and registry oces in 1935
to facilitate the draft process. The Volkskartei in its eventual form that adapted the
Wehrmacht 's proposal and connected it with several demands from other sides had been
proposed and promoted by Frick's Reich Ministry of the Interior. The Reichsmeldeord-
nung started of as part of the wider reform eorts towards a centralised authoritarian
state as envisioned by Frick.
With Himmler's takeover of the police forces and Kerstien's replacement by Lieber-
mann von Sonnenberg, the Volkskartei began to take shape in 1937 whilst the Reichs-
meldeordnung was nalised. Its establishment was announced and thus sanctioned by
Göring. Its main objective was to register the entire population in order to put them at
the government's full disposal for the war eort both on the combatant and the product-
ive side. While Himmler and Daluege both considered the new index indispensable, it
met with disregard or indierence from other parts of the administration. The Labour
Ministry had denied cooperation. Hitler did not appreciate the index. It was thus denied
proper funding, making it to a large extent dependent on volunteers. This was a fact
Daluege had commiserated, aware of the diculties this would present to the integrity
of the index in the long term.
Due to the limited funding the Reich nancial contribution only covered the costs for
the initial supply with the necessary hardware. The long-term operation of the index was
to be covered by the state governments. Hence the central government lost its inuence
87. BArch R 1509 1729, Der Direktor des Reichssippenamtes dem Herrn Polizeipräsidenten in Düssel-
dorf, 26th June 1941.
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on the further operation and maintenance. Yet, the data presented by the index was
to serve mainly the Reich's need to execute oversight over the nation's human resources
and put the local workforce at the central administration's disposal.
Lack of personnel had already been a problem stang the positions that resulted
from the establishment of the index. However, this was a major problem for all indus-
tries. As a consequence, local authorities were unwilling to share knowledge with central
authorities and hence give them access to the local workforce.88 The Volkskartei thus
presented a threat to their control over the local workforce. For similar strategic reasons
the labour oces had denied any cooperation with the Volkskarteibehörden  apart from
retrieving data. However, the initial survey and evaluation had been conducted on a
nationwide scale despite the immense obstacles and had helped to identify parts of the
population previously unregistered  in particular children. The initial evaluation had
produced data on the nation's medical personnel, comprehensive registration of which
had remained a desideratum of the 1938 registration system. The Volkskartei was estab-
lished in the entire `Altreich'  including Danzig and Königsberg where the onset of the
war caused a delay of about three months. Himmler's orders in early 1943 to establish
the index in the territories since incorporated into the `Reich' that were issued secretly,
were certainly a preemptive move to refute ongoing advances against the index that had
escalated in January 1943.89
The decision in favour of the Volkskartei 's establishment had been taken at the height
of the National socialist eorts towards centralisation when the local powers in the
federal states were at their weakest. With Germany entering the war, the power balance
began to shift once again towards the `periphery'. Not only did the situation on the
ground make it increasingly dicult to centrally control the local powers, the Gauleiter
position had also been reinforced as many of them had been appointed in the new
position of Reichsverteidigungskommissar, responsible for organising defence measures
during the war. This position, equipped with extensive powers, had remained marginal
while German troops were advancing. With the campaigns in gridlock and even more
with the beginning retreat it became increasingly important.90 The Gauleiter formed the
88. Cf. Michael Ruck, `Partikularismus und Mobilisierung  traditionelle und totalitäre Regional-
gewalten im Herrschaftsgefüge des NS-Regimes', in Der prekäre Staat: Herrschen und Verwalten im
Nationalsozialismus, ed. Sven Reichardt and Wolfgang Seibel (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2011), 74
120, 100.
89. BArch R 70 POLEN 155, Bl. 9, Ausschnitt aus dem Ministerial-Blatt des Reichs- und Preussis-
chen Ministerium des Innern, and RdErl.d.RMdI.v.15.4.1943PolO-VuRRIII3433/43, Einführung der
Volkskartei in weiteren Reichsgauen und Reg.-Bezirken.
90. Cf. Peter Hüttenberger, Die Gauleiter: Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefüges in der NSDAP,
Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19 (Stuttgat: DVA, 1969), 155.
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local back-bone of Bormann's inuence, who after Heÿ's ight to England, had acquired
a similar position.
Meanwhile, Himmler had managed to secure a growing inuence establishing an `SS-
Staat ' with control over the police forces, the SS including its combat units and an
increasing number of inmates of the concentration camps supplying a considerable work
force.91 In particular via the control of the police forces, Himmler was able to exert
inuence or at least execute oversight on the local level.
Oversight over Germany's idle human resources was a crucial aspect of securing fu-
ture inuence and hence, in early 1943, the struggle for power between Bormann and
Himmler was negotiated on the eld of registration. On 13th January 1943, the `Erlass
des Führers über den unfassenden Einsatz von Männern und Frauen für Aufgaben der
Reichsverteidigung ' marked the onset of `total mobilisation'. The explanatory paragraph
stated:
Der Bedarf an Kräften für Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung macht es not-
wendig, alle Männer und Frauen, deren Arbeitskraft für diese Zwecke nicht
oder nicht voll ausgenutzt ist, zu erfassen und ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit ent-
sprechend zum Einsatz zu bringen. Das Ziel ist, die wehrfähigen Männer für
den Fronteinsatz frei zu machen.92
The decree ordered the Wehrmacht 's supreme command to review all personnel in re-
served occupation (Uk-Stellung) and release all non-essential sta for the Wehrmacht 's
disposition. Keitel, Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht, and Göring in his positions as
Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan were to give general orders in connection with this
were to be implemented by the Reichsverteidigungskommissare. Similarly, Bormann was
appointed to free personnel from the party and its subsidiary organisations. Thus, on
6th February, Sauckel issued the decree `Meldungen von Männern und Frauen für die
Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung ' in which he specied the group of persons the labour
oces were to register. It targeted mainly unemployed people, small enterprises with
less than 5 employees and employees in marginal employment, but rst and foremost
women:
91. Cf. Ruck, `Partikularismus und Mobilisierung  traditionelle und totalitäre Regionalgewalten im
Herrschaftsgefüge des NS-Regimes', 90
92. BArch 43II/652 a, Erlass des Führers über den unfassenden Einsatz von Männern und Frauen für
Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung, 13th January 1943.
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Diese Gruppe ist die zahlenmäÿig weitaus bedeutendste. Ihre Mobilisierung
bildet den Hauptteil der zu leistenden Arbeit.93
Notably, the decree appointed the labour oces and not the police  and thus the
Volkskarteibehörden  as the responsible authority for the registration process, despite
having the exact same purpose for which the Volkskartei had originally been devised.
This certainly predetermined the future faith of the index as a number of Gauleiter now
started creating so called Gaukarteien.
In order to free up personnel, the decree furthermore stipulated that all work that
did not directly serve the war eort should be immediately suspended and personnel
released. The decree had once again strengthened the position of those Gauleiter who
were installed as Reichsverteidigungskommissare. On the same day Sauckel issued the
registration decree, the Reich Ministry of the Interior gathered the parties involved
to discuss the Volkskartei 's decommissioning in the course of the implementation of
Hitler's decree from January 13th. The main opponent to the index was Düsseldorf's
Gauleiter Florian, who had claimed [. . . ] daÿ die Volkskartei sich bei der praktischen
Inanspruchnahme [. . . ] nicht bewährt habe. Hence Bormann was delegated to approach
Himmler in the matter of the decommissioning of the index.94
In a rst reply Daluege, who answered Bormann on Himmler's behalf, deemed the
index irreplaceable, arguing that even a temporary immobilisation of the index would
render its data obsolete and result in its complete decommission.95 When it became
known to Himmler that an unspecied number of Gauleiter had established independ-
ent indices for their territories, he had Daluege issue a circular in which all heads of the
SS and police were ordered to approach those Gauleiter holding the position of Reichs-
verteidigungskommissar and inform them über die Wichtigkeit der von der Polizei ein-
gerichteten Volkskartei with the objective of stopping the establishment of independent
indices. In that regard, the circular underlined a possible extension of data made avail-
able by the index. Arguing that the creation of a completely new index would require
more work than an extension of the Volkskartei to the Gauleiter 's needs, the heads of
the SS and police were instructed to oer the SS' support stressing:
93. BArch 4901 12603, Der Beauftragte für den Vierjahresplan. Der Generalbevollmächtigte für den
Arbeitseinsatz. Meldungen von Männern und Frauen für die Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung, 6th of
February 1943.
94. BArch R 58 994, Vermerk Dr. Ficker, Betrit: Durchführung des Führererlasses vom 13.1.1943.
Verwaltung. Volkskartei. 6th of February 1943.
95. BArch R 58 254, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichministerium des
Innern an den Leiter der Parteikanzlei z. Hd. v. Herrn Staatssekretär Dr. Klopfer, 27th February 1943.
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Der Reichsführer hat nochmals angeordnet, daÿ die Volkskartei auf jeden
Fall bestehen bleibt und weitergeführt wird wie bisher. Sie soll aber für
die Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigungskommissare zur Verfügung gestellt wer-
den.96
Himmler refrained from an outright confrontation in the matter, delivering his message
by proxy of the local heads of the SS and the police. The oer of cooperation combined
with his renewed insistance that the index remain in place, illustrates Himmler's defens-
ive position in the matter. On 28th May 1943 Bormann wrote a personal letter to Frick
informing him without much ado that in the course of measures for the rationalisation of
the administration (Verwaltungsvereinfachung) the decommissioning of the Volkskartei
had been examined and reached a damning verdict:
Diese Prüfung, die sich auf die Erfahrung von 4 Jahren und die Stellung-
nahme zahlreicher Gauleiter stützt, ergab eindeutig die Unbrauchbarkeit der
Volkskartei in ihrer gegenwärtigen Form. Der Grund dafür liegt in ihrer
Unzulänglichkeit überhaupt und in ihrer immer noch bestehenden Unvoll-
ständigkeit.97
Over the ve pages of the letter, Bormann lists ve mayor shortcomings of the in-
dex which he characterised as einen sich aus den damaligen Ressortschwierigkeiten
ergebenden Kompromiss that could not be considered das auch für die Zukunft weg-
weisende allgemeine Erfassungsmittel. Most points Bormann brings up are familiar
from the trial period in Potsdam. The completion of the cards by the population had
resulted in inaccurate and incomplete cards, rendering the index unreliable. Under the
headline `Schwerfälligkeit des Verfahrens ', Bormann reports the failing integration of
the index with the registration system's notication system (and hence the failure of the
registration system). A further concern was the duplicate Kreiskarteien. These indices,
Borman states, were often outdated since the honorary mayors failed to forward changes
in time. This resembles very much what the district commissioner of Teltow had anti-
cipated during the test run in the Potsdam district when he judged that the index would
turn into a `complete failure' if maintained by the honorary mayors.98 Overall Bormann
regarded the Volkskartei as completely unserviceable.
96. BArch R 19 407, Chef der Ordnungspolizei an die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer, 25th February
1943.
97. BArch R 19 407, Bormann, Parteikanzlei an Frick, 28th May 1943.
98. See chapter `A test run', 137.
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Insbesondere die restlose jahrgangsweise Erfassung bestimmter Altersklassen
(Jugendliche, Kleinkinder, Kleinstkinder) war mit der Volkskartei unmöglich.
[. . . ] Für die Wehr- und Arbeitsdiensterfassung genügen auch die polizei-
lichen Melderegister vollauf.
This remark proves Bormann's ignorance regarding the registration system since both
the Volkskartei and the registration system relied on the same notication system. For
almost an entire page Bormann lists registration measures that did not utilise the index
at all, ascertaining that, even where it was used in the enrolment process of the Wehr-
macht and the Hitler Youth, it merely increased the required work as it usually entailed
follow up investigations to locate missing draftees, concluding:
Besonders aufschlussreich ist die Tatsache der Nichtbenutzung der Kartei bei
der jetzt laufenden Erfassung im Rahmen der Aktion Sauckel.
Bormann omitted that Sauckel had deliberatly refrained from using the index. His
last point was the incompleteness of the index. The index, Bormann continued, was
not completed when Germany entered the war, and konnte infolge des Personalman-
gels in den weitaus meisten Gebieten nicht vervollkommnet werden. When Bormann
considered the index incomplete he referred to the incomplete index cards, the part of
the male population that due to the 1939 draft had remained unregistered and to the
territories in which the index was not yet established  Austria in particular. With re-
gard to Himmler's secret order to establish the Volkskartei in these territories, Bormann
informed Frick:
Durch die Erlasse vom 31. März und 7. April 1943 wurde ohne vorherige Be-
teiligung der Partei-Kanzlei die Volkskartei auch in den Alpen- und Donau-
reichsgauen sowie in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten eingeführt. Um den
schwebenden Ermittlungen über die Stillegung der Volkskartei nicht vorzu-
greifen, habe ich [. . . ] um vorläuge Aussetzung der Durchführung der ge-
nannten Erlasse gebeten. Inzwischen haben sich die beteiligten Gauleiter
durchweg gegen die Einführung der Volkskartei ausgesprochen.
In eect, Bormann's intervention had stopped the establishment of the index in the
respective regions for good. Throughout the letter Bormann puts the index in the
most unfavourable light, targeting existing weak spots as well as bringing up entirely
new demands like the registration of toddlers or of the card holders' party membership,
which had been explicitly forbidden by his predecessor Heÿ who had maintained that only
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the party was in a position to register its members. In addition, Bormann overstated
the number of workers needed to maintain the Volkskartei. Hence, the head of the
Partei-Kanzlei concluded that the insignicant benets of the index did not justify the
required workload. He favoured the decommissioning of the index whilst proposing
that a completely new index be established after the war, thereby rebutting Daluege's
strongest argument for maintaining the index.99 Though Bormann addressed Frick in
the matter, the target of this move was more likely to be Himmler. Nevertheless, Frick
forwarded the letter to Daluege, who had recently suered a heart attack. Daluege
compiled a letter to thoroughly repudiate the reproaches made by the Partei-Kanzlei
that he sent Frick for revision, accompanied by a personal letter to Frick, to whom he
admitted Daÿ es für mich nicht leicht ist [. . . ] solche Briefe zu erhalten werden Sie wohl
selbst [. . . ] verstehen. He states:
Ich habe so etwas an Kritik über eine groÿe Kriegsaufgabe, die mit den
schwersten Verhandlungen durchgesetzt worden ist, niemals in irgendeiner
Aufgabe meiner bisherigen Kriegsleistungen erlebt. [. . . ] Eine Aufgabe, die
ich auch bereits vor dem Kriege erkannt habe und die auch durchgeführt
worden ist, bis auf einzelne Gaue [. . . ].100
In his ocial position statement, Daluege maintained the Volkskartei was put to good
use in several states, in particular the Prussian territories. Nevertheless, he had to
admit the lack of compliance of some registrars: Die Arbeit für die Volkskartei ist
eine Frage der reinen Erziehung der Sachbearbeiter [. . . ].101 Frick, in a letter to Bor-
mann, defended the index: Der weitaus überwiegende Teil der Polizeidienststellen hat
die Volkskartei tadellos in Ordnung [. . . ]. Only the recent discussions regarding the
index decommissioning have, Frick argued, posed a threat to the index as they had be-
come known in wider circles of the registrars. Damit haben aber die mit der Führung
der Volkskartei befassten Dienststellen und Kräfte in ihrem Eifer und ihrer Gewissen-
haftigkeit nachgelassen. In June 1943 Frick was still supporting the Volkskartei as the
best available index. Nevertheless, he had started his letter to Bormann admitting:
Auch ich weiss, dass eine allgemeine Erfassungskartei für alle Einwohner Groÿdeutsch-
lands nach dem Kriege sofort geschaen werden muss.102 Ocially, Daluege responded
99. BArch R 19 407, Bormann, Parteikanzlei an Frick, 28th May 1943.
100. BArch R 19 407, Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei an Herrn Reichsminister Frick, 12th June 1943.
101. Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Stellungnahme zum Schreiben des Leiters der Parteikanzlei vom 28.
Mai 1943 an Reichsminister Dr. Frick, 12th June 1943.
102. BArch R 19 407, Der Reichsminister des Innern an den Leiter der Parteikanzlei Reichsleiter Martin
Bormann, June 1943.
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with a ten-page position statement defending the Volkskartei. However, compared to
the initial reasoning, the focus had shifted from its utilisation for the draft to its use as
an identication and control device for the police. His main argument was the connec-
tion of the police registration system and the Volkskartei. Those who appreciated the
registration system could not dispense with the index, Daluege argued. Furthermore, of
the 43 Gauleiter, only six had favoured so called Gaukarteien  which had to be newly
established  over the Volkskartei. He maintained that despite the known decits of the
index it was the best available source and was used in most districts to organise the
draft for the Wehrmacht, the Labour Service and the Hitler Youth.
Die Frage der Volkskartei oder Gaukartei ist also im gesamten Reichsgebiet
noch nicht einheitlich entschieden. Es muÿ nur eines nochmals festgestellt
werden, daÿ die Volkskartei der Polizei niemals ersetzt werden kann, da die
Volkskartei allein auf dem Polizeimeldewesen aufgebaut ist, das von keiner
anderen Dienststelle übernommen oder auch nur ersetzt werden kann.103
Regarding the workload Bormann had estimated, Daluege corrected his numbers and
pointed out what he had formerly considered a decit: most of the personnel involved
were volunteers and of those who were payed, many were women. Nevertheless, support
for the Volkskartei began to dwindle. In May, Frick had noted on his copy of Bormann's
initial letter: Ich war von vornherein skeptisch über den Wert der Karte.104 Daluege
meanwhile had ordered Werner Bracht head of the Order Police' department Verwal-
tung und Recht to inquire the state of the index and provide up to date information. In
the course of this reevaluation of the Volkskartei, Bracht inspected the register oce in
Klein-Machnow in the Potsdam district. Inspite of some minor irregularities the respect-
ive report noted: Die Angestellte, welche das Einwohnermeldeamt und die Volkskartei
zusammen [. . . ] führt, hat ihre beiden Karteien sehr in Ordnung. [. . . ] Die Volkskartei
enthält ca. 12 ooo Karten und ist vollständig auf dem Laufenden. Rückstände sind nicht
vorhanden.105 But this report had no eect  nor had the support of the Gauleiter of
Berlin, Mark Brandenburg, Pommern and Mecklenburg, who completely relied on the
Volkskartei in their administration and supported Daluege.106 Even though only few
103. BArch R 19 407, Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Stellungnahme zum Schreiben des Leiters der Parteik-
anzlei vom 28. Mai 1943 an Reichsminister Dr. Frick. 12th June 1943.
104. BArch R 19 407, Abschrift der auf dem Schreiben der Parteikanzlei vom 28. Mai 1943 bendlichen
handschriftlichen Vermerke.
105. BLHA Rep. 2AI Pol 2703, Abschrift, Aktenvermerk, 14th July 1943.
106. BArch R 19 407, Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Stellungnahme zum Schreiben des Leiters der Parteik-
anzlei vom 28. Mai 1943 an Reichsminister Dr. Frick. 12th June 1943.
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Gauleiter, namely, Düsseldorf's Friedrich Karl Florian, had spoken against the Volks-
kartei, Sauckel's move to put the labour oces in charge of the mobilisation eort had
sealed the faith of the index and secured the Labour Oces' oversight over Germany's
work-force.
In contrast to the Volkskartei and similar to the measures during the Great War, the
labour oces resorted to public announcements obliging individuals to register. Once
again the population was in charge of the thorough implementation of registration. Yet,
the objective of the `Aktion Sauckel ' to signicantly increase the number of deployed
women did not achieve the desired eect. Dietmar Petzina estimates an increase of three
to four percent of women working for the time between May 1942 and May 1944.107
This, however, was also because plant managers tended to prefer forced labourers to
German women as they were not protected and could be deployed more rigidly.108 On
18th August Himmler issued a circular decree, in which he decommissioned the index
for the time being, except for the alphabetical reference indices, which were used as
replacements and only decommissioned in September 1944.109 The index cards were to
be stored in a safe place to protect them from air raids. Two days later  depriving
the other authorities from access to the data  he ordered the evacuation of all police
registers (Einwohnermeldekarteien), both those in use as well as archived registers.110
The decommission of the Volkskartei was thus not an isolated case. As Hitler's decree
highlighted, all branches of administration, the party and private enterprises were subject
to renewed scrutiny. On the other hand, Daluege's argument that a new index was
unlikely to require less registrars and wasted tons of paper was valid, in particular as the
index cards for the Gaukarteien diered only in one aspect from the Volkskarteikarten.
They provided an extra eld for party membership that could have been easily added
to the latter.
107. Dietmar Petzina, `Die Mobilisierung deutscher Arbeitskräfte vor und während des Zweiten
Weltkrieges', Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Oldenburg) 18, no. 4 (1970): 443475, 450-454.
108. Cf. Marc Buggeln and Michael Wildt, eds., Arbeit im Nationalsozialismus (München: De Gruyter
Oldenbourg, 2014), 85-86.
109. BArch R 70 POLEN 212, RdErl RFSSuCHdDtPol Im RMdI vom 18.8.1943, and 8.9.1944.
110. BArch 1509 1470, Der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des
Innern an die höheren Verwaltungsbehörden, die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer etc., Betr.: Sicherung
von Einwohnermeldekarteien und kulturell wichtigen Archiven gegen Zerstörung bei Luftangrien. 20th
August 1944.
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6.3 `Volk ' and index
Before embedding the development of the devices of oversight during National Socialist
rule in the wider historical context I to want to cover the most important arguments of
the existing historiography on the issue and my major ndings for this period. When Aly
and Roth's book on registration and statistics was reissued in 2000 they maintained that
the introduction of a nationwide registration system was a genuine National Socialist
enterprise.
More importantly their argument linked the census of 1939 to the deportations of
German Jews, suggesting the compilation of a central Judenkartei from the census data.
In 2001 Jutta Wietog noted that such index never existed and concluded the data on
descent of the 1939 census was irrelevant for the deportation of German Jews. This thesis
has shown that the Ergänzungskarten were the only source for identifying Germans of
Jewish descent as dened in 1935. Contrary to Wietog, this study by and large conrms
Aly and Roth's hypothesis regarding the relevance of the census and the registration
system for the identication of German Jews. Regarding the details of the events and
their interpretation, however, my investigation draws dierent conclusions altogether.
The identication of Germans of Jewish descent was achieved through the collation
of the Ergänzungskarten with the Volkskartei and not through the compilation of a
central Judenkartei maintained by the SD. Contrary to Aly and Roth, I argue that only
this `racial' aspect of the Volkskartei addressed the genuine National Socialist issue of
`race' and thus deviated from the general historical trend in registration  increasing
comprehensiveness and standardisation on the national level.
They furthermore understand the long genesis of the system as a premeditated and
deliberate ten-year-project cautiously implemented so as not to alienate the public.111
This interpretation, however, can not be backed by the sources analysed for this thesis.
The early National Socialist measures were a continuation of the eorts initiated in the
context of the Weimar Republic's Reichsreform. Both the nationwide census and the
Prussian registration regulations of 1933 were initiated in the previous years. Apart from
that, the registration system was not a priority for Minister of the Interior Frick. The
early years of racial politics were, on the other hand, marked by serious inghting over
denitions of `race' and required forms of knowledge management. The plans devised at
the time intended to maintain the data relevant for both `racial hygiene' and segregation
at the Standesämter. In consequence the reform of the registration system could leave
111. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 161.
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`racial' questions unconsidered. This changed only when the plans for a transformation
of the Standesämter were abandoned in February 1937.
On the occasion of the rst combined draft of the Labour Service and the military in
1935, the Wehrmacht requested the fusion of the vital and residential data to facilitate
the identication and localisation of draftees. After the Nuremberg Laws had dened
the Volksgemeinschaft ex negativo, the Ministry of the Interior required the information
to discriminate Reichsbürger from Staatsangehörige  which primarily amounted to the
identication of those Germans who were Jewish according to the new denition. Fur-
thermore, the ministry intended to prepare for total mobilisation by producing oversight
over the employable population. These demands initiated a shift towards a genuinely
National Socialist policy in registration and census taking that eventually led to the
establishment of the Volkskartei.
But Frick lost inuence and only with Himmler's appointment as Head of the German
Police in the summer of 1936 did the initiative gain momentum. Still, the pending state
of the Reichsreform impeded detailed planning. In February 1937 all eorts towards
a comprehensive Reichsreform  including the transformation of the Standesämter 
were postponed until after the war. Yet, the implementation of the Reichsbürgergesetz
still required a device to manage the necessary information. In 1937 the Ministry of
the Interior decided against the inclusion of respective questions in the registration
forms because it had required a process of verication and  more importantly  the
aggregation of data in a cumulative data base would not provide comprehensive results
quickly. In consequence, the Reichsmeldeordnung by and large implemented the Eisenach
agreement. It left the the administrative competences of the federal states untouched and
the issues of mobilisation and `race' unconsidered so that these had to be solved by the
Volkskartei. Devised and implemented by a coalition of the Reich Ministry of the Interior,
Himmler, as Head of the German Police, and the Ministry for Education, the index was
contested. It lacked the support of Hitler and met with adamant resistance from the
Labour Oces who feared the loss of their genuine competences. But on a fundamental
level even the structure of the Volkskartei adhered to the logic of the dezentralisierte
Einheitsstaat (`decentralised unitary state') which had been discussed and called for by
national politicians and administration over the Weimar period. As it depended entirely
on the administrative structure determined by the Reichsmeldeordnung it implemented
a unied, yet decentralised, index system.
The index was ill-funded and poorly staed and due to the temporal and nancial
limits, the planners of the index decided to sacrice accuracy for comprehensiveness.
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Therefore, the eventual establishment of the Volkskartei, despite the long period of
planning, appears to be a make shift solution on the brink of war rather than the
keystone in a larger design. National Socialist registration policy is characterised by
competing interests and policy shifts in which, after a long process of standardisation and
centralisation peaking with introduction of the Volkskartei, control returned to the local
administration when the index was decommissioned and replaced by local Gaukarteien.
Regarding the decommissioning of the index in 1943, Aly and Roth claim that the
system failed at the end of the war only because technology at the time could die einmal
erhobenen Informationen nicht adäquat speichern.112 Several times in the book they
insinuate that the National Socialists lacked the technology introduced in the 1980s to
fully implement the vision of seamless registration. This is, however, more a contem-
porary political intervention at the time their book was rst published than a historical
conclusion. Index cards were certainly reliable data carriers. Problems arose on the side
of data processing and transferral in the form of shortage of sta. Despite occasional
inaccuracies, the project did not fail due to technical diculties. The decommission-
ing of the Volkskartei in 1943 can best be understood as a token in a power struggle
which revived the antagonisms of the federal state under the conditions of a purportedly
centralised state.113
The assessment of the Volkskartei 's impact on the population has to consider three
dierent aspects. Its function in the mobilisation and organisation of the Volksgemein-
schaft, the complementary function in the process of segregation and its role in the
context of the wider National Socialist registration measures. Furthermore, as the index
was integrated with the registration system, its impact on the German population cannot
be assessed in isolation from changes in registration in general.
Contrary to the expectations of its designers, the Volkskartei did not turn out to
be the device that organised the Volksgemeinschaft as a unied whole  nor did any
other single measure. When `total mobilisation' was eventually ordered in 1943 the
decommissioning of the index was a deliberate, politically motivated move to secure the
labour oces' control over the workforce. Contrary to the expectations of the Ministry
of the Interior, a grand-scale deployment of German women in the industries did not
take place  instead increasingly foreign, often forced labour was imported to keep up
productivity.
112. Aly and Roth, Die restlose Erfassung, 161.
113. Cf. Ruck, `Partikularismus und Mobilisierung  traditionelle und totalitäre Regionalgewalten im
Herrschaftsgefüge des NS-Regimes', 100.
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Despite its marginal role in military and economic mobilisation, the index did increase
registration rates and granted an unprecedented access to personal details to the police
and the administration in general. Both the Reichsmeldeordnung and the Volkskartei es-
tablished a coherent system of registration regulations for the population. Moreover, the
various registration measures during the National Socialist era accustomed the German
population as well as the civil servants to a comparatively strict regime of registration.
The Ministry of the Interior had invested an enormous amount of resources in the
Volkskartei. While it remained irrelevant for the economic mobilisation of the Volksge-
meinschaft, regarding the signicance of the index in processes of exclusion its impact
diered considerably.The Volkskartei and the 1939 census Ergänzungskarten can only be
considered a closely coordinated eort to identify Jews and Fremdstämmige in Germany
in order to implement a völkisch understanding of state membership.
Unity and exclusion
Jede Karteikarte bedeutet einen Menschen.114
Concluding this thesis I want to return to the wider historical movements that organised
this thesis. Concepts of modern state membership had always implied a direct  in Scott's
terms `unmediated'  relationship between the state and its members. Guided by the
notion that this relationship materialises in the records the state keeps of its members,
this thesis explored the evolution of German devices of oversight from the registration
of Prussian Jews in the course of emancipation to the identication of German Jews
via index cards as a precondition to `emancipation revoked' by deportation and often
murder. The inclusion of Jews in the `German people' was documented in a separate
register  their exclusion required a register of all Germans.
When, in 1812, Jews had to apply for Prussian citizenship, no population register
existed in which the new status could simply be recorded. To keep a record of these
state members a dedicated register was required. Dened as a police task and therefore
a competence of the municipalities, registration regulations were disparate all over Prus-
sia. And despite being widely acknowledged as the backbone of modern administration
it was never a priority to political rulers. As the survey taken during the preparations
for the test run of the Volkskartei in Potsdam has shown, even after the introduction
of the Reichsmeldeordnung, regulations were often not implemented at the local level.
The call for nationwide alignment in registration originated from the criminal police and
the `Gypsy' departments in particular. In order to track moving suspects towards the
turn of the century these departments developed the rst, initially informal, notication
system beyond state boundaries. On the brink of the First World War these systems
were institutionalised. Over the Weimar period the need for an alignment of adminis-
trative procedures  registration included  became obvious. In spite of the uncontested
Eisenach agreement, implementation was hindered by conicting interests on other elds
and the political crisis. As we have seen in this study the decisive incisions in the de-
114. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Die Volkskartei (1939) 20.
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velopment of the German registration system are not the familiar dates that organise
German history. Neither the German unication in 1871, the disruption of the First
World War and the subsequent transition to democracy nor its replacement by National
Socialism immediately aected the political agenda regarding the devices of oversight.
Particularly the last transition is marked by continuity rather than rupture. The trans-
ition of power to the National Socialists, in particular the `Gleichschaltung der Länder ',
disrupted bequeathed power balances and was expected to centralise administration.
But the new rulers had no coherent vision of the administrative structure of a future
German state so the initial momentum got lost. The Reichsmeldeordnung was instead
realised without wider administrative reform and thus left competences untouched.115
The law followed and brought an administrative logic of alignment and standardisation
that originated in the previous century to a preliminary close. The tracing of the mobile
poor and criminals required interstate cooperation in the form of a notication system.
In 1935 the heightened mobility caused by the introduction of compulsory labour and
military service had highlighted its importance for the remaining population. With the
1938 Reichsmeldeordnung these measures and techniques to guarantee seamless tracing
of individuals  initially devised to monitor the movement of aliens, the mobile poor and
criminals  were for the rst time adapted nationwide and for the entire population. The
Volkskartei that was hastily compiled at the brink of the war established a unied index
system and centralised registration on the municipal level. As early as at the onset of
the war the power balance began to shift towards the local administration in the form
of the Gauverwaltungen once again.
The development of modern statistics and census taking in particular has seen a steady
development and nationwide standardisation. Initially dependent on registration data,
statistics exerted some pressure for standardisation of registration practice. But in the
process of German unication censuses gained direct political signicance and developed
into an independent branch of administration. The rst nationwide census in 1871 used
standardised questionnaires and already understood the individual as survey unit. To-
wards the turn of the century calls for minority censuses of `Gypsies' and Jews were
raised. But the attempts made in the case of `Gypsies' foundered because of lack of
criteria. Increasingly the trend towards an ethno-cultural understanding of state mem-
bership began to show in statistics. From 1890 on, censuses asked a question on language
to determine nationality. Confessional statistics were reintroduced. The 1905 census an-
115. Only in 2013 the Bundesmeldegesetz vom 3. Mai 2013, (BGBl. I. 1084) established registration
as competence of the national administration.
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ticipated changes in the law of citizenship in 1913 by including Auslandsdeutsche who
were not necessarily German citizen, but of `German descent'. During the First World
War, statistics played a prominent role in organising the war economy and nourished the
understanding of the nation as an organic entity that was at the heart of the following
discourse on a Volksgemeinschaft. In this context, the 1916 Judenzählung stands out.
It was not conducted by the statistical oce, did not adhere to the standards that had
been established for ocial censuses and the results never were published. Still, it was
of political signicance as it soon was fused with the Dolchstoÿlegende and evolved into
a cornerstone of a völkisch interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft. Due to the post-
war turmoil and the crisis in the late 1920s the Weimar government only conducted a
single census in 1925. It was succeeded only in 1933 when the National Socialists were
already in power. And, even though it introduced new questions, it was entirely based
on work of the previous administration. While all these censuses were used to monitor
the population and adjust policy accordingly the census of 1939 diered signicantly
as it was the rst to identify individuals as members of a given group. Like previous
surveys it contained a question about language that was not used not to indicate na-
tionality this time but to identify `Fremdvölkische'. Unlike previous surveys it included
the Ergänzungskarte that allowed the identication of Jews according to the Nuremberg
denition. It thus provided the data required to implement a völkisch understanding of
state membership and alter the composition of the German population.
This brings me to the historical development in which the previous threads convene.
German concepts of state membership over the period which has been examined are
characterised by an increasingly ethno-cultural understanding of belonging. The incid-
ental introduction of the concept of citizenship on the occasion of the emancipation of
Prussian Jews in 1812 had been based on residency. A rst closure was marked by the
introduction of citizenship based on descent in 1842 in Prussia that was also adopted
in other German states. At the same time procedures for naturalisation provided de-
liberate leeway for ocials who could arbitrarily doubt a person's citizenship. Initially
devised to curb the naturalisation of Jews, this legal vagueness was increasingly applied
against those classied as `Gypsies'. It is noteworthy that the lack of coherent citizen-
ship registers was often to the disadvantage of those who lacked ocial documentation
to prove otherwise. Furthermore, the vagueness allowed law-makers to avoid providing
a denition of the targeted groups.
The German unication had no consequences for legislation that dened state mem-
bership apart from granting equal rights to member-states' citizens. But it was accom-
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panied by a new nationalism that aimed at producing cohesion by negative Integration.
The 1913 law on citizenship extended the aspects of ius sanguinis to persons born
abroad but of `German descent' and altered the concept of German state membership as
it eliminated the remains of ius soli for this group. At the onset of the war the ocial
course briey shifted towards a more inclusive understanding of belonging but it met
with growing resistance that manifested, in particular, in the Judenzählung. Over the
Weimar period legislation on citizenship remained unaltered. Only in January 1934,the
Gesetz über den Neuaufbau des Reiches transferred sovereign rights of the federal states
to the Reich, thus establishing German citizenship. While this could be understood as
the keystone in the process of German unication, the more important incision in legal
concepts of state membership is marked by the passing of the Reichsbürgergesetz in 1935
as part of the Nuremberg Laws. It divided the German population into Reichsbürger
and Staatsangehörige and constructed the Volksgemeinschaft by exclusion primarily of
German Jews and Germans of Jewish descent. As this thesis has shown, religion had
always been registered so that the identication of self-identifying Jews never presented
a diculty to the authorities. Diculties arose identifying those who had only been
dened Jewish by the Nuremberg Laws. The implementation of the negative logic of the
Nuremberg Laws was facilitated by several overlapping measures. Most importantly, the
census of 1939 identied German Jews and Germans of Jewish descent. The Volkskartei
provided the system to manage the information while its integration with the registration
system that allowed seamless tracing ensured the localisation of the individuals.
While the process of emancipation aected the entire population it was exemplied in
Prussia and elsewhere with the Jewish population. The National Socialist endeavour to
reverse emancipation aected the entire population but was executed with unmatched
rigour against Jewish Germans. Since its rst introduction, registration had provided the
means to counter the eects of emancipation and regain control over the individuals set
free in the process. Hence, the attempt to revoke emancipation fundamentally depended
on these techniques.
With the Volkskartei, the wider historical movements came to a preliminary close.
The index reects the atomisation of the individual by representing everyone with an
individual index card and simultaneously facilitated the production of a new state col-
lective. The National Socialists had promised to overcome modernity and its atomisation
by forming a new community based on an presumably `natural' ontological certainty 
a community of common blood  the Volksgemeinschaft. Faced with the impossibility
of providing a positive denition for this collective it was produced by `removing the
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margins', applying a negative logic that dened criteria for exclusion rather than for
inclusion.
Registration regulations in place for the Volkskartei specied that index cards of per-
sons who had moved or died were transferred into the reponierte Register. In accordance
with these regulations, the Volkskarteikarten of those who had been deported were re-
moved from the kurrent register. The cards that stayed in the index represented the
members of the German Volksgemeinschaft  a people from paper.
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